Determination of the scope of "gross income"

[jg]

In many cases, the tax denier agrees that the income tax is imposed on income (in at least some cases); but claims the particular amounts received by the tax denier are not included in income (or more correctly in "gross income"). There are many and various claims that all avoid the starting point in the determination of whether income is included in gross income.

Since the Constitution has provided a means for knowing with certainty the correct interpretation of the law, let us see how the Supreme Court goes about the determination of the scope of "gross income".
From COMMISSIONER v. KOWALSKI, 434 U.S. 77 (1977):

The starting point in the determination of the scope of "gross income" is the cardinal principle that Congress in creating the income tax intended "to use the full measure of its taxing power." Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940); accord, Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935); Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 166 (1925). In applying this principle to the construction of 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 12 this Court stated that "Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature[, but intended] to tax all [434 U.S. 77, 83] gains except those specifically exempted." Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 -430 (1955), citing Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949), and Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 -91 (1934). Although Congress simplified the definition of gross income in 61 of the 1954 Code, it did not intend thereby to narrow the scope of that concept. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra, at 432, and n. 11; H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A18 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 168 (1954). 13 In the absence of a specific exemption, therefore, respondent's meal-allowance payments are income within the meaning of 61 since, like the payments involved in Glenshaw Glass Co., the payments are "undeniabl[y] accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the [respondent has] complete dominion." Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra, at 431. See also Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 247 (1956); Van Rosen v. Commissioner, 17 T. C. 834, 838 (1951).

For easier reading, without the citations and footnote references:

The starting point in the determination of the scope of "gross income" is the cardinal principle that Congress in creating the income tax intended "to use the full measure of its taxing power." In applying this principle to the construction of 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 this Court stated that "Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature[, but intended] to tax all gains except those specifically exempted." Although Congress simplified the definition of gross income in 61 of the 1954 Code, it did not intend thereby to narrow the scope of that concept. In the absence of a specific exemption, therefore, respondent's meal-allowance payments are income within the meaning of 61 since, like the payments involved in Glenshaw Glass Co., the payments are "undeniabl[y] accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the [respondent has] complete dominion."

This determination of the scope of "gross income" can be applied to any payment that is received - no matter whether one is or is not an employee, or involved in a trade or business, the income is from domestic or foreign sources, or is paid in cash or paid in any other manner.

In the absence of a specific exemption any payment that is a clearly realized accession to wealth over which one has dominion is included in gross income. This is the starting point for determination of "gross income" and it is the only starting point.

[jkeeb]

That's pretty much was the law as I saw it until Murphy. The DC circuit, now, has reopened the debate on "what is income". Below is Tax Analyst's summary of arguments in Murphy.

ABSTRACT: On April 23, the District of Columbia District Court of Appeals reheard arguments in Murphy v. IRS, 05-5139, 460 F.3d 79, on the issue of whether the awards Marrita Murphy and Daniel J. Leveille received in an administrative action against Murphy's former employer can be taxed.

SUMMARY:

Published by Tax AnalystsTM

On April 23, the District of Columbia District Court of Appeals reheard arguments in Murphy v. IRS, 05-5139, 460 F.3d 79. (For prior coverage, see Doc 2006-25682 or 2006 TNT 248-1.) At issue was whether the awards Marrita Murphy and Daniel J. Leveille received in an administrative action against Murphy's former employer can be taxed.

The rehearing was the result of an unusual order by the Court of Appeals to vacate its August 2006 decision, which had incited a hail of criticism. The order also required appellant Murphy to rebrief all the issues in the case. (For the order, see Doc 2006-25647 or 2006 TNT 248-3; for the August decision, see Doc 2006-15916 or 2006 TNT 163-6.)

Counsel for the appellant David K. Colapinto began his argument by listing five reasons Murphy's award should not be taxed. He said the following factors illustrate that the IRS was wrong not to refund the taxes Murphy paid on her award: the section 61(a) definition of income; that the term "income" must have meaning; that losses, payments to restore losses, and the return of capital are not income; that payments to make a tort victim whole are not income; the government's concession that tax can only be on an accession to wealth; and the "in lieu of what" test articulated in cases such as Raytheon Products Corporation v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944).

Chief Judge Robert H. Ginsburg stopped Colapinto to ask about the government's argument under article 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress broad taxing powers, which were further broadened by the 16th Amendment. Colapinto responded that this is not an article 1 case because the only applicable statutes, sections 61 and 104, should be read to exempt compensatory awards.

Gilbert S. Rothenberg, assistant chief of the Justice Department's Tax Division, Appellate Section, argued for the IRS. Colapinto's argument has a fatal flaw because the sale of an asset does not increase wealth unless its basis is exceeded by the sale price, he said, and Murphy's basis in her health and reputation was zero.

Chief Judge Ginsburg jumped in immediately to question Rothenberg's premise. Murphy suffered a loss, he said, and whatever her basis might have been, she lost something.

Rothenberg responded that there is no deduction for personal injury, and that there is no investment in physical health. There is no loss for a poor night's sleep, he said.

Judge Rogers questioned that premise, saying that in her opinion people can invest in their health.

Rothenberg concluded by saying that section 104 is not constitutionally mandated. If Congress wanted to eliminate those exceptions, it could, he said, and no inconsistencies would be generated.

In rebuttal Colapinto repeated that gross income does not include all money received by the taxpayer. He cited a long line of cases and Solicitor's Opinion 132 for that proposition. The government's reliance on section 104 is excessive, he said, because the legislative history shows that the 1996 amendment was done as a rider to another bill and was never debated.

Congress could eliminate section 104, Colapinto said, but human life has value. The "in lieu of what" test governs, not measurements of economic gain, he said.

[Quixote]

That's pretty much was the law as I saw it until Murphy.

I don't see how the decision in Murphy conflicts with Kowalski. The question in Murphy is whether or not Murphy's damage award was an accession to wealth or compensation for a loss. If it was not an accession to wealth, then there is no gain to tax. Congress intended "to tax all gains except those specifically exempted". No gain, no tax.

[Disilloosianed]

I think you are right, Quixote, that there is no conflict as of yet, but it seems to be going down a dangerous road. To say that there is a tax basis in health and wellbeing is kissing cousins from the argument that to exchange labor for pay isn't an increase in income. I know my job is definitely lowering my basis in health and sanity.

[Imalawman]

I think you are right, Quixote, that there is no conflict as of yet, but it seems to be going down a dangerous road. To say that there is a tax basis in health and wellbeing is kissing cousins from the argument that to exchange labor for pay isn't an increase in income. I know my job is definitely lowering my basis in health and sanity.

Exactly. What frustrates me is that you don't have to go into a basis debate in order to find that her damages aren't taxable. I guess its similar to what Quixote is saying. We'll see how it comes out this time. I would really doubt that they would write the same opinion though after vacating it.

[John J. Bulten]

Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature[, but intended] to tax all gains except those specifically exempted.

Hi jg. I know this is your favorite, but the USSC cannot intend "all gains" to be unqualified. All gains unqualified would include gains over which Congress has no jurisdiction, such as Transylvanian gains. In that case the USSC would be saying Congress intended to tax gains over which it had no jurisdiction, which is a fundamental contradiction.

The qualifier is the word "taxable", which in fact performs the exact narrowing needed, limiting the gains only to those Congress has jurisdiction over. Congress intended to tax all taxable gains.

The quote, which was 2 sentences in the original Glenshaw Glass, clearly has the intent first that Congress did not limit taxable receipts from taxation, and second that Congress intended to tax all taxable gains.

Of course, this is the basic principle of construction of the highly important Banana versus Fruit case.

Banana versus Fruit: Words having universal scope ... will be taken, as a matter of course, to mean only everyone subject to such legislation. 213 US 347, 357

[Brian Rookard]

The qualifier is the word "taxable", which in fact performs the exact narrowing needed, limiting the gains only to those Congress has jurisdiction over. Congress intended to tax all taxable gains.

Ok, well they have jurisdiction over you since you live in the United States, and also since you are a citizen of the United States. Your income is taxable.

See how easy that was.

[Cpt Banjo]

Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature[, but intended] to tax all gains except those specifically exempted.

Hi jg. I know this is your favorite, but the USSC cannot intend "all gains" to be unqualified.

Of course, the Court never said any such thing, as its use of the phrase "except those specifically exempted" demonstrates.

All gains unqualified would include gains over which Congress has no jurisdiction, such as Transylvanian gains. In that case the USSC would be saying Congress intended to tax gains over which it had no jurisdiction, which is a fundamental contradiction.

Congress has chosen not to tax Transylvanian gains. See Section 872. Now, if you're asking whether Congress could constitutionally tax Transylvanian gains, I'd be interested in seeing any authority you might have that says it can't. Heck, I'd even be interested in seeing any authority that limits the federal taxing power on the basis of "jurisdiction". And please don't cite the tired old Drexel Furniture case, which dealt with a peanalty and not a bona fide tax.

[wserra]

Y'know, Bulten, I think you've got something there. So when the New York Legislature says

A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:

1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person;

it can't intend that every person who intentionally kills someone else is guilty of murder 2. All killings unqualified would include killings over which New York has no jurisdiction, such as Transylvanian killings. In that case the statute would be saying New York intended to penalize killings over which it had no jurisdiction, which is a fundamental contradiction.

This analysis, of course, lets us make up what the New York legislature actually meant, as opposed to what it said. I personally think that the qualifying word is "person", as in "cause the death of another person". What it must have meant is that the statute doesn't cover the killings of those who make truly moronic legal arguments, since such killings, after all, would be a public service.

[John J. Bulten]

What Brian actually says is absolutely correct, as often, but what he seems to say is not what he actually says or means, as usual. Reading Rookard without CtC (or other accurate understanding of legal terms) is performed at your own risk.

Drexel is tired. It's much simpler. In Banjo's world, Congress has the power to choose whether or not to tax Transylvanian gains. In the real world, the Romanian government, which has such jurisdiction, is in fact such an authority that says that Congress can't tax Transylvanian gains. Granted that there are laws which exempt Transylvanian gains (out of respect for the Romanians). This cuts both ways and so does not prove anything. If Congress has that power, it considerately waived it; if it doesn't, it was compelled to waive it.

Serra, you have a great example, until you make up an illegal definition of person, which is still great for the humor angle at least. Of course not every person who intentionally kills someone else is guilty of NEW YORK Murder Two, which is the subject of that law. Of course NY has no jurisdiction over killings in Transylvania and it's a contradiction to say they would intend to assert such. You didn't take Banana versus Fruit very seriously. It's a real romp. Here it is again:

Banana versus Fruit: Words having universal scope ... will be taken, as a matter of course, to mean only everyone subject to such legislation. 213 US 347, 357

[jg]

What Brian actually says is absolutely correct, as often, but what he seems to say is not what he actually says or means, as usual. Reading Rookard without CtC (or other accurate understanding of legal terms) is performed at your own risk.

Cutting to the chase, please show us the legal basis for the claim that the pay for work that you receive is not included in "gross income" using the starting point described by the Supremes for the determination, if there is any basis for the claim.

Thanks.

[Cpt Banjo]

In Banjo's world, Congress has the power to choose whether or not to tax Transylvanian gains.

Since I never made such a claim, Bulten is playing straw man. It may be that Congress has no such power -- but what I asked to see was any legal authority that says so, and Bulten failed to provide any.

In the real world, the Romanian government, which has such jurisdiction, is in fact such an authority that says that Congress can't tax Transylvanian gains.

Absent a treaty, the Romanian government has no authority to tell Congress what it can and cannot tax, since Congress' taxing power comes from the Constitution and not from Bucharest.

I notice that Bulten provided no authority for his "jurisdiction" argument. Gee, could that be because there isn't any?

[John J. Bulten]

JG, I'll give you my starting point in exchange for yours, plus plenty of fodder. All I have to do to meet your question (if I chose to take the burden of proof) is to prove that my pay for work is not within "the full measure of its taxing power". This involves arguments similar to those jkeeb observed upheld in the Murphy case posted here elsewhere, but I'm not going into them right now (because I determined at this forum not to spend so much time rushing to do research which I can do at leisure).

Since the burden of proof is NOT on me, I work in RELIANCE upon the hundred court decisions I've reviewed which touch areas close to my position statement, but never do touch it itself. I have looked through statutes, regulations, and cases looking for the statement that taxing unprivileged pay for work (to state the nature of my pay briefly) is within Congress's taxing authority, and I don't see it. I've looked at the cases which are right now flashing before your eyes like those blotchy spots you can't get rid of, and they don't say it. (I've seen one case you probably won't guess which might seem to say it, though there is a potential escape clause within the case and there is also the greater potential the one judge erred in disagreeing with the hundred.) So if no government lawyers ever think to contradict my position and get upheld (by other government lawyers), I reasonably conclude it is not likely to be contradicted in the future.

Now I happen to have my position statement handy, so it is below submitted to scrutiny and heckling. I hope you'd agree with the facts of the statement (if not, I'm interested). Aside from a side issue which I will mention next, it is sufficient proof to me that 1) my facts are correct; 2) the code is correct; which derives the position 3) my conclusion is correct that my unprivileged pay for work is not statutory "wages". Would you agree with the facts in my position statement? And you agree with the code? So why would you disagree and say my pay is statutory "wages"?

Aside, one might (sorry, I meant "you will") object that even if I prove my pay is not 3401(a) or 3121(a) wages, that does not prove my pay is not compensation or income. That is granted, but there I pass the burden wholly on the party who claims it is compensation or income by some other route than 3401(a) or 3121(a). Again, reviewing a hundred cases, no such claim has ever been advanced, so I reasonably conclude it is not likely to be advanced. What you've posted so far proves tautologically that Congress meant to tax everything they can tax without answering what they can tax. I respond by showing, more on point, that, regardless of what they CAN tax, they HAVE NOT taxed me under the clause I am accused of being taxed under.

Sorry I didn't meet your proof standards, I wasn't trying to.

Paragraph 1. "Eligible Years" means 1999-2002 and "Worker" means John J Bulten.

Paragraph 2. During Eligible Years, Worker did not receive any remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an Eligible Employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash - the term "Eligible Employee" includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the Federal Territory, a Federal District, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term "Eligible Employee" also includes an officer of a corporation. - The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this Statement shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined. - When used in this Statement, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof - The term "Federal District" shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this Statement - The term "Federal Territory" when used in a geographical sense includes only the Federal Districts and the District of Columbia (and when not used in a geographical sense has the same meaning as "United States" in the Internal Revenue Code).

Paragraph 3. During Eligible Years, Worker did not receive any remuneration for - any service, of whatever nature, performed (A) by an employee for the person employing him, irrespective of the citizenship or residence of either, (i) within the Federal Territory, or (ii) on or in connection with an American vessel or American aircraft under a contract of service which is entered into within the Federal Territory or during the performance of which and while the employee is employed on the vessel or aircraft it touches at a port in the Federal Territory, if the employee is employed on and in connection with such vessel or aircraft when outside the Federal Territory, or (B) outside the Federal Territory by a citizen or resident of the Federal Territory as an employee for an - employer which is - (1) the Federal Territory or any instrumentality thereof, (2) an individual who is a resident of the Federal Territory, (3) a partnership, if two-thirds or more of the partners are residents of the Federal Territory, (4) a trust, if all of the trustees are residents of the Federal Territory, or (5) a corporation organized under the laws of the Federal Territory or of any Federal District - , or (C) if it is service, regardless of where or by whom performed, which is designated as employment or recognized as equivalent to employment under an agreement entered into under section 233 of the Social Security Act - , including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash - For purposes of this Paragraph - The term "Federal District" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa - The term "Federal Territory" when used in a geographical sense includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

Paragraph 4. Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have examined this information, including accompanying documents, and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the information contains all the relevant facts relating to the request for technical advice, and such facts are Correct, True, and Complete.

[Quixote]

Everyone seems to have assumed that Congress has not taxed Transylvanian gains. The capital gains provisions of the US/Romanian tax treaty would be moot if the US could not tax Romanian, including Transylvanian, gains and vice versa.

[John J. Bulten]

Banjo, yours is too easy. You said "Congress has chosen not to tax Transylvanian gains." I inferred your statement to include "Congress has the power to choose whether or not to tax Transylvanian gains."

I do not throw strawmen, and in the real world where very slight inferences do not justify a charge of throwing strawmen, I stand acquitted.

There is an overretentive escape for you. But if you're going to be so nitpicky as to argue that you did not imply Congress has power to choose when you say Congress chose, or else that you may have implied Congress has power to choose not to tax but that you did not imply Congress has power to choose to tax, or something even more convoluted, then why are you here?

Then you say you asked for "legal authority" when what you asked for was "authority", the latter of which I humorously obliged. But aside from noting the nitpick, I will make no further light of it.

In the real world, the Constitution does not have power over Transylvania, so it cannot confer such power on Congress. It binds we the people of the United States, IIRC.

Did you fall for my trap and think that Banana versus Fruit was not a real decision? I'd give you a link but you'd need a findlaw account. Just use the cite. It is, as I've implied twice, sufficient legal authority for the commonsense proposition that Congress cannot tax outside its jurisdiction, which is to say that it can't do what it can't do. Romania, in contrast, is sufficient -diplomatic- and -military- authority to tell Congress what it can and cannot tax within Romania's jurisdiction, with or without treaty, unless you're advocating war on Transylvania.

[Quixote]

All I have to do to meet your question (if I chose to take the burden of proof) is to prove that my pay for work is not within "the full measure of its taxing power".

Which you cannot do.

This involves arguments similar to those jkeeb observed upheld in the Murphy case posted here elsewhere ...

I see you haven't read the Murphy decision. No surprise there.

Since the burden of proof is NOT on me, I work in RELIANCE upon the hundred court decisions I've reviewed which touch areas close to my position statement, but never do touch it itself.

But, as you later concede, your position statement is irrelevant to the question of whether or not pay for work is income.

Sorry I didn't meet your proof standards, I wasn't trying to.

Spoken like a true troll.

[jg]

Aside, one might (sorry, I meant "you will") object that even if I prove my pay is not 3401(a) or 3121(a) wages, that does not prove my pay is not compensation or income. That is granted, but there I pass the burden wholly on the party who claims it is compensation or income by some other route than 3401(a) or 3121(a). Again, reviewing a hundred cases, no such claim has ever been advanced, so I reasonably conclude it is not likely to be advanced.

Wrong, as seen in the quote in the first post of this thread.

What you've posted so far proves tautologically that Congress meant to tax everything they can tax without answering what they can tax. I respond by showing, more on point, that, regardless of what they CAN tax, they HAVE NOT taxed me under the clause I am accused of being taxed under.

Wrong again, what I posted is what the Supremes use to determine what is included in "gross income" which is, by definition, that which is subject to the income tax. The determination is (again): "In the absence of a specific exemption, payments are income within the meaning of section 61 when, like the payments involved in Glenshaw Glass Co., the payments are "undeniabl[y] accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the [respondent has] complete dominion." "

Please provide the basis for claiming your work for pay is not included in "gross income" or the specific exemption that applies to those payments.

The particular item of income that was paid, or whether the item of income is or is not subject to any other tax, is not relevant to this first step of determination if the payment is being included in "gross income" under section 61 of subtitle A of Title 26.

Please cut to the chase:
Why is your work for pay (since it increases your wealth, when realized and is under your dominion) not included in "gross income" of section 61?

[Cpt Banjo]

Let’s see. Bulten takes a civil case between two American corporations that involved the issue of whether a federal antitrust statute (that criminalized certain anticompetitive acts and that provided a civil cause of action to private parties) should be interpreted to apply extraterritorially, even though the acts complained of were not only not illegal where they were allegedly committed but were the acts of a sovereign foreign government. He then suggests that the case has some applicability to Congress’ taxing power under the Constitution. Can you say non sequitur?

The case has been restricted to its facts by the Supreme Court itself, and it doesn’t stand for the proposition that antitrust laws (or any other laws for that matter) have no extraterritorial effect:

”Viewed in its context, the holding in that case was not meant to confer blanket immunity on trade practices which radiate unlawful consequences here, merely because they were initiated or consummated outside the territorial limits of the United States. Unlawful effects in this country, absent in the posture of the Banana case before us, are often decisive…” Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952)

Here's what a treatise on international taxation has to say about this area of the law:

...readers familiar with American legal mores will not be surprised to find that numerous taxpayers, domestic and foreign, whose positions left them no other issue, have sought refuge in the Constitution. The most commonly asserted grounds are failures of jurisdiction, confiscation, unequal treatment, denials of due process of law, or a medley of such grounds. At some point, virtually every clause of the Constitution has been invoked as invalidating some aspect of taxation. [footnote omitted] Seekers of constitutional protection from the U.S. taxing power have not, however, enjoyed the same success as other aspirants. The courts have taken the taxing power, within its stated limits, at face value and have almost invariably upheld the validity of federal taxes, whether imposed on United States persons or foreign persons. n20 For example, in Ross v. Commissioner n21 a U.S. tax was upheld on dividends received by a Canadian citizen from a Canadian corporation, which itself had no activity in the United States (but did receive U.S.-source dividends from U.S. corporations). The tax statute in force at the time (which has since been changed on this point) clearly purported to reach Ross's income, and the court found this to be dispositive. The result in Ross was severe because several layers of tax were imposed on the same income as it moved from entity to entity, but the decision in the case was both inevitable and sound.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n20 Most constitutional attacks on the extraterritorial exercise of the U.S. taxing power have been brought in the name of due process of law, suggesting that it is somehow "unreasonable" for the United States to tax persons having no connection with it. See Lord Forres v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 154 (1932). It is not immediately obvious what "due process of law" has to do with this. That phrase, however, despite its thoroughly procedural ring, has been invoked to question the substantive content of numerous laws. And while it is not currently fashionable to invoke "due process" to scrutinize the substantive content of economic laws, there is no more reason from first principles to deny its application there than to laws affecting the autonomy or integrity of the person. See also P12.5.


n21 44 B.T.A. 1 (1941).


- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

...The power of the United States to tax incomes would be, if exercised to the fullest, essentially coextensive with the power to collect. The widely used term "jurisdiction" to tax is somewhat misleading in this regard. Probably the only requirement of any "connection" with the United States as a prerequisite of taxation is whatever is necessary to give the U.S. Treasury something to take hold of. Once past this threshold, the short answer to the objection that the United States "cannot" impose a tax is that it just did.

This does not mean that foreign persons must live in constant fear of overreaching by the U.S. tax authorities. The United States imposes income taxes well within the limits of its power, having discovered, like most other countries, that it does not pay to bear too heavily on the economic activity of those who are free to take it elsewhere. In a broad sense this is true even of the taxation of U.S. citizens, but is more obvious in the treatment of foreign persons, who will find it relatively easier, once bitten, not to offer the U.S. Treasury a second chance. In its actual operation, U.S. taxation of foreigners balances thirst for revenues with the goal of fostering the highest levels of economic activity within the United States. Taxation is frequently thought a deterrent to the latter, and the U.S. tax laws accordingly do not extend U.S. taxation to anywhere near its theoretical reach.

Joseph Isenbergh, International Taxation, (Aspen 2003)

[LPC]

I really don't have the time or the patience to wade through Bulten's blatherings, posturings, and weaselings.

Will someone please post an alert if he ever writes anything directly relevant to why he thinks his own income is not subject to tax?

[Nikki]

I really don't have the time or the patience to wade through Bulten's blatherings, posturings, and weaselings.

Will someone please post an alert if he ever writes anything directly relevant to why he thinks his own income is not subject to tax?

You'll know because you'll see Satan shopping for ice skates.