“[T]he earnings of the human brain and hand when unaided by capital ... are commonly dealt with as income in legislation.” Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).John J. Bulten wrote:Sorry, Quixote, I generally ignore cites with "TC" in them. Intended to ask for USSC cites.
“There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them....” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930).
“[The tax code] is broad enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected.” C.I.R. v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
“[T]he premise that personal injury awards cannot involve gain is obviously false, since they often are intended in significant part to compensate for the loss of gain, e. g., lost wages. (Citation omitted.) Since the gain would have been income, surely at least that part of a personal injury award that replaces it must also be income.” Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 375 (1987), (plurality opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, White, and Stevens, Blackmun concurring in the result; footnote omitted).
“The definition of gross income under the Internal Revenue Code sweeps broadly. Section 61(a), 26 U.S.C. 61(a), provides that ‘gross income means all income from whatever source derived,’ subject only to the exclusions specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Code. As this Court has recognized, Congress intended, through 61(a) and its statutory precursors, to exert ‘the full measure of its taxing power,’ [citation omitted] and to bring within the definition of income any ‘accessio[n] to wealth.’ [citation omitted] There is no dispute that the settlement awards in this case [for ‘back wages’ to compensate for sex discrimination] would constitute gross income within the reach of 61(a).” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992). Later in the same opinion, the Supreme Court referred to the compensation received by the taxpayers as “the wages properly due them - wages that, if paid in the ordinary course, would have been fully taxable.” 504 U.S. at 241.
"It [I.R.C. section 104, relating to compensation for personal injuries] also excludes from taxation those damages that substitute, say, for lost wages, which would have been taxed had the victim earned them.” O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996).
“Even if we suppose that strike benefits are made to compensate in a sense for the loss of wages, the principle of payments in compensation does not apply because the thing compensated for, the wages, had they been received, would have been included in gross income.” United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 311 (1960).
Sure. What Quixote cited:Do you have the 8th circuit context by any chance?
“One’s gain, ergo his ‘income,’ from the sale of his labor is the entire amount received therefor without any reduction for what he spends to satisfy his human needs.”
Reading v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 730, 734 (1978), affirmed 614 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1980).
The 8th Circuit opinion affirming Reading was per curiam, and the complete text is as follows:
Some others:8th Circuit wrote:Taxpayers brought suit in the United States Tax Court contesting a deficiency assessment of $ 2,486.45 by the Commissioner for their 1975 federal income taxes. The deficiency assessment was based on (1) disallowing itemized deductions for housing, food, schooling, and medical expenses (not otherwise deductible under 26 U.S.C. § 213) because those expenses were nondeductible personal living or family expenses under 26 U.S.C. § 262, and (2) a determination that taxpayers owed self-employment taxes on reported self-employment income.
Before the Tax Court taxpayers conceded the disallowed deductions were for living or family expenses but they contended that by disallowing deductions for those expenses Congress exceeded its authority to lay and collect income taxes under the sixteenth amendment, and that income means the gain or income received less the expense of living. The Tax Court rejected taxpayers' claims but redetermined the deficiency to be $ 2,468.29, and on January 25, 1979, the court entered its decision for the Commissioner. On appeal taxpayers claim they had no income, for income tax purposes, and on appeal they challenge the constitutionality of the tax laws and Tax Court.
The standard of review on appeal from the Tax Court is whether the Tax Court's factual findings are clearly erroneous (See, e.g., Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291, 80 S. Ct. 1190, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1218 (1960); Smith v. Commissioner, 608 F.2d 321, at 322 (8th Cir. 1979)), and "findings of fact are not clearly erroneous unless the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Smith v. Commissioner, supra, 608 F.2d 321, at 323, Citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746, Rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 869, 68 S. Ct. 788, 92 L. Ed. 1147 (1948). The findings of the Tax Court that all except $ 78 [footnote 1] of the claimed deductions were not expressly deductible under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and were thus nondeductible under 26 U.S.C. § 262, and that taxpayers owed self-employment income tax on their self-employment income was correct. We have repeatedly rejected attacks on the constitutionality of the income tax laws; taxpayers claims of unconstitutionality are without merit, and thus we adopt the well reasoned decision of the Tax Court filed August 21, 1978.
It is so ordered.
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1. $ 78 for state gasoline tax was not otherwise claimed as a deduction and was held by the Tax Court to be deductible as a tax expense under 26 U.S.C. § 164.
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“[W]e have [repeatedly] held that wages are within the definition of income under the Internal Revenue Code and the Sixteenth Amendment, and are subject to taxation.” Denison v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 241, 242 (8th Cir.1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1069, 105 S.Ct. 2149, 85 L.Ed.2d 505 (1985); United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. den. 510 U.S. 1193 (1994).
"Taxpayers' argument that compensation for labor is not constitutionally subject to the federal income tax is without merit. There is no constitutional impediment to levying an income tax on compensation for a taxpayer's labors. [Citations omitted] Furthermore, § 61(a) of the Code defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived, including . . . compensation for services." In sum, the sixteenth amendment authorizes the imposition of a tax upon income without apportionment among the states, and under the statute, the term "income" includes the compensation a taxpayer receives in return for services rendered. Taxpayers' argument that wages received for services are not taxable as income is clearly frivolous." Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 264, 265 (8th Cir. 1982), affirming T.C. Memo. 1981-506.