wserra wrote:From
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943) (quoting
Phelin v. Kenderdine, 20 Pa. 354, 363 (1853)):
If the privilege claimed by the witness be allowed, the matter is at an end. The claim of privilege and its allowance is properly no part of the evidence submitted to the jury, and no inferences whatever can be legitimately drawn by them from the legal assertion by the witness of his constitutional right. The allowance of the privilege would be a mockery of justice, if either party is to be affected injuriously by it.
Sorry to be tedious about this, but the issue raised by Bill Riley (and me) is whether it is proper for the jury to consider a 5th Amendment claim by a witness in determining the guilt of the defendant (not the witness), and the cases cited above don't really seem to be on point.
In Johnson v. United States, the defendant in a criminal case (tax evasion, by the way) took the stand in his own defense and on cross-examination claimed a 5th Amendment privilege when the prosecutor started asking about income receipts in years not at issue. The Supreme Court *affirmed* the conviction, even though the prosecution asked the jury to take the claim of the 5th Amendment into account. Briefly: The defendant was indicted for tax evasion for years 1935-1937, and there was testimony that the defendant received kickbacks in 1937, which the defendant took the stand to deny. On cross, the defendant was then asked about kickbacks in 1938 and invoked the 5th Amendment,which the judge allowed (wrongly, according to the SC). The SC opinion is hard to follow, because the court (Douglas, writing for the majority) seems to say that the jury should not have been allowed to consider the plea of the 5th Amendment, and yet the court affirmed the conviction.
The Pennsylvania case (from 1853) cited by the SC is even less relevant because it was a civil action brought by two parents for the seduction of their daughter. Two witnesses (young men) were asked if they knew whether the girl in question was "virtuous" and chose to invoke their 5th Amendment rights (apparently because of the age of the girl and their all-to-intimate knowledge of her "virtue" or the lack thereof). But my understanding is that a 5th Amendment claim *can* be considered in a civil action. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
As I said before, I think that a jury should NOT be allowed to draw inferences from a 5th Amendment claim by a non-defendant witness, but because of the 6th Amendment and not the 5th. If a 5th Amendment claim by a witness could be considered by a jury, then a jury would be able to consider the "testimony" of a witness (i.e., the assertion that the testimony might incriminate the witness) without the defendant being able to cross-examine and "confront" the witness, as guaranteed by the 6th Amendment.
But I don't think that the Johnson (or Phelin) cases establish that.