CTC, dead men walking MASS PANIC PRECICTED

[Famspear]

After having been called on his "jack squat" comment, Weston White has now backpedalled . . .

Now, Weston has responded again, with:

** UPDATE: Additionally by "jack squat" I presumed those intelligent enough to read and comprehend those words would fully understand everything I was actually referring to. However, upon reading several posts at Quackloss, to my astonishment... that was not the case at all... hence the need for further clarification. Thank you carry on.

http://www.losthorizons.com/phpBB/viewtopic.php?t=1397

No, sorry Weston. That doesn't work, either.

And yes, it's too bad that everything you write on the internet is subject to this kind of scrutiny, isn't it Weston? Not only are the federal law enforcement authorities apparently recording what you write, but you have to be careful not to offend your host, the Pontificating PeterMeister. Walk that fine line, buddy.......

[ASITStands]

All the IRM is saying is that IRS lawyers are going to act the same way as other lawyers. Losing one case in one district, or even one circuit, does not necessarily mean you give up. You rethink your position, and you think about it, but you're not "bound" by one court opinion that you think reached the wrong result.

Hendrickson doesn't have this kind of problem, because no judge has ever agreed with him, or ever will, and that's because what he's peddling his crap. Whether one district court or 50 district courts have ruled against him, and whether one district or 11 districts have ruled against him, isn't the issue, because he's still peddling gibberish and crap.

Hendrickson had no good reason to ignore the rulings of the courts that had ruled against his theories, and a jury has no good reason to believe that he made a mistake, because his theories not only conflict with all precedent since 1796 but also make no sense.

Here's where I think Hendrickson's Cheek defense breaks down.

If a litigant brings a reasoned and colorable argument for a change in law, or a change in policy based on a reading of the law, they review cases in each district and circuit, rethink their position and make their argument. However, Hendrickson doesn't have that luxury.

His reading of law conflicts with all precedents since the beginning.

And, he knows it! There's where his "good-faith belief" breaks down. He cannot argue he has no knowledge of a legal duty, or a "good-faith misunderstanding," as Cheek suggests:

In this case, if Cheek asserted that he truly believed that the Internal Revenue Code did not purport to treat wages as income, and the jury believed him, the Government would not have carried its burden to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem such a belief. Of course, in deciding whether to credit Cheek's good-faith belief claim, the jury would be free to consider any admissible evidence from any source showing that Cheek was aware of his duty to file a return and to treat wages as income, including evidence showing his awareness of the relevant provisions of the Code or regulations, of court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, or of any contents of the personal income tax return forms and accompanying instructions that made it plain that wages should be returned as income.

Of course, I understand that Hendrickson believes the money he received from his work-related activity does not reach the definition of "wages," but he has no case on point.

And, that's where it breaks down. That's where the jury will not believe him.

[SteveSy]

. . . . Lower courts are not even the final say on the law when it concerns the public in general. It's binding on the taxpayer that's in front of them and that's it. It's very clear by the IRS's own manual they do not consider lower court decisions the law for everyone.

Sorry Steve, but you're wrong. The rulings of the lower courts are indeed binding on EVERYONE -- but within certain limitations. The Internal Revenue Manual is also wrong -- or least the language of the Manual is misleading. Whether the IRS "considers" itself to be bound by lower court decisions, the IRS is indeed bound by lower court decisions to some extent.

But not legally bound. You're using two different concepts "legal" as in lawfully and "in practice". While it's true everyone who comes before that a court that ruled a certain way will in all likelihood receive the same decision. However, the court nor the new party to a new case is legally bound to the precedent established in previous cases. The IRM is correct, the lower court's do not make law they simply set precedent within their district. No one is legally bound to the previous decision except the parties involved for that case.

If, for the sake of argument, we assume that tons and tons of District Court and Tax Court decisions have ruled that "compensation for personal services rendered in private sector, non-federally privileged activity is includible in section 61 gross income (and therefore is taxable)" -- which is a legal issue, not a factual one -- and literally no federal court has ever ruled the other way, then a defendant in a federal criminal tax case who is AWARE of those lower court decisions may well be found by a jury to have the mens rea element of willfulness. Under the Cheek doctrine and other federal cases, willfulness connotes the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. Even assuming for the sake of argument that no appeals court has ever ruled on the issue at hand, that WOULD NOT BE A DEFENSE. The mere fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue WOULD NOT BE A DEFENSE.

No its evidence that you were notified that you were in all likelihood wrong. It's not final, lower courts get overturned all the time. There might even be conflict between the courts concerning the law, it happens all the time. You can not make the claims you're making while these things happen all the time. Sure, you can claim that an argument it's sure loser but you can't claim because an interpretation of a law was provided by the court everyone must accept that interpretation as the law. If the later were true precedent from one lower court would be binding on all courts, no one is above the law, including the courts.

Willfulness is the voluntary, intentional violation of a KNOWN LEGAL DUTY, not the voluntary, intentional violation of a "known legal duty but only if there is a higher court ruling of which the defendant is aware."

True, but you have to know personally its a legal duty. Just because someone provided you interpretation of a law doesn't mean that is law. However, it is evidence that you were notified that there is another interpretation out there that disagrees with you. The more evidence presented showing this means its more likely you're wrong and its highly unlikely you didn't know it.

btw, you can't be right. Cheek was notified by the IRS, lawyers and previous decisions that he was wrong. He also lost a civil case against the IRS. If you were right the Supreme Court couldn't have reversed the lower court. The district court used the same flawed logic you are using. Basically that it was impossible he did not know he had a know legal duty therefore he was bared from arguing he did not know.

You, like the district court, are stating as a matter of law Pete is willful. You're wrong, you can't be right, Cheek would have lost. Cheek's case and the evidence against him was very similar to Pete's current situation. I'm no lawyer but what you're saying obviously doesn't jive with what transpired in Cheek.

[Famspear]

But not legally bound. You're using two different concepts "legal" as in lawfully and "in practice". While it's true everyone who comes before that a court that ruled a certain way will in all likelihood receive the same decision. However, the court nor the new party to a new case is legally bound to the precedent established in previous cases.

Yes, they are legally bound. You are wrong. I am right.

The IRM is correct, the lower court's do not make law they simply set precedent within their district. No one is legally bound to the previous decision except the parties involved for that case.

No, go back and read my post. You are confusing precedent with res judicata and collateral estoppel.

. . . . .but you have to know personally its a legal duty. Just because someone provided you interpretation of a law doesn't mean that is law. However, it is evidence that you were notified that there is another interpretation out there that disagrees with you. The more evidence presented showing this means its more likely you're wrong.

Yes, and as the Supreme Court stated in Cheek, you will bear the risk of being wrong. Knowledge means awareness. And you will not have, as a valid defense, the argument that "an intepretation by a court is not the law." A court interpretation that is a RULING, a HOLDING in a case, is authoritative (unlike my personal interpretation or your personal interpretation).

btw, you can't be right. Cheek was notified by the IRS, lawyers and previous decisions that he was wrong. He also lost a civil case against the IRS. If you were right the Supreme Court couldn't have reversed the lower court.

Wrong again. I think you're confused on the procedural history of the case, and on the significance of that history. We've been through this already. The district court made an erroneous jury instruction. Cheek was convicted in a trial where that erroneous instruction was made. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed. The case went back to trial. Cheek was re-tried, and was convicted again, this time with the court using the correct instruction as provided by the Supreme Court. Cheek appealed again. He lost on the appeal. And he went to the Supreme Court a second time, and the Supreme Court declined to even hear his case. His second conviction stood.

You, like the district court, are stating as a matter of law Pete is willful. You're wrong, you can't be right, Cheek would have lost.

Cheek did lose. I am right.

Cheek's case and the evidence against him was very similar to Pete's current situation.

Not good for Pete!

I'm no lawyer but what you're saying obviously doesn't jive with what transpired in Cheek.

You're no lawyer, and your understanding of what happened in the case does not jive with what happened. What I am saying is correct.

[SteveSy]

But not legally bound. You're using two different concepts "legal" as in lawfully and "in practice". While it's true everyone who comes before that a court that ruled a certain way will in all likelihood receive the same decision. However, the court nor the new party to a new case is legally bound to the precedent established in previous cases.

Yes, they are legally bound. You are wrong. I am right.

Well then how can one court rule differently than another, after all they're legally bound by a decision made by the other court. I can only assume you think courts are above the law.

btw, you can't be right. Cheek was notified by the IRS, lawyers and previous decisions that he was wrong. He also lost a civil case against the IRS. If you were right the Supreme Court couldn't have reversed the lower court.

Wrong again. I think you're confused on the procedural history of the case, and on the significance of that history. We've been through this already. The district court made an erroneous jury instruction. Cheek was convicted in a trial where that erroneous instruction was made. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed. The case went back to trial. Cheek was re-tried, and was convicted again, this time with the court using the correct instruction as provided by the Supreme Court. Cheek appealed again. He lost on the appeal. And he went to the Supreme Court a second time, and the Supreme Court declined to even hear his case. His second conviction stood.

The erroneous instruction provided to the jury is exactly in substance what you're claiming should happen. I don't think you've read the case and the oral arguments which expose the history and details upon which Cheek sought his appeal.

The court held that Cheek's belief concerning the law wasn't objectively reasonable. It was one of those arguments that have been knocked down many times before. You are saying, like the court, that he is willful because he knew his argument was wrong. He knew it because another court and the IRS ruled it was wrong and he was aware of that information. The court simply gave the jury the instruction that his argument must be objectively reasonable. Obviously if he was aware of previous decisions and given information stating he was wrong it wasn't an objectively reasonable argument. This is basically what you're doing. You've taken away the personal belief aspect and made it a matter of being objectively reasonable.

[Prof]

. . . . Lower courts are not even the final say on the law when it concerns the public in general. It's binding on the taxpayer that's in front of them and that's it. It's very clear by the IRS's own manual they do not consider lower court decisions the law for everyone.

Sorry Steve, but you're wrong. The rulings of the lower courts are indeed binding on EVERYONE -- but within certain limitations. The Internal Revenue Manual is also wrong -- or least the language of the Manual is misleading. Whether the IRS "considers" itself to be bound by lower court decisions, the IRS is indeed bound by lower court decisions to some extent.

But not legally bound. You're using two different concepts "legal" as in lawfully and "in practice". While it's true everyone who comes before that a court that ruled a certain way will in all likelihood receive the same decision. However, the court nor the new party to a new case is legally bound to the precedent established in previous cases. The IRM is correct, the lower court's do not make law they simply set precedent within their district. No one is legally bound to the previous decision except the parties involved for that case.

If, for the sake of argument, we assume that tons and tons of District Court and Tax Court decisions have ruled that "compensation for personal services rendered in private sector, non-federally privileged activity is includible in section 61 gross income (and therefore is taxable)" -- which is a legal issue, not a factual one -- and literally no federal court has ever ruled the other way, then a defendant in a federal criminal tax case who is AWARE of those lower court decisions may well be found by a jury to have the mens rea element of willfulness. Under the Cheek doctrine and other federal cases, willfulness connotes the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. Even assuming for the sake of argument that no appeals court has ever ruled on the issue at hand, that WOULD NOT BE A DEFENSE. The mere fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue WOULD NOT BE A DEFENSE.

No its evidence that you were notified that you were in all likelihood wrong. It's not final, lower courts get overturned all the time. There might even be conflict between the courts concerning the law, it happens all the time. You can not make the claims you're making while these things happen all the time. Sure, you can claim that an argument it's sure loser but you can't claim because an interpretation of a law was provided by the court everyone must accept that interpretation as the law. If the later were true precedent from one lower court would be binding on all courts, no one is above the law, including the courts.

Willfulness is the voluntary, intentional violation of a KNOWN LEGAL DUTY, not the voluntary, intentional violation of a "known legal duty but only if there is a higher court ruling of which the defendant is aware."

True, but you have to know personally its a legal duty. Just because someone provided you interpretation of a law doesn't mean that is law. However, it is evidence that you were notified that there is another interpretation out there that disagrees with you. The more evidence presented showing this means its more likely you're wrong.

btw, you can't be right. Cheek was notified by the IRS, lawyers and previous decisions that he was wrong. He also lost a civil case against the IRS. If you were right the Supreme Court couldn't have reversed the lower court. The district court used the same flawed logic you are using. Basically that it was impossible he did not know he had a know legal duty therefore he was bared from arguing he did not know.

You, like the district court, are stating as a matter of law Pete is willful. You're wrong, you can't be right, Cheek would have lost. Cheek's case and the evidence against him was very similar to Pete's current situation. I'm no lawyer but what you're saying obviously doesn't jive with what transpired in Cheek.

You forget: Cheek lost on retrial.

Here is what the Supremes said about Cheek's first trial:

We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals' requirement that a claimed good-faith belief must be objectively reasonable if it is to be considered as possibly negating the Government's evidence purporting to show a defendant's awareness of the legal duty at issue. Knowledge and belief are characteristically questions for the factfinder, in this case the jury. Characterizing a particular belief as not objectively reasonable transforms the inquiry into a legal one and would prevent the jury from considering it.

It was therefore error to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of Cheek's understanding that, within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not a person required to file a return or to pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable income, as incredible as such misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might be. Of course, the more unreasonable the asserted*204 beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple **612 disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge.

However, the Court also said:

It was therefore error to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of Cheek's understanding that, within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not a person required to file a return or to pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable income, as incredible as such misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might be. Of course, the more unreasonable the asserted*204 beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple **612 disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge.

On remand, before the Circuit sent the matter back for a new trial, the Circuit said:

Tax evaders who persist in their frivolous beliefs (such as that wages are not income or that Federal Reserve Notes do *1209 not constitute cash or income) should not be encouraged by the Court's decision in Cheek or our decision today. While a defendant is now permitted to argue that his failure to file tax returns and to pay his income taxes was the result of his incredible misunderstanding of the tax law's applicability, the government remains free to present evidence demonstrating that he knew what the law required but simply chose to disregard those duties. See id. (noting possible evidence government can utilize to demonstrate Cheek's awareness of his legal duties). And, as the Court noted, “the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge.” Id. at 611-12.

See Cheek v. U. S., 931 F.2d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir., 1991).

At his new trial, Cheek lost again, and appealed again to the Circuit, which said:

Other questions are presented, but essentially Cheek argues that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on a reliance of counsel defense, that his due process rights were violated when a heavier penalty was imposed after his second trial, and that his indictment should have been dismissed because the time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act were not observed. We will affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects.

See 3 F.3d 1057, 1059-60 (7th Cir. 1993). This time around, Cert. was denied.

[SteveSy]

I didn't say he won Prof. I'm simply saying Pete like any other should have a fair trial. He should be allowed to show how he arrived at his belief using the evidence which helped him form it.

He is not automatically willful becuase the IRS told him he was wrong and because he read a few court cases that disagreed with him. His argument doesn't have to be objectively reasonable. He just has to prove to the jury that he honestly and sincerely believes he had no duty at the time he filed. Obviously the government is free to show whatever they want to expose that there's no way Pete could believe what he's saying.

Pete would probably lose even if we were allowed to present everything including the law and the jury was to find if he was sincere in his belief or not. I'm not arguing differently.

However, if Pete truly and honestly believes he's right and the jury believes he believed it he should not be convicted of the willfulness charge. He will still be on the hook for all penalties, interest and unpaid taxes.

Famspear is trying to say he's barred from claiming he wasn't willful, his personal beliefs are moot. Which is exactly what the seventh tried to do and was overturned.

[jg]

... His argument doesn't have to be objectively reasonable. He just has to prove to the jury that he honestly and sincerely believes he had no duty at the time he filed. ...
However, if Pete truly and honestly believes he's right and the jury believes he believed it he should not be convicted of the willfulness charge. ...

No, that is not the standard.
The government must show that he violated a known legal duty and that the violation was not due to a good faith misunderstanding.
Hendrickson (like Rose) can honestly and sincerely believe that he is right and the government is wrong and still knowingly violate his legal duty.
Disagreement is not a defense; but a good faith misunderstanding or a lack of knowledge of what the law requires are defenses.
This has been explained many times to you. The sincerity or honesty of his disageement is not at issue.

[Famspear]

Well then how can one court rule differently than another, after all they're legally bound by a decision made by the other court. I can only assume you think courts are above the law.

The erroneous instruction provided to the jury is exactly in substance what you're claiming should happen. I don't think you've read the case and the oral arguments which expose the history and details upon which Cheek sought his appeal.

No, that's incorrect. And I have studied the Cheek case. You are the one who's confused. Go back and read what I just wrote.

The court held that Cheek's belief concerning the law wasn't objectively reasonable.

No, that's incorrect. The TRIAL COURT erroneously instructed the jury, IN THE FIRST TRIAL, that Cheek's belief had to be objectively reasonable. That's the part that the Supreme Court reversed.

You are saying, like the court, that he is willful because he knew his argument was wrong.

That's a separate issue. You are still confusing two separate issues.

He knew it because another court and the IRS ruled it was wrong and he was aware of that information. The court simply gave the jury the instruction that his argument must be objectively reasonable. Obviously if he was aware of previous decisions and given information stating he was wrong it wasn't an objectively reasonable argument. This is basically what you're doing. You've taken away the personal belief aspect and made it a matter of being objectively reasonable.

No, you are still confusing two separate issues, Steve.

He is not automatically willful becuase the IRS told him he was wrong and because he read a few court cases that disagreed with him.

Now you're getting it, Steve.

His argument doesn't have to be objectively reasonable.

That's correct. Now you're getting it.

He just has to prove to the jury that he honestly and sincerely believes he had no duty at the time he filed. Obviously the government is free to show whatever they want to expose that there's no way Pete could believe what he's saying.

That's correct. You see, you were confusing two different concepts.

[ASITStands]

If, for the sake of argument, we assume that tons and tons of District Court and Tax Court decisions have ruled that "compensation for personal services rendered in private sector, non-federally privileged activity is includible in section 61 gross income (and therefore is taxable)" -- which is a legal issue, not a factual one -- and literally no federal court has ever ruled the other way, then a defendant in a federal criminal tax case who is AWARE of those lower court decisions may well be found by a jury to have the mens rea element of willfulness. Under the Cheek doctrine and other federal cases, willfulness connotes the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. Even assuming for the sake of argument that no appeals court has ever ruled on the issue at hand, that WOULD NOT BE A DEFENSE. The mere fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue WOULD NOT BE A DEFENSE.

No its evidence that you were notified that you were in all likelihood wrong. It's not final, lower courts get overturned all the time. There might even be conflict between the courts concerning the law, it happens all the time. You can not make the claims you're making while these things happen all the time. Sure, you can claim that an argument it's sure loser but you can't claim because an interpretation of a law was provided by the court everyone must accept that interpretation as the law. If the later were true precedent from one lower court would be binding on all courts, no one is above the law, including the courts.

Bingo! By and through lower court decisions, particularly, the one in his own case, Pete Hendrickson was notified that in all likelihood he was wrong, and that's his problem.

He cannot say, "I had no knowledge of the law." He cannot say, "I did not know of my legal duty." He cannot say, "I did not willfully choose to ignore the lower court's decision."

And, that's how his Cheek defense breaks down.

[SteveSy]

... His argument doesn't have to be objectively reasonable. He just has to prove to the jury that he honestly and sincerely believes he had no duty at the time he filed. ...
However, if Pete truly and honestly believes he's right and the jury believes he believed it he should not be convicted of the willfulness charge. ...

No, that is not the standard.
The government must show that he violated a known legal duty and that the violation was not due to a good faith misunderstanding.
Hendrickson (like Rose) can honestly and sincerely believe that he is right and the government is wrong and still knowingly violate his legal duty.

That simply doesn't make sense.

Read carefully....

In this case, if Cheek asserted that he truly believed that the Internal Revenue Code did not purport to treat wages as income, and the jury believed him, the Government would not have carried its burden to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem such a belief
...
but it is not contrary to common sense, let alone impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant of his duty based on an irrational belief that he has no duty, and forbidding the jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision.

Notice the word "belief". You have to personally believe you had a duty before it's a known legal duty. Common sense...

Read the first paragraph many times over if necessary. Nothing in that paragraph even hints at the fact that knowledge of court case saying your wrong negates willfulness. Willfulness is entirely based on personal belief. Knowledge of a court cases is evidence to show that your belief may have become more and more difficult to maintain, that's it.

Your intentional effort to ignore what they said is not a fault of mine.

Disagreement is not a defense; but a good faith misunderstanding or a lack of knowledge of what the law requires are defenses.

Disagreement with the law. A court opinion or IRS letter is not the law, its an interpretation of it.

This has been explained many times to you. The sincerity or honesty of his disageement is not at issue.

Whatever....as soon as you show me where in the constitution a courts opinion is law your explanation will hold weight....until then I'll consider it nothing but your personal illogical opinion.

A disagreement with an interpretation of law is not disagreeing with the law no matter how you look at it. Try looking up the word interpretation before proceeding, you'll save some bandwidth.

[Famspear]

Steve wrote:

Nothing in that paragraph even hints at the fact that knowledge of court case saying your wrong negates willfulness. Willfulness is entirely based on personal belief.

You obviously have not read the Cheek case or (as is more likely) you do not remember what you read, Steve.

From the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cheek:

[ . . . ] in deciding whether to credit [defendant John] Cheek's good-faith belief claim, the jury would be free to consider any admissible evidence from any source showing that Cheek was aware of his duty to file a return and to treat wages as income, including evidence showing his awareness of the relevant provisions of '''the Code or regulations, of court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, or of any contents of the personal income tax return forms and accompanying instructions''' that made it plain that wages should be returned as income.

--Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991).

Steve, you are still confusing the objective-subjective issue with the issue of what kind of actual belief qualifies as a Cheek good faith belief. A mere actual belief may or may not qualify. And it's up to the jury to decide that. The Court in Cheek ruled that a SUBJECTIVE actual belief can qualify (meaning that the belief does not have to be OBJECTIVELY rational or reasonable to qualify).

But that does not change the point that the jury is still free to consider the defendant's AWARENESS of the existence of COURT DECISIONS REJECTING THE DEFENDANT'S INTERPRETATION -- in determining whether the defendant's actual belief is qualifies as a Cheek good faith belief -- in other words, as a belief that negates willfulness.

You're still confusing two separate issues.

[Famspear]

Steve wrote:

A disagreement with an interpretation of law is not disagreeing with the law no matter how you look at it. Try looking up the word interpretation before proceeding, you'll save some bandwidth.

Wrong. See the decision of the Supreme Court in Cheek. Re-read the text I just quoted.

Under the Cheek doctrine, a disagreement with a COURT'S interpretation of the law CAN INDEED BE DEEMED BY THE JURY TO BE A MERE disagreement with the law if the defendant is AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THAT COURT INTERPRETATION!!!! The point is that it's up to the jury to make that call.

[ASITStands]

It's true that no one can truly know what's in a person's mind or heart. It's true that no one can truly know what a person believes about a law, their reading of it or their intent.

However, that does not take away the likelihood the government can show by evidence that Pete Hendrickson actually knew of a legal duty but willfully ignored it. And, it's likely they'll be able to show his awareness by lower court decisions and his extensive writings.

On the other hand, I agree he should be able to show how he arrived at his conclusions.

It will be the jury's duty to weigh the evidence one way or another, but looking at it from a distance, it's fairly obvious he had knowledge and notice he was likely wrong in his reading.

The fact he disagreed with the government's reading of law is no a defense.

[SteveSy]

[ . . . ] in deciding whether to credit [defendant John] Cheek's good-faith belief claim, the jury would be free to consider any admissible evidence from any source

Yes, it's the jury, not the judge that makes the consideration whether his belief is valid or not. The JURY determines willfulness not the judge. The defendant should, per the cheek doctrine, get to show whatever it is that helped him form his belief, including the law, that might negate willfulness. Willfulness is not a matter of law, seeing a court case proving you wrong does not automatically mean you're legally willful for violating said law.

Under the Cheek doctrine, a disagreement with a COURT'S interpretation of the law CAN INDEED BE DEEMED BY THE JURY TO BE A MERE disagreement with the law if the defendant is AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THAT COURT INTERPRETATION!!!! The point is that it's up to the jury to make that call.

"Can" being the key word it's not automatic as jg and you have implied. The jury "can" also think the system is wholly corrupt and it's likely the defendant could honestly believe he's right. It's something for the jury to determine. It's entirely based on the defendant's belief and whether or not in spite of all the evidence saying he's wrong he could still maintain that belief. Court cases are just something saying he's wrong, it isn't an automatic disagreement with the law if he chose not to believe them.

[Paul]

As usual, stevesy skips right past the words that the argument is really about -- admissible evidence. And what is admissible is a matter of law, which means that is decided by whom, stevesy? Quit ignoring the words that go against you -- we've seen it too many times.

[SteveSy]

As usual, stevesy skips right past the words that the argument is really about -- admissible evidence. And what is admissible is a matter of law, which means that is decided by whom, stevesy? Quit ignoring the words that go against you -- we've seen it too many times.

According to cheek it's everything upon which he formed his belief, that would include the law itself if that was a big part of it. Ignoring what words Paul, you pulling that out of your rear end? Show me these words I'm ignoring.

It would of course be proper to exclude evidence having no relevance or probative value with respect to willfulness, but it is not contrary to common sense, let alone impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant of his duty based on an irrational belief that he has no duty, and forbidding the jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision.

Obviously if your entire belief is based on what's written in the law itself, that is "evidence that might negate willfulness". It certainly has relevance and probative value.

[Famspear]

Yes, it's the jury, not the judge that makes the consideration whether his belief is valid or not. The JURY determines willfulness not the judge.

That's correct. The defendant's actual subjective belief is what counts in determining whether that actual subjective belief is also a "Cheek good faith belief".

The defendant should, per the cheek doctrine, get to show whatever it is that helped him form his belief, including the law, that might negate willfulness.

Incorrect. The defendant is still subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Not everything that is "relevant" is admissible in a court of law.

Willfulness is not a matter of law .....

That's correct. Determination of willfulness is a question of fact, to be decided by the jury.

........seeing a court case proving you wrong does not automatically mean you're legally willful for violating said law.

And that's correct, too -- with the key word here being "automatically." However, as the Supreme Court indicated in Cheek, "seeing a court case proving you wrong" MIGHT be evidence enough to convict you -- provided the jury makes that finding.

"Can" being the key word it's not automatic as jg and you have implied. The jury "can" also think the system is wholly corrupt and it's likely the defendant could honestly believe he's right. It's something for the jury to determine.

Agreed.

It's entirely based on the defendant's belief and whether or not in spite of all the evidence saying he's wrong he could still maintain that belief.

Agreed, but with the proviso that it's up to the jury to make that determination.

Court cases are just something saying he's wrong, it isn't an automatic disagreement with the law if he chose not to believe them.

I agree with most of that, Steve. No, court cases are not "just something saying he's wrong." Court cases (or more specifically, the holdings of the courts, the actual decisions) are definitive on what the law actually is. But I agree with you, Steve, that it is not an "automatic" disagreement with the law if the defendant chose not to "believe" the courts. Again, it's up to the jury to decide.

The part where you go off into the weeds is to argue that the defendant legally gets to "show whatever it is that helped him form his belief, including the law, that might negate willfulness". That's not precisely accurate. You still have the Rules of Evidence.

EDIT: Background on the limitations of what the defendant can introduce as evidence regarding the law (from something I wrote in another web site):

One contention by some tax protesters is that a taxpayer should be allowed to introduce, as evidence in court, copies of statutes, cases or other materials to persuade the jury about what the law is. Courts do not allow this procedure as, under the U.S. legal system, the general rule is that neither side in a civil or criminal case is allowed to try to prove to the jury what the law is. For example, in a murder case the defendant is not allowed to persuade the jury that there is no law against murder, or to try to interpret the law for the jury. Likewise, the prosecution is not allowed to do this. Instead, disagreements about what the law is are argued by both sides before the judge, who then makes a ruling. Prior to jury deliberations, the judge instructs the jury on the law. Examples of applications of this rule in tax controversies are United States v. Ambort, 405 F.3d 1109, 2005-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,453 (10th Cir. 2005). United States v. Bonneau, 970 F.2d 929, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,385 (1st Cir. 1992) and United States v. Willie, 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,409 (10th Cir. 1991).

In a criminal tax case, a taxpayer is allowed to present evidence about what the taxpayer ''believes'' the law to be -- but only in an attempt to demonstrate, as a defense, an actual good faith belief based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law, not to try to persuade the jury that the taxpayer's belief is correct. An actual good faith belief based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law negates the "willfulness" requirement for a conviction (see Cheek v. United States).

Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, copies of the statutes, court cases, etc., might be excluded, even though the defendant wants to get them admitted.

[Famspear]

According to cheek it's everything upon which he formed his belief, that would include the law itself if that was a big part of it. Ignoring what words Paul, you pulling that out of your rear end? Show me these words I'm ignoring.

Here is Steve's quote from the case:

It would of course be proper to exclude evidence having no relevance or probative value with respect to willfulness, but it is not contrary to common sense, let alone impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant of his duty based on an irrational belief that he has no duty, and forbidding the jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision.

Show you the words you're ignoring, Steve? OK.

Here is the actual quote:

We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals' requirement that a claimed good-faith belief must be objectively reasonable if it is to be considered as possibly negating the Government's evidence purporting to show a defendant's awareness of the legal duty at issue. Knowledge and belief are characteristically questions for the factfinder, in this case the jury. Characterizing a particular belief as not objectively reasonable transforms the inquiry into a legal one, and would prevent the jury from considering it. It would of course be proper to exclude evidence having no relevance or probative value with respect to willfulness, but it is not contrary to common sense, let alone impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant of his duty based on an irrational belief that he has no duty, and forbidding the jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision.

You left out the two important sentences that preceded the material you quoted.

Excluding evidence that is probative of (relevant with respect to) the issue of willfulness is indeed a serious matter -- but courts do it all the time in federal tax cases. Again, the Supreme Court in Cheek did not rule that EVERY PIECE OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT WANTS TO ADMIT will be admissible.

What the Court ruled was that the trial court's instruction -- that the defendant's belief had to be OBJECTIVELY reasonable to negate willfulness -- was incorrect.

In other words, Steve, your implication seems to be that the Supreme Court RULED that forbidding the jury to consider ANY relevant evidence whatsoever that the defendant wants to admit that might negate willfulness would violate the Sixth Amendment. The Court did not say that, and the Court did not so rule. We still have the Federal Rules of Evidence, and Mr. John Cheek neither argued what you seem to imply he argued about the effect of the Federal Rules of Evidence (e.g., Rule 403) on a trial court jury instruction, nor did the Court make any such ruling on that.

Having said that, it's my personal observation that federal judges in these criminal tax cases where the Cheek defense is presented probably do have to carefully walk a fine line between protecting the rights of the defendant, and preventing the defendant from usurping the function of the court or confusing the jury.

[Famspear]

Essentially, Steve, in addition to ignoring the words of the sentences that came before your quoted material, you also silently inserted words that weren't there. Not intentional on your part, I don't think. It's easy to "read things into" things. We all do it from time to time.