TP Wanted A Do-Over

[The Observer]

BASIL N. STEPHANATOS,
Plaintiff, pro se
v.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

Release Date: MAY 12, 2008


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

(Filed: May 12, 2008)

Basil N. Stephanatos, pro se.

Jennifer Dover Spriggs, U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Court of Federal Claims Section, Washington, D.C., for the Defendant. With her on the briefs were Eileen J. O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General, and David Gustafson, Of Counsel.

Lauren A. Weeman, law clerk.

OPINION

BASKIR, Judge.

The Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed on April 29, 2008, a timely motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) 59. The Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider certain legal and factual aspects of the opinion it issued on April 21, 2008, dismissing his complaint with prejudice. Stephanatos v. United States, No. 06-781T, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 115 (Apr. 21, 2008). For the reasons stated below, we DENY the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.

I. Legal Standard Governing Reconsideration

RCFC 59 governs reconsideration. The Rule authorizes the Court to grant reconsideration "to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the reasons established by the rules of common law or equity applicable as between private parties in the courts of the United States. . . ." and provides that the Court "may reopen the judgment if one has been entered, . . . amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment." RCFC 59(a)(1). The Rule specifies that the motion "shall be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." RCFC 59(b).

The decision whether to grant reconsideration lies within the sound discretion of the Court. Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Durango Assoc, Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 912 F.2d 1423, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (observing that a trial court may deny a motion for reconsideration without issuing an opinion). A party seeking reconsideration must establish that the Court committed a "manifest error of law or mistake of fact." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 1, 2 (2003). The movant is required to show that: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred; (2) previously unavailable evidence is now available; or (3) the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. See Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 298, 301 (1999). The movant will not successfully persuade the Court to grant such motion by simply reasserting arguments which were previously made and considered by the Court. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 58 Fed. Cl. at 2; Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 157, 164 (1993).

RCFC 59 is designed to bring to the Court's attention circumstances in which the legal authority relied upon has been weakened or undermined or where new evidence should be considered. As one illustration, reconsideration may be appropriate in a case where the legal authority relied upon has been reversed. However, the availability of reconsideration "'is not intended to give an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the [C]ourt.'" Fru-Con Constr. Corp., 44 Fed. Cl. at 300 (quoting Bishop v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 281, 286 (1992)).

II. Discussion

The Plaintiff challenges the Court's dismissal of his complaint on several grounds. He argues that reconsideration is proper because the Court committed several "harmful errors" handling his case. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Pl. Mot.) at 6. First, the Plaintiff contends that the Court failed to consider a "new legal theory" he presented during briefing that he is entitled to "deduct reasonable compensation from his wages." Id. Contrary to the Plaintiff's assertion, this is not a new legal argument at all. Rather, it is a variation of the Plaintiff's overall argument that his income is not subject to federal income tax because his activities constitute "not-for-profit" activities.

This argument was presented in the Plaintiff's original complaint, see Compl. at 8-11, and was considered by the Court when we ruled on the Government's motion to dismiss, see Stephanatos, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 115, at *4-11. This argument has also been considered and rejected as frivolous by the Third Circuit, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and the Tax Court. See id. at *7-11; see also Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 Fed. Appx. 785 (3d Cir. 2007); Stephanatos v. Cohen, No. 06-1310 (D. N.J. Aug. 7, 2006); Stephanatos v. Cohen, No. 05-2992 (D. N.J. Nov. 3, 2005); Stephanatos v. Comm'r, No. 04-3060, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21221 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1123 (2005); Stephanatos v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2004-151 (T.C. 2004).

Next, the Plaintiff argues that he should have been granted leave to amend his complaint. Pl. Mot. at 6-7. The Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint pursuant to RCFC 15 on November 29, 2006. He did so just eight days after filing the original complaint on November 21 and before the Government filed a responsive pleading. The Plaintiff was therefore entitled to file an amended complaint without seeking leave of the Court. See RCFC 15 ("A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. . . ."). The Court did not formally grant the Plaintiffs motion to amend. The Court does so now. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's November 29, 2006, motion to amend the complaint is hereby GRANTED nunc pro tunc to the date it was filed.

However, nothing in the Plaintiff's amended complaint warrants reconsideration of our April 21, 2008, opinion. The amended complaint streamlined the original complaint and added a claim for a refund for the 2006 tax year. However, similar to the original complaint, the amended complaint is verbose, largely unintelligible, and does not present any new legal theories or arguments. The Plaintiff's claim for a refund for the 2006 tax year -- which was not addressed by the Government -- would have to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See RCFC 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."). This claim is therefore subject to the same fate as the Plaintiffs claims for refunds for tax years 2004 and 2005. See Stephanatos, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 115, at *10-11 (dismissing the Plaintiff's claims for refunds for tax years 2004 and 2005 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, stating "[t]he Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to plead sufficient facts to prove the plausibility of his claims for relief."). The Court's failure to address the Plaintiff's claim for a refund for 2006 therefore does not constitute grounds for reconsideration. See Pl. Mot. at 21 (arguing that the Court's failure to address his claim for a refund for 2006 was harmful error warranting reconsideration).

The Plaintiff presents various other arguments for reconsideration in his motion. However, none of these arguments establishes that reconsideration is "necessary to prevent manifest injustice." Fru-Con Constr. Corp., 44 Fed. Cl. at 301. This case was nothing more than a continuation of the Plaintiff's relentless pursuit of "frivolous claims which are not only totally devoid of any merit and entirely insubstantial, but [which] have previously been adjudicated against him." Stephanatos v. Cohen, No. 06-1310 (D. N.J. Aug. 7, 2006), at 4. As the District Court accurately observed, "[the Plaintiff's] actions only serve to further clog the dockets of the federal judiciary" and his claims "appear to be made solely for the purpose of attempting to invoke [federal court] jurisdiction over what is, and always has been, [his] personal gripes with the Internal Revenue Service." Id. No further consideration of the Plaintiff's claims is warranted.

III. Conclusion

In conclusion, the Plaintiff has failed to establish any ground justifying reconsideration. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Furthermore, the Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED not to file additional pleadings with the Court of Federal Claims without first seeking leave of the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Lawrence M. Baskir
Judge

[Dezcad]

The original 04/21/08 opinion in this case, for which he sought reconsideration is here.

It gives a good factual background about how many do overs this TP really wanted and the $15K in sanctions from the Tax Court.

[Dezcad]

It appears he doesn't like state property taxes either:

http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/0 ... awsui.html

Appeals court dismisses lawsuit against school tax
by Tom Hester/The Star-Ledger
Wednesday March 19, 2008, 7:39 PM

Basil Stephanatos isn't the first person to challenge the constitutionality of New Jersey's property tax system, and lawyers who've seen it before say he won't be the last.

But his lawsuit against Wayne Township was tossed out yesterday by a state appeals court which said his arguments were without merit.

Having no children in the Wayne school system, Stephanatos said he shouldn't have to pay his school tax bill of over $6,000. Representing himself in court, he raised 19 arguments, including "that his constitutional rights are violated by financing public education through his property taxes."

Stephanatos cited the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, U.S. Supreme Court cases and the state Supreme Court's landmark Robinson vs. Cahill "thorough and efficient" education decision.

An Appellate Division panel dismissed his case in a brief decision that concluded: "We have carefully considered the record in light of (Stephanatos') arguments and we are convinced they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion."

"It does not really surprise me," said Stephanatos, adding he intends to petition the state Supreme Court to review his case.

[notorial dissent]

The problem is that he believes that HE shouldn’t have to pay INCOME / PROPERTY TAXES, not that EVERYONE shouldn’t have to pay them.

[The Observer]

An Appellate Division panel dismissed his case in a brief decision that concluded: "We have carefully considered the record in light of (Stephanatos') arguments and we are convinced they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion."

"It does not really surprise me," said Stephanatos, adding he intends to petition the state Supreme Court to review his case.

You can almost hear the synapses in his brain disonnecting from each other as he sets out to prove the validity of Einstein's definition of insanity.