Sherry Jackson's Appeal

[LPC]

I have been reading this appeal and also some motions to dismiss on a few other cases with the same argument recently. The argument to me has nothing to do with venue, it is about subject matter jurisdiction, at least that is my opinion on the matter. Jackson is saying it's not within the power of Congress per Article 3 as given up by the States.

Article III, section 1, states that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."

The United States District Court for the northern district of Georgia is an inferior court ordained and established by Congress.

Article III, section 2, states that "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... arising under ... the Laws of the United States ...."

Jackson was indicted and tried for violating a law of the United States.

So what's the problem? Why isn't her trial on of the "Cases ... arising under ... the Laws of the United States"?

"The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed."

Jackson was tried by a jury, and was tried within the state of Georgia, which is the state within which she was alleged to have committed the crime of failing to file income tax returns.

So what's the problem?

They keep going back to the crime was committed in the "District of ....", when the argument is whether or not it was committed in the State or outside the State.

Are you saying that the northern district of Georgia is not in Georgia? From what I can see from this map, the northern district of Georgia is in Georgia.

I believe that the trial was held in Atlanta. Are you saying that Atlanta is not in Georgia? Or that the trial was not held in Atlanta? Or that Jackson was not living in Georgia when she failed to file tax returns? Or that the alleged crime was not committed in Georgia regardless of where she was living?

DOJ keeps referring back to 3231 but that section would be rendered moot by Jackson's claim if it were committed in the "State".

Now I'm even more confused. Are you saying that Georgia is not a "State"? Or that the alleged crime was not committed in Georgia?

And a federal statute does not become "moot" just because the defendant does not understand it.

[Doktor Avalanche]

For a brief moment a strange thought had crossed my mind reading the title of this thread:

Exactly what is the appeal of Sherry Peel Jackson?

Then I remembered where I was.

[ASITStands]

So many interesting thoughts and so little time to respond.

Let's start with 'Nikki's' comments:

Does the word "concurrent" mean anything to you?

Would you care to explain exactly how federal laws are somehow not applicable within any one of the 50 states, territories, possessions, or the District of Columbia?

Sherry Peel Jackson appears NOT to be arguing on appeal that federal laws are somehow not applicable within the 50 States, territories, possessions or the District of Columbia.

Instead, it appears the appeal goes to the question of venue, as in which court had original jurisdiction to hear the Trial, a district court of the United States or a court of the State of Georgia. Sherry Jackson arrives at this question by a reliance on Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3.

And, a distinction between the words, "in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed," and, "when not committed within any State," becomes important.

Dan raises the question, "Are you saying that the northern district of Georgia is not in Georgia?" while I posed the question, "In other words, in what part of the judicial district of the Northern District of Georgia did Sherry Peel Jackson commit the alleged crime?"

Let me rephrase it, as it appears Jackson is making it, "Is the judicial district of the Northern District of Georgia a place directed by Congress pursuant to Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3?"

And, if so, then, "What part of Sherry Jackson's alleged crime was committed in a place directed by Congress?" And, if none, then, "Did the courts of the State of Georgia have concurrent jurisdiction as hinted at by 'Nikki?'" I think that's Sherry Jackson's question.

Looking at the history of venue and subject-matter jurisdiction, starting from before the Constitution, we'd have to agree with Dan that cases involving "piracy" could have been tried in the courts of the several States prior to the Constitution. In like manner, cases involving violation of tax law could have been tried in the courts of the States, as well.

Prior to the Constitution, the Trial of all Crimes would have arisen by violation of State law.

So, we arrive at the question, "What judicial jurisdiction did the States grant the national government under Article III of the Constitution of the United States of America?"

Did the States grant exclusive judicial jurisdiction for the Trial of all Crimes to those places directed by Congress, or did they limit that jurisdiction to those crimes "not committed within any State?" Pursuant to Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, the answer appears obvious.

Now, we arrive at Sherry Jackson's question, "What words in Article III of the Constitution bring the controversy between the United States, or United States of America, and Sherry Peel Jackson into the judicial district of the Northern District of Georgia?"

And, U.S. Attorney Langway's response was to remain silent.

That's likely because there are no words in Article III of the Constitution that bring the controversy into the judicial district of the Northern District of Georgia. And, pointing out the language in Sec. 2, Cl. 3, "when not committed within any State," or, "such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed," only affirms Jackson's challenge.

Sherry Peel Jackson is challenging judicial jurisdiction on Constitutional grounds.

We can agree Sherry Jackson most likely did not commit the alleged crime in any place over which the United States had exclusive jurisdiction. She did not commit the alleged crime in the United States District Court at Atlanta, or in any federal enclave. Pursuant to Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, that places the Trial of all Crimes in the courts of the State of Georgia.

I have run out of time for further discussion. Later.

[The Operative]

So many interesting thoughts and so little time to respond.

Let's start with 'Nikki's' comments:

Does the word "concurrent" mean anything to you?

Would you care to explain exactly how federal laws are somehow not applicable within any one of the 50 states, territories, possessions, or the District of Columbia?

Sherry Peel Jackson appears NOT to be arguing on appeal that federal laws are somehow not applicable within the 50 States, territories, possessions or the District of Columbia.

I believe that Nikki was responding to DarkestBeforeDawn and not directly to the issue of jurisdiction raised by the appeal. I also believe that Nikki may have misunderstood DBD, but I'll leave that point alone.

Instead, it appears the appeal goes to the question of venue, as in which court had original jurisdiction to hear the Trial, a district court of the United States or a court of the State of Georgia. Sherry Jackson arrives at this question by a reliance on Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3.

And, a distinction between the words, "in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed," and, "when not committed within any State," becomes important.

[SNIP]

I have run out of time for further discussion. Later.

While I am not a lawyer, I would say your analysis is a rather distorted reading of the Constitution. I agree with Dan that Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3. does not indicate jurisdiction. What does indicate jurisdiction is Clause 1.

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, ... the Laws of the United States, ...—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;

Clause 1 establishes the jurisdiction of the federal courts and Clause 3 says the trial shall be in the state where the crime was committed. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over federal crimes. In my layman opinion, the jurisdiction issue is clear and the appeal is incorrect on that point.

[Nikki]

So many interesting thoughts and so little time to respond.

Let's start with 'Nikki's' comments:

Does the word "concurrent" mean anything to you?

Would you care to explain exactly how federal laws are somehow not applicable within any one of the 50 states, territories, possessions, or the District of Columbia?

Sherry Peel Jackson appears NOT to be arguing on appeal that federal laws are somehow not applicable within the 50 States, territories, possessions or the District of Columbia.

Instead, it appears the appeal goes to the question of venue, as in which court had original jurisdiction to hear the Trial, a district court of the United States or a court of the State of Georgia. Sherry Jackson arrives at this question by a reliance on Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3.
Just a minor point: since she was charged with violating a FEDERAL law, over which the states do not have jurisdiction, how can the trial take palce in a court which does not have the authority to hear the case?

And, a distinction between the words, "in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed," and, "when not committed within any State," becomes important.

Dan raises the question, "Are you saying that the northern district of Georgia is not in Georgia?" while I posed the question, "In other words, in what part of the judicial district of the Northern District of Georgia did Sherry Peel Jackson commit the alleged crime?"

Let me rephrase it, as it appears Jackson is making it, "Is the judicial district of the Northern District of Georgia a place directed by Congress pursuant to Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3?"

And, if so, then, "What part of Sherry Jackson's alleged crime was committed in a place directed by Congress?" And, if none, then, "Did the courts of the State of Georgia have concurrent jurisdiction as hinted at by 'Nikki?'" I think that's Sherry Jackson's question.
You have it backwards. The federal government, according to "the supreme law of the land" shares jurisdiction with the states, municipalities, counties, etc.

Looking at the history of venue and subject-matter jurisdiction, starting from before the Constitution, we'd have to agree with Dan that cases involving "piracy" could have been tried in the courts of the several States prior to the Constitution. In like manner, cases involving violation of tax law could have been tried in the courts of the States, as well.
Piracy is irrelevant.

Prior to the Constitution, the Trial of all Crimes would have arisen by violation of State law.
This is not prior to the Constitution.

So, we arrive at the question, "What judicial jurisdiction did the States grant the national government under Article III of the Constitution of the United States of America?"

Did the States grant exclusive judicial jurisdiction for the Trial of all Crimes to those places directed by Congress, or did they limit that jurisdiction to those crimes "not committed within any State?" Pursuant to Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, the answer appears obvious.

Now, we arrive at Sherry Jackson's question, "What words in Article III of the Constitution bring the controversy between the United States, or United States of America, and Sherry Peel Jackson into the judicial district of the Northern District of Georgia?"

And, U.S. Attorney Langway's response was to remain silent.

That's likely because there are no words in Article III of the Constitution that bring the controversy into the judicial district of the Northern District of Georgia. And, pointing out the language in Sec. 2, Cl. 3, "when not committed within any State," or, "such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed," only affirms Jackson's challenge.

Sherry Peel Jackson is challenging judicial jurisdiction on Constitutional grounds.

We can agree No we can't. That's YOUR allegation and belief which is 100% incorrect based on every challenge to Federal jurisdiction since the Constitution was enacted. States do not have jurisdiction with respect to federal laws unless the law specifically devolves jurisdiction to the states. Sherry Jackson most likely did not commit the alleged crime in any place over which the United States had exclusive jurisdiction. She did not commit the alleged crime in the United States District Court at Atlanta, or in any federal enclave. Federal enclaves are, again, irrelevant with respect to the case at bar. The only significance of federal enclaves is that the states ceded THEIR jurisdiction to the federal government, thereby removing concurrency. Pursuant to Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, that places the Trial of all Crimes in the courts of the State of Georgia.

I have run out of time for further discussion. Later.

You have run out of more than time. You have run out of facts and valid arguments.

[wserra]

In my layman opinion, the jurisdiction issue is clear and the appeal is incorrect on that point.

In my professional opinion too - except that I would substitute "frivolous" for "incorrect".

[LPC]

Instead, it appears the appeal goes to the question of venue, as in which court had original jurisdiction to hear the Trial, a district court of the United States or a court of the State of Georgia. Sherry Jackson arrives at this question by a reliance on Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3.

You seem to believe that the words "in the State" in Article III, Section 2, clause 3, mean "in the courts of the State."

You are mistaken.

[LPC]

Exactly what is the appeal of Sherry Peel Jackson?

The middle name is important to that question, because the appeal of Sherry Jackson is obvious:

[Cpt Banjo]

As is the appeal of Mrs. Emma Peel.

[Nikki]

Emma Peel

Major concentration required to type properly ...

[Mr. Mephistopheles]

Emma Peel

Major concentration required to type properly ...

From wikipedia:

The character was notable for a number of characteristics. She is a feminist heroine, eschewing traditional "damsel-in-distress" portrayals of women (she is rarely bested in any fight and rescues Steed as often as he rescues her.) She is a master of martial arts and a formidable fencer. A certified genius, she specializes in chemistry and other sciences. She is often seen in episodes engaging in artistic hobbies and had success in industry at the helm of the company of her late father, Sir John Knight. The name "Emma Peel" is a play on the phrase "Man Appeal" or "M. Appeal", which the production team stated was one of the required elements of the character.

(emphasis mine)

Well they certainly got that part right! I had a huge crush on Ms. Peel when I was in about the 7th grade. We could catch The Avengers in after school re-runs.

[ASITStands]

Hmm.

Well, I was going to discuss the questions, "How did the Supreme Court view exclusive jurisdiction before passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3231?" And, "Whether the Judiciary Act of 1789, or 18 U.S.C. § 3231, could supersede, or contradict, Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3?"

But I see there's no real interest [except to call the discussion frivolous].

Pursuant to Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939), and before passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3231, the Supreme Court resolved the question of jurisdiction by determining whether the United States had obtained exclusive jurisdiction over land set aside [by consent and cession] for the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park [federal enclave] and whether the State of Georgia had ceded judicial jurisdiction over the Trial of all Crimes to the United States.

Exclusive jurisdiction was acquired by the United States pursuant to Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17.

The United States had exclusive Article I jurisdiction [at Sec. 8, Cl. 17] when the land was ceded to it by the State of Georgia, but it did not have exclusive Article III jurisdiction, except by the terms of consent and cession. In other words, the State of Georgia had to have granted exclusive judicial jurisdiction to the United States for the Trial of the Crime of murder to have been in the district court of the Northern District of Georgia.

There is a difference between the jurisdictional grants of Article I and Article III.

Where Congress had exclusive legislative jurisdiction under Article I, Sec. 8, in those things granted by the States, the States retained jurisdiction in regard to the Trial of all Crimes, in Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, where those crimes had been committed within the State.

The district courts of the United States must acquire subject-matter jurisdiction, but prior to obtaining subject-matter, there's the question of venue, which is addressed in Sec. 2, Cl. 3.

And, the Supreme Court viewed the grant at Article III in light of Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17.

The Bowen Court based its decision on the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 3231, Judicial Code § 24, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41(2), which read in part:

Crimes are thus cognizable --

"When committed within or on any lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building."

The key word being “any place,” as in the Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17 exclusive grant.

That's not surprising, as the Judiciary Act of 1789 had stated, at Sec. 9:

[T]he district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the high seas ...

Parsing that in light of Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, we'd have to ask, “What crimes and offenses are cognizable under the authority of the United States, or in the Place or Places where Congress directs, except those crimes and offenses not committed within any State?”

And, again, “What crimes and offenses, committed within their respective districts, are cognizable under the authority of the United States in the Place or Places Congress directs?”

Is not the Northern District of Georgia a Place where Congress directs? And, are not the crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States the same crimes and offenses identified in Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, as not committed within the State of Georgia?

What jurisdiction was “under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts,” pursuant to Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3? Surely, neither the Judiciary Act of 1789, nor Judicial Code § 24 or 18 U.S.C. § 3231, violate Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3?

If the Supremacy Clause means anything, it means Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3 supersedes, or stated another way, 18 U.S.C. § 3231 cannot contradict Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3.

It comes down to an understanding of the difference between the State of Georgia and the judicial district of the Northern District of Georgia. The Supreme Court has answered that question in terms of "lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof," pursuant to Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17.

Sherry Peel Jackson was charged with a crime of omission, and the question could be asked, "What part of omitting the filing of a tax return was committed within the Northern District of Georgia by Sherry Jackson?" The answer is obvious, and on that basis, she appeals.

Whatever exclusion 18 U.S.C. § 3231 provides in regard to the adjudication of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, it cannot contradict Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, otherwise, it's unconstitutional.

I seek not to offend. I seek only to understand Article III Jurisdiction. - ciao

[Nikki]

Sherry Peel Jackson is (1) a citizen of the United States or she is (2) a resident alien or she is (3) a tourist.

If either 1 or 2 applies, she was required to file a federal income tax return (under penalty of prosecution) if her gross income exceeds a stated amount for each of the years at issue.

She failed to do so, thus she was in violation of federal law.

Other aspects of federal law determine where federal trials are to be held. In specific, she resided within the Northern Federal District of the State of Georgia.

Thus, that District court had both subject matter (specific legislation establishing failure to file a federal tax return as a federal crime) and personal (she resided within the defined jurisdiction of the Court) jurisdiction.

Any amount of wordsmithing or arcane legal arguments on her part, with respect to jurisdiction, are doomed to failure.

[Quixote]

Sherry Peel Jackson was charged with a crime of omission, and the question could be asked, "What part of omitting the filing of a tax return was committed within the Northern District of Georgia by Sherry Jackson?" The answer is obvious, and on that basis, she appeals.

Yes, the answer is obvious. All of it. And on that basis her appeal will fail.

I can't make out your argument at all. Did Georgia courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the case? If not, then the case was properly brought in the federal district court for the Norther District of Georgia, which had, at least, concurrent jurisdiction. If you're saying that Georgia courts did have exclusive jurisdiction, why is your entire post about exclusive federal jurisdiction?

[Nikki]

[quote="Quixote
....
why is your entire post about exclusive federal jurisdiction?[/quote]

When the only thing in your toolkit is a hammer, you have to treat everything as a nail.

[The Operative]

Hmm.

Well, I was going to discuss the questions, "How did the Supreme Court view exclusive jurisdiction before passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3231?" And, "Whether the Judiciary Act of 1789, or 18 U.S.C. § 3231, could supersede, or contradict, Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3?"

But I see there's no real interest [except to call the discussion frivolous].

Pursuant to Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939), and before passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3231, the Supreme Court resolved the question of jurisdiction by determining whether the United States had obtained exclusive jurisdiction over land set aside [by consent and cession] for the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park [federal enclave] and whether the State of Georgia had ceded judicial jurisdiction over the Trial of all Crimes to the United States.

Exclusive jurisdiction was acquired by the United States pursuant to Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17.

The United States had exclusive Article I jurisdiction [at Sec. 8, Cl. 17] when the land was ceded to it by the State of Georgia, but it did not have exclusive Article III jurisdiction, except by the terms of consent and cession. In other words, the State of Georgia had to have granted exclusive judicial jurisdiction to the United States for the Trial of the Crime of murder to have been in the district court of the Northern District of Georgia.

While that is correct, it is also in an instance where the state and the federal government both have a law against a specific act, in this case, murder. This differs from a violation of the income tax laws, since the state income tax laws are different in scope from the federal income tax laws. Since the violation is of a federal law that did not have a corresponding state law, the jurisdiction issue falls back to Article III, Sec. 2, Clause 1.

There is a difference between the jurisdictional grants of Article I and Article III.

Where Congress had exclusive legislative jurisdiction under Article I, Sec. 8, in those things granted by the States, the States retained jurisdiction in regard to the Trial of all Crimes, in Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, where those crimes had been committed within the State.

But that would only apply if the crime had been committed against the state. To the best of my knowledge, the state does not have a law making willfully failing to file tax returns a crime. While it is arguable that the state courts would be perfectly capable of hearing such a case, the federal court system holds the proper jurisdiction since the United States is a party to the case and a federal law is broken.

The district courts of the United States must acquire subject-matter jurisdiction, but prior to obtaining subject-matter, there's the question of venue, which is addressed in Sec. 2, Cl. 3.

And, the Supreme Court viewed the grant at Article III in light of Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17.

The Bowen Court based its decision on the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 3231, Judicial Code § 24, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41(2), which read in part:

Crimes are thus cognizable --

"When committed within or on any lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building."

The key word being “any place,” as in the Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17 exclusive grant.

That's not surprising, as the Judiciary Act of 1789 had stated, at Sec. 9:

[T]he district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the high seas ...

Parsing that in light of Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, we'd have to ask, “What crimes and offenses are cognizable under the authority of the United States, or in the Place or Places where Congress directs, except those crimes and offenses not committed within any State?”

For one, any crime that is strictly a federal crime. i.e. willful failure to file federal income tax returns

And, again, “What crimes and offenses, committed within their respective districts, are cognizable under the authority of the United States in the Place or Places Congress directs?”

Is not the Northern District of Georgia a Place where Congress directs? And, are not the crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States the same crimes and offenses identified in Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, as not committed within the State of Georgia?

Again, I believe you are taking a rather distorted reading of the Constitution.
The crime was committed in the State of Georgia. Since the trial was held in the State of Georgia, and it was by jury, the requirements of Article III, Sec. 2, Clause 3 are met.

What jurisdiction was “under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts,” pursuant to Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3? Surely, neither the Judiciary Act of 1789, nor Judicial Code § 24 or 18 U.S.C. § 3231, violate Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3?

If the Supremacy Clause means anything, it means Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3 supersedes, or stated another way, 18 U.S.C. § 3231 cannot contradict Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3.

Again, since the crime was a federal law, that makes it under the authority of the United States. The crime was committed within the State of Georgia and was within the area of the state considered the northern district of Georgia. The Judiciary Act, the Judicial Code and 18 U.S.C. § 3231 are all consistent.

It comes down to an understanding of the difference between the State of Georgia and the judicial district of the Northern District of Georgia. The Supreme Court has answered that question in terms of "lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof," pursuant to Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17.

"lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof," refers to parks, federal buildings, military installations, etc. However, the reach of federal law extends to the entire geographic region of the United States and not just those federal enclaves. Again, when a federal law is broken that does not have a corresponding state law, the federal courts have jurisdiction.

Sherry Peel Jackson was charged with a crime of omission, and the question could be asked, "What part of omitting the filing of a tax return was committed within the Northern District of Georgia by Sherry Jackson?" The answer is obvious, and on that basis, she appeals.

Whatever exclusion 18 U.S.C. § 3231 provides in regard to the adjudication of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, it cannot contradict Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, otherwise, it's unconstitutional.

I seek not to offend. I seek only to understand Article III Jurisdiction. - ciao

Willful failure to file is a federal law that extends to the entire geographic area of the United States. She resided in the area of the State of Georgia that was established by Congress as the northern district of Georgia with a district court established to prosecute federal crimes.

------------------------------------------
Note: I am not a lawyer, nor do I play one on T.V.
None of the ideas expressed above are actually mine. They are told to me by Luthor and Ferdinand, the five inch tall space aliens who live under my desk. In return for these ideas, I have given them permission to eat any dust bunnies they may find under there.

[Dr. Caligari]

The United States had exclusive Article I jurisdiction [at Sec. 8, Cl. 17] when the land was ceded to it by the State of Georgia, but it did not have exclusive Article III jurisdiction, except by the terms of consent and cession. In other words, the State of Georgia had to have granted exclusive judicial jurisdiction to the United States for the Trial of the Crime of murder to have been in the district court of the Northern District of Georgia.

Sure, because murder is only a state crime. Congress has no Article I power to punish murder except in federal territories. But tax evasion is a federal crime, because the power to tax is a delegated Article I power. So Congress may ban tax evasion and provide for tax evasion cases to be tried in federal courts.

[LPC]

Well, I was going to discuss the questions, "How did the Supreme Court view exclusive jurisdiction before passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3231?" And, "Whether the Judiciary Act of 1789, or 18 U.S.C. § 3231, could supersede, or contradict, Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3?"

Why can't you understand (or at least acknowledge) that your entire argument is based on the belief that the words "in the State" in Article III, section 2, clause 3, should mean "in the courts of the State"?

It is difficult to "discuss" something with someone who refuses to clearly state his position and persistently evades all attempts to clarify his position.

[LPC]

When the only thing in your toolkit is a hammer, you have to treat everything as a nail.

I prefer:

"When all you have is a hammer, everything *looks* like a nail."

[Nikki]

When the only thing in your toolkit is a hammer, you have to treat everything as a nail.

I prefer:

"When all you have is a hammer, everything *looks* like a nail."

You STILL haven't learned to think like a Sovereidiot, have you?

It doesn't matter, to them, WHAT it looks like. They still hit it with the same hammer.

Again, and again, and again ...

And they're surprised by the identical lack of result again, and again, and again ...