grixit wrote:Yup, that's tp for you, always bringing a rubber chicken to a gun fight.
Great point, grixit!
A sample of Richard's rubber chickens, which are the usual mindless “copy and paste” materials from other tax protester web sites:
“Because of what appears to be a lawful command on the surface, many citizens, because of their respect for what only appears to be law, are cunningly coerced into waiving their rights due to ignorance.” U.S. v. Minker, 350 US. 179, at 187.
Yeah, so what? There IS a lawful command to file federal tax returns and pay federal taxes, and there are civil and criminal penalties for willful failure to timely do so. And nothing in the Minker case says anything different. Minker is not even a federal tax case. It’s not a tax case at all. Taxes are not even discussed. The word “tax” does not even appear in the text. Great going, “Richard.” As rubber chickens go, this one isn't even very good quality rubber.
"Whatever difficulty that may be about a precise and scientific definition of "income," it imparts, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax, conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from, corporate activity." - Dole v. Mitchell Bros. Co. 247 U.S. 179 (1918)
Tax protesters love to cite this case. Over and over.
It’s “Doyle,” not “Dole.” In
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918), the taxpayer was a corporation engaged in the manufacture of lumber. In 1903, the taxpayer purchased certain timber land at a cost of about $20 per acre. As of December 31, 1908, the value of the land had increased to about $40 per acre.
The Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 was enacted on August 5, 1909, and was effective retroactively to January 1, 1909. For the years 1909 through 1912, the taxpayer filed tax returns under the 1909 Act, showing gross receipts from the sale of manufactured lumber and, in arriving at the amount of net income subject to tax under the 1909 Act, deducted an amount based on the $40 per acre value, rather than the actual cost of about $20 per acre.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued that the taxpayer should be able to deduct only an amount based on the taxpayer’s historical cost basis of $20, rather than the $40 fair market value at the time the 1909 Act became effective. (Essentially, if the taxpayer were allowed to use the $40 per acre value as its basis rather than the actual $20 historical cost basis, a portion of the taxpayer’s gain -- the increase in value from 1903 to December 31, 1908 -- would go untaxed.)
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled, however, that under the 1909 Act – which had become effective January 1, 1909 -- the taxpayer should be taxed only on the increase in value after 1908. Increases in value prior to the effective date of the statute were not to be taxed under the terms of that statute. Thus, the taxpayer was entitled to deduct, from its gross receipts from the sale of finished lumber, a basis amount computed with reference to the $40 per acre value as of December 31, 1908.
One key point missed by Richard and other tax protesters is that this case involved statutory construction, not constitutional interpretation. In this case, the Court was interpreting the 1909 statute. No issues involving the constitutional definition of income, or of income under any other tax statutes, were presented to or decided by the Court.
”Of Course, gross income and not gross receipts, is the foundation of income tax liability, for it is only earnings, profits and gains which the statute subjects to tax." - Clark v. U.S. (1954) 211 F. 2d 100.
Basically correct – but of no material benefit to tax protesters’ arguments.
"Decided cases have made the distinction between wages and income and have refused to equate the two.” - Central Illinois Publishing v. U.S. 435 U.S. 31.
Yes, and the two are NOT equated – for the simple reason that they are not “equal.” However, unfortunately for “Richardf614,” wages are still ONE KIND of income, and wages are TAXABLE. In the case of
Central Illinois Public Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that under Internal Revenue Code section 3401, an employer who reimbursed employees for lunch expenses during company travel was not required to withhold federal income tax on those reimbursements. The lunch reimbursements did not qualify as wage for purposes of the section 3401(a) withholding requirements. The Supreme Court did not rule that wages are not taxable. Another dead end for tax protesters.
And if the doctrine of Stare Decisis has any meaning at all, it requires that the people in their everyday affairs be able to rely upon the decisions of the Supreme Court and not be necessarily penalized for such reliance." - Cf. Flood v. Kuhn 407 S. 258 Wallace v. McConnell 13 Pet. 136, 10 L. ED. 95.
--Yawwnnnnn.
How have the courts responded to the question of liability?
“Keeping in mind the well settled rule that the citizen is exempt from taxation unless the same is imposed by clear and unequivocal language, and that where the construction of tax law is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid.” - Spreckles Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain 192 U.S. 397.
Note: The correct spelling and citation:
Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904). Yawnn.....
“…the taxpayer must be liable for the income tax. Tax liability is a condition precedent to the demand! Merely demanding payment, even repeatedly, does not cause liability.” -
Boethke v. Flour Engineers & Contractors 713 F 2nd 1405
The correct spelling (with a more full citation) for this case is ''Bothke v. Fluor Engineers and Constructors, Inc. and W. J. Terry'', 713 F.2d 1405, 83-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9556 (9th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded, 468 U.S. 1201, 104 S. Ct. 3566, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9617 (1984). The plaintiff's name was "Bothke" (not "Boathe" or "Boethke"). In some case reports the name of the company "Fluor" is misspelled as "Flour." There is no provision of the Internal Revenue Code, and no policy or position of the Internal Revenue Service, that says that “merely demanding payment” CREATES or CAUSES liability. Another dead end for tax protesters.
The courts have made it very clear that an American Citizen does not have to pay a tax for the mere privilege of existing, as otherwise inferred by the Internal Revenue Code. The court ruled:
“The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter to the state; but the individual’s right to live and own property are NATURAL RIGHTS for the enjoyment of which an EXCISE cannot be imposed.” - Redfield v. Fisher, 292 P. 813
Nowhere does the Internal Revenue Code impose a federal income tax for “merely existing.” And nothing in Redfield v. Fisher says otherwise. This is not even a federal tax case. It’s not a federal case at all. It’s an Oregon case, and is cited over and over and over by tax protesters all over the internet. Dead end.
"My greatest fear is that the audience will beat me to the punch line." -- David Mamet
