"State" is not only DC

[jg]

Just one example of the improper use of "includes":
From http://www.quatloos.com/taxscams/protcase/albers.htm

The Schroeders also contend that they are non-resident aliens to the United States, seeming to interpret "United States" to mean only where the seat of its government is located, the District of Columbia. In their capacity as non-resident aliens, they assert they can have no tax liability to the United States. This position is wholly without merit.

The term "United States" is properly used to "designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends." Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 671- 72 (1945), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984). The sovereignty of the United States extends to all the states comprising it. The United States was not created as a separate state, but as a union of other states, of which each state is a part. Thus, at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, the "United States" referred to those states which had adopted the Constitution. Since that time, the United States has come to comprise the fifty states. Furthermore, when the United States came into being it was not limited to the territory of the District of Columbia, which did not yet even exist. Instead, the authority of the United States under the Constitution was understood to extend to the area bounded by the "several states."

In addition, the United States Constitution provides for the admission of new states to the Union. See UNITED STATES CONST. art. IV, s 3, cl. 1. Pursuant to that provision, Nebraska voluntarily entered into the Union created by the United States Constitution on March 1, 1867. The Proclamation of Admission of the State reads: [The people of Nebraska] now ask for admission into the Union: Therefore, Be it enacted by the Senate and House of representatives of the United States of America, in Congress Assembled, That the constitution and State government which the people of Nebraska have formed for themselves be, and the same is hereby, accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and that the said State of Nebraska shall be, and is hereby, declared to be one of the United States of America; and is hereby admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatsoever. Thus, Nebraska entered the Union by actions initiated by its own citizens. As a state of the Union, it became subject to the laws of the United States, including those enacted by Congress dealing with the generation of revenue for the federal government. [FN7] Nebraska is a part of the whole of the United States of America, rather than a state foreign to it. Thus, its residents are residents of the United States. Therefore, the Schroeders are not "non-resident aliens" to the United States. As a result, any claim that they are not subject to its revenue laws because they are non-resident aliens is without merit. [FN8]

The Schroeders also argue that Nebraska is not a State as that term is defined by 26 U.S.C. ss 3121(e)(1) and (2), 4612(a)(4)(A), and 7701(a)(9) and (10) (Supp. V 1993). The Schroeders in citing these statutes in support of their position, fail to note that these sections define the stated term (for example, "State" and "United States" in s 3121(e)(1) & (2), "United States" in s 4612(a)(4)(A), and "United States" and "State" in s 7701(a)(9) & (10)) to be more inclusive than might otherwise be commonly understood. This result is easily reached by reading each of these sections in conjunction with the definition of "includes" and "including" contained in 26 U.S.C. s 7701(c) (Supp. V 1993), which states that "[t]he terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title [i.e. Title 26] shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." Thus, the definition of "State" clearly includes what would be its commonly understood meaning--one of the fifty states forming a part of the entire United States. So, too, with "United States," the Union and sovereign entity produced through the association of all of the states. The Schroeders attempt, unsuccessfully, to remove from the language of the statutes its commonly understood meaning and usage. [FN9] The Schroeders base their claim to the disputed funds on the existence of a private, oral contract for the lease of real estate entered into between themselves and the plaintiff, Tregan Albers. They contend that under the Nebraska State Constitution no law may be made that impairs the obligation of such a contract. NEB. CONST., art. I, s 16. The implication to be drawn is that the federal statutes pursuant to which the United States makes its claim to the disputed funds are laws impairing the obligation of contract. [FN10] However, the Schroeders have failed to understand that the United States Constitution and laws enacted pursuant to it, as well as treaties, are the supreme law of the land, notwithstanding any state law or constitution to the contrary. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. Thus, they cannot base their argument on Nebraska law. Furthermore, the impairment provision of the Nebraska Constitution is understood to provide that state laws in force at the time when the contract is entered into form a part of the contract, see Norris v. Tower, 102 Neb. 434 (1918), and that the state may not subsequently enact laws that retroactively alter obligations under an existing contract, see Travelers Inc. Co. v. Ohler, 119 Neb. 121 (1929). Thus, the federal tax laws remain unaffected by the application of this state constitution provision.

[jg]

Another ruling that addresses whether the IRC applies withn a state is Betz v. United States, KTC 1998-37 (Ct.Cl. 1998)

B. State Citizens are Bound by the Laws of the United States, Including the I.R.C.

Along with his claim that he is not a United States citizen, plaintiff further claims that federal laws, including the I.R.C., do not apply to citizens of the state of Washington, a "compact state." Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to "lay and collect Taxes." U.S. CONST., ART. 1, section 8. The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified on February 25, 1913, modified the requirements in Article 1, sections 2 and 9, that taxes had to be apportioned and in proportion to the census. U.S. CONST., ART. 1, sections 2, 9, AMEND. XVI. The Sixteenth Amendment provides that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST., AMEND. XVI. Despite plaintiff's and numerous other tax protesters' contention that the Sixteenth Amendment was never ratified, courts have long recognized the Sixteenth Amendment's ratification and validity. See United States v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 46-47 (2nd Cir. 1988) (holding that "[t]he validity of that process and of the resulting constitutional amendment are no longer open questions"). Pursuant to the authority vested in Congress under the Sixteenth Amendment to impose a direct income tax on citizens and residents of the United States comprised of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, Congress enacted Title 26 of the United States Code, the Internal Revenue Code.

The I.R.C. applies to "United States persons," defined as "citizen[s] or resident[s] of the United States." 26 U.S.C. section 7701(a)(30)(A) (1994). In addition, the I.R.C.'s definition of "United States" includes "the States and the District of Columbia." 26 U.S.C. section 7701(a)(9) (1994). Plaintiff regards himself as a "nonresident alien," defined as an individual who is "neither a citizen of the United States nor a resident of the United States . . .." 26 U.S.C. section 7701(b)(1)(B) (1994). As stated above, however, plaintiff is clearly a citizen and resident of the United States, as well as the state of Washington, and is therefore not a nonresident alien.

In support of his argument that the laws of the United States, including the I.R.C., do not apply to citizens and residents of the so-called "compact states of America," plaintiff cites United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), President Reagan's Executive Order Number 12612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. section 601 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. section 297 (1994). Plaintiff cites Lopez as authority for the proposition that if the federal government's jurisdiction was not limited, then it could tax "compact state individuals" on all income "at a 100 percent rate," thus denying the states any revenue. Lopez, however, held that regulating gun possession in "school zones" is not, as numerous other regulatory activities have been found to be, within Congress' authority under the commerce clause to regulate state and local commercial activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. Lopez has no relevance to plaintiff's case, however, as Congress is given explicit constitutional authority to impose and collect taxes. Therefore, Lopez in no way supports plaintiff's position that the federal government cannot tax state citizens.

Plaintiff's reliance on Executive Order Number 12612, entitled "Federalism," is also misplaced. See 3 C.F.R. section 252 (1988). The order is simply a directive to the federal executive agencies directing them to leave as much authority to the states as constitutionally permitted. Id. Section 8 of the order specifically states that "[t]his Order is intended only to improve the internal management of the Executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person." Id. at 256. Thus, the order in no way supports plaintiff's argument that federal law is inapplicable to citizens of "compact states."

Plaintiff also cites 28 U.S.C. section 297, which allows for the assignment of any circuit or district judge from the Ninth Circuit to serve temporarily as a judge of a court of the "freely associated compact states," and the reimbursement of the judge for expenses arising from such service from the "countries" involved, in support of his argument that he is citizen of a "compact state" and not the United States. 28 U.S.C. section 297. Plaintiff contends that the statute's terms "compact states" and "countries" describe the state of Washington, and places it outside of the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States. See id. The legislative history of the statute, however, reveals that Congress used the term "compact states" and "countries" in 28 U.S.C. section 297 to refer exclusively to the former Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, namely, the Federal States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau, and not the 50 states comprising the United States. 10 See 134 Cong. Rec. at 31,066 (1988). Thus, 28 U.S.C. section 297 bears no relevance to plaintiff's claim.

[jg]

In re Trainor, KTC 1995-572 (9th Cir. 1995) also speaks to interpretation of section 7701(a)(9) and contains some familiiar tax denier rhetoric:

In review of the complaint filed by Mr. Trainor on December 23, 1994 and Mr. Trainor's testimony at the hearing on the United States' motion to dismiss, it is clear to this panel, "to a certainty that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact, 769 F.2d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986) (citation omitted). The apparent thrust of the complaint is that Mr. Trainor has participated in no "particular tax" activity that would subject him to the payment of income taxes; that there is no federal regulation supporting the Internal Revenue Code sections that would require him to pay income tax; and that the IRS has no jurisdiction over him.

Certain of the allegations made by Mr. Trainor in his complaint, if true, appear to raise a claim upon which relief could be granted. For example, his statements that "I was not born or naturalized (26 CFR 1.1-1(c)) in the statutory 'united states' defined in 26 USC 7701(a)(9)" and "I have not earned any statutory 'wages' or statutory 'tips' as defined in 26 USC 3121(a), 3201, 3306(b) and 3401(a)." See, Appellee's E.R., Tab A, page 5. However, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Trainor stated that he was born in Brooklyn, New York, Appellee's E.R. 38:23-24; that he had been employed by a hotel during the period from 1986 to present, Appellee's E.R. 40:13-23; and that he received W-2 forms each year reporting how much had been withheld for his paychecks, Appellee's E.R. 40-41; 23-2. Nonetheless, Mr. Trainor testified that he did not pay income tax nor file tax returns since 1986. Appellee's E.R. 36:20-23.

The bankruptcy court apparently considered Mr. Trainor's testimony in deciding the United States' motion. In order to determine whether a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted, "a court may properly look beyond the complaint to matters of public record and doing so does not convert a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment." In re Russell, 166 B.R. 901, 904 (9th Cir. BAP 1994), citing, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).

Mr. Trainor's position was best summed up in his section 505 complaint, "I believe the Supreme Court when it says that Rights can NOT be taxed, and that I have a Right to contract my labor and to receive free from taxation the fruits of my labor. This is the law of the land." Appellee's E.R., Tab A, page 10. Mr. Trainor is under the mistaken belief that he has no obligation to pay federal income tax. There was no basis upon which the trial court could have granted Mr. Trainor's relief.

[John J. Bulten]

Congratulations JG! You have joined Dan in finding a District Court case which CtC readers might hold to be in error. Remind me not to work in Nebraska. So now my list is:

Albers v IRS
Chamberlain v Krysztof
US v Ferguson
US v Hendrickson
US v Spitzer

The key part of your first post is:

The Schroeders ... fail to note that these sections define the stated term ... to be more inclusive than might otherwise be commonly understood .... Thus, the definition of "State" clearly includes what would be its commonly understood meaning--one of the fifty states forming a part of the entire United States.

The court rightly noted that "State" is an expansive term and then assumed out of whole cloth that it necessarily expands to include what would be its commonly understood meaning. If that logic were used in 3231, then all workers would be Section 3231 employees and subject to Railroad Retirement tax. Rather, the expansion of "State" is given in 7651 to include all possessions and territories. Since this expansion is explicit, it nullifies the expansion the court wishes to import.

So you're right that "State" is not just DC; in fact, "State" is just DC, possessions, and territories.

Your other two cases say nothing of consequence.

[Florida]

Congratulations JG! You have joined Dan in finding a District Court case which CtC readers might hold to be in error. Remind me not to work in Nebraska. So now my list is:

Albers v IRS
Chamberlain v Krysztof
US v Ferguson
US v Hendrickson
US v Spitzer

The key part of your first post is:

The Schroeders ... fail to note that these sections define the stated term ... to be more inclusive than might otherwise be commonly understood .... Thus, the definition of "State" clearly includes what would be its commonly understood meaning--one of the fifty states forming a part of the entire United States.

The court rightly noted that "State" is an expansive term and then assumed out of whole cloth that it necessarily expands to include what would be its commonly understood meaning. If that logic were used in 3231, then all workers would be Section 3231 employees and subject to Railroad Retirement tax. Rather, the expansion of "State" is given in 7651 to include all possessions and territories. Since this expansion is explicit, it nullifies the expansion the court wishes to import.

So you're right that "State" is not just DC; in fact, "State" is just DC, possessions, and territories.

Your other two cases say nothing of consequence.

Mee sa no work in Nebraska!

[LPC]

The court rightly noted that "State" is an expansive term

The court (in Schroeder) never said that.

and then assumed out of whole cloth that it necessarily expands to include what would be its commonly understood meaning.

A word doesn't need to "expand" to mean what it already means.

If that logic were used in 3231, then all workers would be Section 3231 employees and subject to Railroad Retirement tax.

Section 3231 uses the word "means" and not "includes" to define "employer" and "employee."

[David Merrill]

In addition, the United States Constitution provides for the admission of new states to the Union. See UNITED STATES CONST. art. IV, s 3, cl. 1. Pursuant to that provision, Nebraska voluntarily entered into the Union created by the United States Constitution on March 1, 1867. The Proclamation of Admission of the State reads: [The people of Nebraska] now ask for admission into the Union: Therefore, Be it enacted by the Senate and House of representatives of the United States of America, in Congress Assembled, That the constitution and State government which the people of Nebraska have formed for themselves be, and the same is hereby, accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and that the said State of Nebraska shall be, and is hereby, declared to be one of the United States of America; and is hereby admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatsoever. Thus, Nebraska entered the Union by actions initiated by its own citizens. As a state of the Union, it became subject to the laws of the United States, including those enacted by Congress dealing with the generation of revenue for the federal government...

1867 is after 1861 when the States choosing to secede from the Union were denied that right. The actions of the Congress since July 4, 1861 are only properly assembled by the Constitution under the "extraordinary occasions" clause.

This is like Edward Rivera going to magistrates pretending to be judges with the claim that they are not judges. Of course the magistrates say that since the President says they are Article III, they are Article III. The President has had Executive Order since March 28, 1861. That is obvious even today.

On CSPAN a senior advisor commented on the President's ability to wage war independent of Congress. They referred to the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 which depended on the 1861 emergency as well.



Regards,

David Merrill.

[John J. Bulten]

Section 3231 uses the word "means" and not "includes" to define "employer" and "employee."

For purposes of this chapter, the term "employee" means any individual in the service of one or more employers for compensation; except that the term "employee" shall include an employee of a local lodge or division defined as an employer in subsection (a) only if he was in the service of or in the employment relation to a carrier on or after August 29, 1935. An individual shall be deemed to have been in the employment relation to a carrier on August 29, 1935, if - (1) he was on that date on leave of absence from his employment, expressly granted to him by the carrier by whom he was employed, or by a duly authorized representative of such carrier, and the grant of such leave of absence was established to the satisfaction of the Railroad Retirement Board before July 1947; or (2) he was in the service of a carrier after August 29, 1935, and before January 1946 in each of 6 calendar months, whether or not consecutive; or (3) before August 29, 1935, he did not retire and was not retired or discharged from the service of the last carrier by whom he was employed or its corporate or operating successor, but - (A) solely by reason of his physical or mental disability he ceased before August 29, 1935, to be in the service of such carrier and thereafter remained continuously disabled until he attained age 65 or until August 1945, or (B) solely for such last stated reason a carrier by whom he was employed before August 29, 1935, or a carrier who is its successor did not on or after August 29, 1935, and before August 1945 call him to return to service, or (C) if he was so called he was solely for such reason unable to render service in 6 calendar months as provided in paragraph (2); or (4) he was on August 29, 1935, absent from the service of a carrier by reason of a discharge which, within 1 year after the effective date thereof, was protested, to an appropriate labor representative or to the carrier, as wrongful, and which was followed within 10 years of the effective date thereof by his reinstatement in good faith to his former service with all his seniority rights; except that an individual shall not be deemed to have been on August 29, 1935, in the employment relation to a carrier if before that date he was granted a pension or gratuity on the basis of which a pension was awarded to him pursuant to section 6 of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 (45 U.S.C. 228f), or if during the last payroll period before August 29, 1935, in which he rendered service to a carrier he was not in the service of an employer, in accordance with subsection (d), with respect to any service in such payroll period, or if he could have been in the employment relation to an employer only by reason of his having been, either before or after August 29, 1935, in the service of a local lodge or division defined as an employer in subsection (a). The term "employee" includes an officer of an employer. The term "employee" shall not include any individual while such individual is engaged in the physical operations consisting of the mining of coal, the preparation of coal, the handling (other than movement by rail with standard railroad locomotives) of coal not beyond the mine tipple, or the loading of coal at the tipple.

[John J. Bulten]

The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

What is in the category of not deemed to be excluded from 3231(b) employee?

Are other things of like kind and class as lodge/division employees and employer officers not excluded?

Or are all ordinary workers not excluded?

Verbum sat.

[Neckbone]

The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

What is in the category of not deemed to be excluded from 3231(b) employee?

Are other things of like kind and class as lodge/division employees and employer officers not excluded?

Or are all ordinary workers not excluded?

Verbum sat.

John:

It all depends on the reader's ability to (i) identify the term being defined and (ii) correctly discern the context in which the defined term is being used. You have yet to demostrate the ability to do either.

Neckbone

[rachel]

The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

What is in the category of not deemed to be excluded from 3231(b) employee?

Are other things of like kind and class as lodge/division employees and employer officers not excluded?

Or are all ordinary workers not excluded?

Verbum sat.

John:

It all depends on the reader's ability to (i) identify the term being defined and (ii) correctly discern the context in which the defined term is being used. You have yet to demostrate the ability to do either.

Neckbone

Exactly neckbone!
What Pete Hendrickson personally interprets and has readers of CtC beleiving is that 3401(c) includes only federal and state individuals, but what Pete completely misses is the context in which the defined term is being used as it relates to 3401(a).
3401(a) identifies many other people. Mainly those in 3121(b) "employment" who are enrolled into Social Security for benefit purposes.

[Neckbone]

Rachel:

Please allow me to rephrase my last post:

John and Rachel:

It all depends on the reader's ability to (i) identify the term being defined and (ii) correctly discern the context in which the defined term is being used. You (ie. John and Rachel) have yet to demostrate the ability to do either.

Neckbone

Is that clear enough for you?

Neckbone

[LPC]

The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

What is in the category of not deemed to be excluded from 3231(b) employee?

Individuals in the service of an "employer" as defined by section 3231(a).

[rachel]

Rachel:

Please allow me to rephrase my last post:

John and Rachel:

It all depends on the reader's ability to (i) identify the term being defined and (ii) correctly discern the context in which the defined term is being used. You (ie. John and Rachel) have yet to demostrate the ability to do either.

Neckbone

Is that clear enough for you?

Neckbone

Really,
So neckbone, with your infinite wisdom (questionable), why doesnt the paper boy who hasnt come to the age of 18 not statutortily 3121(b) "employed" and nor does he have to pay federal income taxes on his pay?
How about the person who's paid by his employer for something done not in the course of the employers "Trade or Business" considered not being 3121(b) employed either. Shouldnt the employee still be withheld federal taxes. I mean seriously Neckbone, the employee was still paid by and from the employer reqardless.
Social Security considers a "trade or business" as an employer whos supplies a service to the public.
How does the employer get around not supplying a service to the public and yet still pays an employee?
Hes still an employee doing a service of what ever nature!

Is that clear enough for you?
IDIOT!

[Nikki]

Really,
So neckbone, with your infinite wisdom (questionable), why doesnt the paper boy who hasnt come to the age of 18 not statutortily 3121(b) "employed" and nor does he have to pay federal income taxes on his pay? Prehaps because his total income for the year is well below the filing threshhold?
How about the person who's paid by his employer for something done not in the course of the employers "Trade or Business" considered not being 3121(b) employed either. Shouldnt the employee still be withheld federal taxes. I mean seriously Neckbone, the employee was still paid by and from the employer reqardless.
Social Security considers a "trade or business" as an employer whos supplies a service to the public.
How does the employer get around not supplying a service to the public and yet still pays an employee?
Hes still an employee doing a service of what ever nature!

Is that clear enough for you?
IDIOT!

Why do you keep signing your posts with a name other than Rachel?

[rachel]

Really,
So neckbone, with your infinite wisdom (questionable), why doesnt the paper boy who hasnt come to the age of 18 not statutortily 3121(b) "employed" and nor does he have to pay federal income taxes on his pay? Prehaps because his total income for the year is well below the filing threshhold?
How about the person who's paid by his employer for something done not in the course of the employers "Trade or Business" considered not being 3121(b) employed either. Shouldnt the employee still be withheld federal taxes. I mean seriously Neckbone, the employee was still paid by and from the employer reqardless.
Social Security considers a "trade or business" as an employer whos supplies a service to the public.
How does the employer get around not supplying a service to the public and yet still pays an employee?
Hes still an employee doing a service of what ever nature!

Is that clear enough for you?
IDIOT!

Why do you keep signing your posts with a name other than Rachel?

Perhaps, but I doubt it.
I know a paperboy who makes well over the filing threshold.
He gets about 100.00 a month all year long!

Your to observant for your own good, idiot!

[Nikki]

Perhaps, but I doubt it.
I know a paperboy who makes well over the filing threshold.
He gets about 100.00 a month all year long!

Your to observant for your own good, idiot!

Single dependents
You must file a return if any of the following apply.
Your unearned income was more than $850.

Your earned income was more than $5,150.

Your gross income was more than the larger of —

$850, or

Your earned income (up to $4,850) plus $300.

Let's see $100 per month for 12 months works out to around $1,200 for the year. If I'm not mistaken, $1,200 is somewhat less than $5,150.

Rachel, I a-pol-o-gize for us-ing big words, but I real-ly thought you could un-der-stand what thresh-hold meant.

Ob-vi-ous-ly, that con-cept is well bey-ond your men-tal ca-pac-i-ty.

Right back at you, Rachel the Idiot.

BTW, it's not "Your to observant..."

The correct English usage is "You're too observant..."

Perhaps you should go back to your ESL class at the same time that you finish up your remedial civics class.

[rachel]

Perhaps, but I doubt it.
I know a paperboy who makes well over the filing threshold.
He gets about 100.00 a month all year long!

Your to observant for your own good, idiot!

Single dependents
You must file a return if any of the following apply.
Your unearned income was more than $850.

Your earned income was more than $5,150.

Your gross income was more than the larger of —

$850, or

Your earned income (up to $4,850) plus $300.

Let's see $100 per month for 12 months works out to around $1,200 for the year. If I'm not mistaken, $1,200 is somewhat less than $5,150.

Rachel, I a-pol-o-gize for us-ing big words, but I real-ly thought you could un-der-stand what thresh-hold meant.

Ob-vi-ous-ly, that con-cept is well bey-ond your men-tal ca-pac-i-ty.

Right back at you, Rachel the Idiot.

BTW, it's not "Your to observant..."

The correct English usage is "You're too observant..."

Perhaps you should go back to your ESL class at the same time that you finish up your remedial civics class.

This still doesnt answer why the newspaper boy is not bound to 3121(b) for the same job.
What was your point to your post in relation to my question about Social Security?
None right! Except to show everyone here you cant follow a question.

[Nikki]

It is more like your inability to read:

(b) Employment
For purposes of this chapter, the term "employment" means any service ... except that such term shall not include -
...
(14)(A) service performed by an individual under the age of 18 in the delivery or distribution of newspapers or shopping news, not including delivery or distribution to any point for subsequent delivery or distribution;

[rachel]

It is more like your inability to read:

(b) Employment
For purposes of this chapter, the term "employment" means any service ... except that such term shall not include -
...
(14)(A) service performed by an individual under the age of 18 in the delivery or distribution of newspapers or shopping news, not including delivery or distribution to any point for subsequent delivery or distribution;

Boy are you TARD or what!
I can read just fine. Its you that cannot read! I already know 3121(14)(A).
This same excluded example found at 3121(14)(A) is also found as an exclusion at 3401(a)(10)(A)(B) for federal income taxes

(10)
(A) for services performed by an individual under the age of 18 in the delivery or distribution of newspapers or shopping news, not including delivery or distribution to any point for subsequent delivery or distribution; or
(B) for services performed by an individual in, and at the time of, the sale of newspapers or magazines to ultimate consumers, under an arrangement under which the newspapers or magazines are to be sold by him at a fixed price, his compensation being based on the retention of the excess of such price over the amount at which the newspapers or magazines are charged to him, whether or not he is guaranteed a minimum amount of compensation for such services, or is entitled to be credited with the unsold newspapers or magazines turned back

The post earlier if you read that far was a reply to Neckbone in regards to John Bultons crappy CtC theory that 3401(c) only includes federal and state individuals which it does not. I gave the above paperboy example to show that John is following an idiots personal interpretive fallacy of 3401(c) because Hendrickson completely leaves out 3401(a) in its entirety when interpreting 3401(c).
3401(a) clearly includes those in 3121(b) employment. Therefore idiot, the term "employee" of 3401(c) includes those mentioned in 3401(a).