http://www.losthorizons.com/phpBB/viewt ... 3069#13069mutter, I'm sorry to see you go. Here are two passages (from http://www.losthorizons.com/Intro.pdf) that might be helpful for you to keep in mind going forward. The first is a reminder that if "it" ends up functioning as a capitation, but isn't apportioned, that's all you need to know-- your inability to understand or explain any of the mechanics doesn't matter (nor does your inability to understand that all those "mechanics" apply within the context of what DOES qualify as "income", but not outside that context). The second provides some elaboration on the "includes" subject, among which are two Supreme Court rulings explicitly addressing the definition of that term given in 7701.
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It is clear that were the distinct, limited meaning of the “income” subject to the “income tax” to be eroded away, and the tax come to be applied to “all that comes in”, it would be, and would have to be recognized as, a direct tax. The United States Supreme Court explicitly declares in its 1916 ruling in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (while specifically considering the limited meaning and effect of the 16th Amendment) that should the tax ever come to exceed its proper boundaries,
“the duty would arise to disregard form [that is, any pretense by which it is made to appear that the tax is being confined to its proper limits when it is not, such as by creatively construing the meaning of “income”, or the use of any pretense, scheme or construction by which non-specialized revenue or activities are made to appear otherwise so as to be subjected to the tax] and consider substance alone [that is, what the tax is actually falling upon as a practical reality], and hence subject the tax to the regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as an excise would not apply to it.”
But, of course, the law behind the tax never has exceeded those boundaries. This is why the very tax which is administered today, on the same activities as it is administered today-- without apportionment, and without any pretense of relief of the apportionment rule, such as is inaccurately ascribed to the 16th Amendment-- could be laid and administered for decades BEFORE that amendment, and yet be upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
Just as an aside: The federal income tax is not now required, nor has it ever been required, to be imposed only on "activities" in order to be valid. The realization of income is an event. Many or even most realizations of income do occur in connection with an "activity", but there is not now nor has there ever been a legal requirement that there be an "activity."
Further, there is not now, nor has there ever been, a legal requirement that there be an activity in connection with the exercise of a privilege, federal or otherwise.
After the Sixteenth Amendment, no federal income tax is required to be apportioned -- regardless of whether that tax is deemed, or ever was deemed, to be direct or indirect. Period. Now, go found a federal court case where someone argued otherwise, and the court ruled in that person's favor on that issue. You will not find one.
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By virtue of the statutory definition of “includes”-- another custom legal term deployed in the definitions of both of “wages” and “trade or business”, both of these terms are amenable to a narrowly limited potential expansion to cover other things of the same class (legal character) as those already listed, but nothing else. “Includes” is defined within the law as follows:
“Includes and including: The terms ''includes'' and ''including'' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.” Rev. Act of 1938 §901(b) (Codified at 26 USC 7701(c).)
The Department of the Treasury has helpfully clarified the meaning of this provision with the following regulatory language:
“The terms “includes and including” do not exclude things not enumerated which are in the same general class;”
as has the United States Supreme Court:
“[T]he verb "includes" imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition. This view finds support in § 2(b) of the Act, which reads: "The terms 'includes' and 'including,' when used in a definition contained in this title, shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.”” Helvering v Morgan’s, Inc, 293 U.S. 121, 126 fn. 1 (1934)
The court refers to and re-iterates this observation in Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co. 314 U.S. 95, 62 S.Ct. 1 U.S. 1941:
“ncluding... ...connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle."
(That is, the enumerated items in a definition in which “including” [or "includes", which is identically defined by statute] is deployed "illustrate"-- identify, and thus establish-- the contours of the class which the defined term represents-- the "general principle" of its application).
The principle involved in the “includes” mechanism is largely that described by the Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. (93-404), 513 US 561 (1995):
“…a word is known by the company it keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a sociis). This rule we rely upon to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving “unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.”
clarified by these additional, related rulings:
“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
OK, Pete, this where you really start drifting off into the weeds.
“It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term.” U.S. Supreme Court, Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987)
Here, Pete is trying to lead us to the false conclusion that this verbiage can support Pete's own intepretation of "includes and including" in section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code. Pete is wrong.
“Of course, statutory definitions of terms used therein prevail over colloquial meanings. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 95, 55 S.Ct. 333, 336.” Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945)
These rulings reflect the fact that when a word becomes a statutorily-defined “term”, its original meaning is entirely stripped away and replaced with the new meaning described. This is why, for instance, the definition of “employee” we looked at earlier explicitly lists “federal employees”. Despite being identically spelled and pronounced, the statutorily-defined-term doesn’t mean “those who work for a boss”, or whatever dictionary definition you might find for the common word ‘employee’ ( by virtue of which federal employees would have been encompassed without being listed); nor does it mean “those who work for a boss” plus the listed persons or types. It only means what the enumerated list describes-- in this case, persons working for the federal government or its subordinate entities, under a variety of different labels and in a variety of different capacities. The meaning of the defined-term “employee” can be considered to cover others not listed who also work for the federal government or its subordinate entities (and who are thus within the class established by the existing list), but no one else. These rules and statutory practices play an important role in preventing the “income” tax from functioning as a de facto capitation.
(bolding added).
No, they don't Pete.
Go look for a federal court case where a taxpayer argued that his private-sector, non-federally privileged compensation for personal services (or however you want to word it, Pete) was not properly the subject of the U.S. federal income tax, and the court ruled that this argument was correct.
This is not Pete's finest hour, but in fairness we should point out that Pete has a lot of worries right now.
) Dozens of people come to me for council on every concevible area of humanity. I literally understand how the universe works on a quantum level, so my capasity to understand can NOT be questioned.