Ducky wrote:jg wrote:Section 86 has a provision for withholding by paymasters that is not in section 90. The specificaton of salaries of government workers is to identify the amount from which to "deduct and withhold the aforesaid duty of three per centum". So, it is not redundant even if some of the wording is repetitive. Hendrickson draws the wrong conclusion and ignores the substantive difference of deducting and withholding on the government workers salary.
The specification of “all salaries of officers or payments to…” is not incorporated to identify the amount from which to deduct, but rather, it is clearly incorporated to identify upon what the duty is imposed, in Section 86. You cannot conflate part one, where the upon whom and what is laid out, with part two, where the “how we are going to collect this tax” is laid out.
The point still remains the same that, as posited in the two separate sections, the basis for the tax is quite different. Section 86 bases the tax on “salaries and payments to.” Section 90 bases the tax on “gains, profits, or income”
What part one and part two? It is all in one sentence (though a bit of a run on sentence):
Ducky wrote:Sec. 86
And be it further enacted, that on and after the first day of August, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, there shall be levied, collected, and paid on all salaries of officers, or payments to persons in the civil, military, naval, or other employment or service of the United States, including senators and representatives and delegates in Congress, when exceeding the rate of six hundred dollars per annum, a duty of three per centum on the excess above the said six hundred dollars; and it shall be the duty of all paymasters, and all disbursing officers, under the government of the United States, or in the employ thereof, when making any payments to officers and persons as aforesaid, or upon settling and adjusting the accounts of such officers and persons, to deduct and withhold the aforesaid duty of three per centum, and shall, at the same time, make a certificate stating the name of the officer or person from whom such deduction was made, and the amount thereof, which shall be transmitted to the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and entered as part of the internal duties;…
(underlining and bold added by jg)
Sec. 90
And be it further enacted, That there shall be levied, collected, and paid annually, upon the annual gains, profits, or income of every person residing in the United States, whether derived from any kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, salaries, or from any profession, trade, employment, or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere, or from any other source whatever, except as hereinafter mentioned, if such annual gains, profits, or income exceed the sum of six hundred dollars, and do not exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars, a duty of three per centum on the amount of such annual gains, profits, or income over and above the said sum of six hundred dollars; if said income exceeds the sum of ten thousand dollars, a duty of five per centum upon the amount thereof exceeding six hundred dollars;…
Section 86 does impose the duty on a specific set of salary and paymnets;
and it provides for paymasters to deduct and withhold the aforesaid duty. Section 90 imposes a duty on a more broad set of income items and does not include any provision for withholding.
Ducky in the earlier thread wrote:One must note that if section 90’s tax levied upon annual gains, profits or income meant the same thing as a tax on salary or payment, then section 86 would have been redundant. Had it been constitutional to levy a duty on the salary or payment to everyone residing in the United States this would have been explicitly stated that way.
I simply showed you that section 86 is not redundant because of the provision for paymasters to deduct and withhold on that particular type of income.
Ducky wrote: So if I understand your logic correctly, the basis for the tax, although clearly different, really means the same thing. The authors just wrote the two as such because they needed to specify how the tax would be collected in section 86, which was going to be different than the planned method of collection for 90. Instead of wording the basis for the tax the same in both, resisted this temptation because __fill in the blank_______________.
The simple reason that only "all salaries of officers, or payments to persons in the civil, military, naval, or other employment or service of the United States, including senators and representatives and delegates in Congress, " is used in section 86 is that those are the only payments that are subject to paymasters deducting and withholding the aforesaid duty.
Ducky wrote:I am going to go with “salaries and payments” doesn’t mean the same thing as “gains, profit and income” _______________.
And you would be correct.Salaries and payments is a subset of “gains, profit and income” Only the income items paid to the persons mentioned in section 86 are subject to deduction and withholding. That is not to say that the officers, or persons in the civil, military, naval, or other employment or service of the United States, including senators and representatives and delegates in Congress are not also subject to section 90 and the duty imposed on all of their annual gains, profits, or income for which deduction and withholding did not apply. Hence the more expansive language in section 90.
Ducky wrote: Let me ask you a fairly simple and direct question, so we don’t have to beat around the bush. Do you think that “salaries, or payments” can be interchanged with “gains, profits, or income” or vice versa?
No.
jg wrote:Although it is unclear why we are discussing a revenue act that has long been replaced with more current statutes, there is available a copy of the 1862 tax return at
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings. ... _page1.jpg
Ducky wrote: Because, technically, the concept of “income” has not changed since the inception of the “income” tax.
That statement is a bit too broad. There are certainly items of income (such as the previously mentioned illegal income) for which it was unclear as to whether that item was income that would be subject to the income tax. There are certainly Supreme Court decisions relevant to what income is subject to the income tax under the statutes.
One case that was not well received by CtC adherents is COMMISSIONER v. GLENSHAW GLASS CO., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (see
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/348/426.html for the full case and links):
It is conceded by the respondents that there is no constitutional barrier to the imposition of a tax on punitive damages. Our question is one of statutory construction: are these payments comprehended by 22 (a)?
The sweeping scope of the controverted statute is readily apparent:
"SEC. 22. GROSS INCOME.
"(a) GENERAL DEFINITION. - `Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever. . . ." (Emphasis added.) 4
This Court has frequently stated that this language was used by Congress to exert in this field "the full measure of its taxing power." Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 ; Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 ; Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 ; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 166 . Respondents contend that punitive damages, characterized as "windfalls" flowing from the culpable conduct of third parties, are not within the scope of the section. But Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature. And the Court has given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 ; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 -91. Thus, the fortuitous gain accruing to a lessor by reason of the forfeiture of a lessee's improvements on the rented property was taxed in Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 . Cf. Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 ; Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 ; United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 . Such decisions demonstrate that we cannot but ascribe content to the catchall provision of 22 (a), "gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." The importance of that phrase has been too frequently recognized since its first appearance in the Revenue Act of 1913 5 to say now that it adds nothing to the meaning of "gross income."
Nor can we accept respondent's contention that a narrower reading of 22 (a) is required by the Court's characterization of income in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 , as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined." 6 The Court was there endeavoring to determine whether the distribution of a corporate stock dividend constituted a realized gain to the shareholder, or changed "only the form, not the essence," of his capital investment. Id., at 210. It was held that the taxpayer had "received nothing out of the company's assets for his separate use and benefit." Id., at 211. The distribution, therefore, was held not a taxable event. In that context - distinguishing gain from capital - the definition served a useful purpose. But it was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions. Helvering v. Bruun, supra, at 468-469; United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., supra, at 3.
Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion. The mere fact that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as punishment for unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable income to the recipients. Respondents concede, as they must, that the recoveries are taxable to the extent that they compensate for damages actually incurred. It would be an anomaly that could not be justified in the absence of clear congressional intent to say that a recovery for actual damages is taxable but not the additional amount extracted as punishment for the same conduct which caused the injury. And we find no such evidence of intent to exempt these payments.
This decision and the identification of income that is subject to income tax as "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion" is the latest word from the Supreme Court on what, in a general sense, is "income" according to the statute.
When that description is applied to any worker's payments received in exchange for services it is clear that those payments are income that is subject to the income tax if there is not any other exclusion of that particular item in the statute (such as foreign earned income exlcusion). That is what the Supreme Court has said is the meaning of the current section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code; which is comparable to section 22 when the Glenshaw Glass case was decided.
Hendrickson imagines a difference in the taxation of the items of income mentioned in the Act of 1862; but there is no merit to his legal argument. The Revenue Act of 1862 language in sections 86 and 90 does not support the contention that the "salaries of officers, or payments to persons in the civil, military, naval, or other employment or service of the United States, including senators and representatives and delegates in Congress" is taxed differently than the salaries of officers, or payments to persons NOT in the civil, military, naval, or other employment or service of the United States; except that the former was subject to deduction nad witholding under that act and the latter was not under the Act of 1862.
“Where there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income.” — Plato