Dan's FAQ Improveable?

[John J. Bulten]

The term State normally includes that which is a State ... ie. the 50 States.

So Brian, does the term employee in 3231 (where "includes" is used) normally include that which is an employee ... i.e., common workers? Are all workers subject to Railroad Retirement tax?

If I say "the brownie recipe includes eggs" ... and I ask people like John whether the recipe includes only eggs ...

If an ordinary person says it, the ordinary meaning is that the recipe includes but is not limited to eggs. If the IRC says it, 7701 requires that the recipe contains eggs and other things otherwise within the meaning of the term (apparently brownie recipe) which has been exemplified only by eggs. I didn't write 7701!

If the common meaning of the word "includes" is used in IRC, you get obviously frivolous results such as 3231. Rather, only the USSC explication of 7701 "includes" (things of like kind and class) may be used in IRC.

Dan, my previous comments answer all your new questions. If you are refusing to answer my questions solely by pretending you can't tell the difference between "state" and "State", which Brian is obviously able to do, we are at an impasse, because I've already explained it in sufficient detail for you to have judicial notice.

Now if anyone else is still confused, please advise.

To repeat: Dan, what evidence shows the 50 states are 7701(a)(10) States? What evidence shows private workers in the 50 states are 3401(c) employees? And would you moderately answer whether my suggested quotes are accurate representations of the law?

[Brian Rookard]

The term State normally includes that which is a State ... ie. the 50 States.

So Brian, does the term employee in 3231 (where "includes" is used) normally include that which is an employee ... i.e., common workers? Are all workers subject to Railroad Retirement tax?

John then says ...

If the common meaning of the word "includes" is used in IRC, you get obviously frivolous results such as 3231. Rather, only the USSC explication of 7701 "includes" (things of like kind and class) may be used in IRC.

John, please tell us ... in section 3231 (which you keep harping on) which word does the definition of "employee" use ... "means" ... or "includes" ...

__ Brian, the statute defining employee in 3231 uses "means", and not "includes."

__ Brian, the statute defining employee in 3231 uses "includes", and not "means."

(Hint, Dan already pointed this out to you, which, when you're talking about the proper word, is why you don't obtain "obviously frivolous results.")

[jg]

If the common meaning of the word "includes" is used in IRC, you get obviously frivolous results such as 3231. Rather, only the USSC explication of 7701 "includes" (things of like kind and class) may be used in IRC.
...
Now if anyone else is still confused, please advise.

I am confused how you imagine there is any erroneous result from reading section 3231.

(b) Employee
For purposes of this chapter, the term “employee” means any individual in the service of one or more employers for compensation; except that the term “employee” shall include an employee of a local lodge or division defined as an employer in subsection (a) only if he was in the service of or in the employment relation to a carrier on or after August 29, 1935. An individual shall be deemed to have been in the employment relation to a carrier on August 29, 1935, if—
<cut for brevity>

[Brian Rookard]

If I say "the brownie recipe includes eggs" ... and I ask people like John whether the recipe includes only eggs ...

If an ordinary person says it, the ordinary meaning is that the recipe includes but is not limited to eggs. If the IRC says it, 7701 requires that the recipe contains eggs and other things otherwise within the meaning of the term (apparently brownie recipe) which has been exemplified only by eggs. I didn't write 7701!

And there you have it. To John, when it says that you DO NOT EXCLUDE what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined (in my example, "brownies") then you would only include the eggs. Even though what is "otherwise within the meaning of the term defined" would include the other normal ingredients (flour, sugar, etc.)

Term defined - brownies.

Include - eggs.

Otherwise within the meaning of the term defined ("brownies") - flour, sugar, etc.

... let's see, do not exclude what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined ("brownies") ... do not exclude what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined ("brownies") ... hmmm .... John, 7701(c) says DO NOT EXCLUDE what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined ... and yet, here you are, excluding what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

John is not following the law.

But no surprise there.

[John J. Bulten]

__ Brian, the statute defining employee in 3231 uses "means", and not "includes."

__ Brian, the statute defining employee in 3231 uses "includes", and not "means."

The statute defining employee in 3231 uses "include(s)" three times (once in negation) and "means" once. Hint: I already pointed out to Dan the appearance of "includes" when I first brought up 3231 last week.

For purposes of this chapter, the term "employee" means any individual in the service of one or more employers for compensation; except that the term "employee" shall include an employee of a local lodge or division defined as an employer in subsection (a) only if he was in the service of or in the employment relation to a carrier on or after August 29, 1935. An individual shall be deemed to have been in the employment relation to a carrier on August 29, 1935, if - (1) he was on that date on leave of absence from his employment, expressly granted to him by the carrier by whom he was employed, or by a duly authorized representative of such carrier, and the grant of such leave of absence was established to the satisfaction of the Railroad Retirement Board before July 1947; or (2) he was in the service of a carrier after August 29, 1935, and before January 1946 in each of 6 calendar months, whether or not consecutive; or (3) before August 29, 1935, he did not retire and was not retired or discharged from the service of the last carrier by whom he was employed or its corporate or operating successor, but - (A) solely by reason of his physical or mental disability he ceased before August 29, 1935, to be in the service of such carrier and thereafter remained continuously disabled until he attained age 65 or until August 1945, or (B) solely for such last stated reason a carrier by whom he was employed before August 29, 1935, or a carrier who is its successor did not on or after August 29, 1935, and before August 1945 call him to return to service, or (C) if he was so called he was solely for such reason unable to render service in 6 calendar months as provided in paragraph (2); or (4) he was on August 29, 1935, absent from the service of a carrier by reason of a discharge which, within 1 year after the effective date thereof, was protested, to an appropriate labor representative or to the carrier, as wrongful, and which was followed within 10 years of the effective date thereof by his reinstatement in good faith to his former service with all his seniority rights; except that an individual shall not be deemed to have been on August 29, 1935, in the employment relation to a carrier if before that date he was granted a pension or gratuity on the basis of which a pension was awarded to him pursuant to section 6 of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 (45 U.S.C. 228f), or if during the last payroll period before August 29, 1935, in which he rendered service to a carrier he was not in the service of an employer, in accordance with subsection (d), with respect to any service in such payroll period, or if he could have been in the employment relation to an employer only by reason of his having been, either before or after August 29, 1935, in the service of a local lodge or division defined as an employer in subsection (a). The term "employee" includes an officer of an employer. The term "employee" shall not include any individual while such individual is engaged in the physical operations consisting of the mining of coal, the preparation of coal, the handling (other than movement by rail with standard railroad locomotives) of coal not beyond the mine tipple, or the loading of coal at the tipple.

The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

What is in the category of not deemed to be excluded from 3231(b) employee?

Are other things of like kind and class as lodge/division employees and employer officers not excluded?

Or are all ordinary workers not excluded?

I am confused how you imagine there is any erroneous result from reading section 3231.

An erroneous result from reading section 3231 arises if the word "includes" has its usual sense of "contains, in addition to the ordinary meaning of the word". If this sense is used, then the appearance of "includes" repeatedly in 3231(b) would require all workers to be subject to Railroad Retirement provisions, which is clearly against the intent stated, contextualized, and universally applied. Rather, the sense demanded by 7701(c) is "contains, in addition to other things of like kind and class", which yields no contradiction in 3231(b).

[Brian Rookard]

For purposes of this chapter, the term "employee" means any individual in the service of one or more employers for compensation; ....

* * *

The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

What is in the category of not deemed to be excluded from 3231(b) employee?

And the definition of "employer" in this context ...

[John J. Bulten]

Let me just change the example Brian without changing your logic.

And there you have it. To John, when it says that you DO NOT EXCLUDE what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined (in my example, "employees") then you would only include the railroad workers. Even though what is "otherwise within the meaning of the term defined" would include the other normal ingredients (private workers)

Term defined - employees.

Include - railroad workers.

Otherwise within the meaning of the term defined ("employees") - private workers.

... let's see, do not exclude what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined ("employees") ... do not exclude what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined ("employees") ... hmmm .... John, 7701(c) says DO NOT EXCLUDE what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined ... and yet, here you are, excluding what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

John is not? following the law.

But no surprise there.

This example breaks down because private workers are NOT otherwise within the meaning of the 3231(b) term "employee". What they are is otherwise within the meaning of the ordinary word "employee".

If the IRC were to say "brownie recipe includes eggs" and nothing else on the subject, there is no legal authority to assume that the ordinary meaning of brownie recipe was intended, because then the definition would be superfluous. In ordinary legal construction "brownie recipe includes eggs" cannot be expanded beyond eggs. In IRC it can be expanded to things of like kind as eggs. (Obviously if it specified elsewhere (as you just did) that flour and sugar were included, that point would be established; and if it specified an "etc." as you did, it would also include chocolate and the other common ingredients.)

If you say that an IRC definition of the type "brownie recipe includes eggs" can be expanded to the ordinary meaning of "brownie recipe", you would, by the same logic, be forced to expand 3231(b) employees to include all workers, because of the inclusion clauses of 3231(b).

Your point that the "means" clause has reference only to 3231(a) employers (railroad companies) does not change the fact that the inclusion clauses do not exclude what is otherwise within the meaning of the term 3231(b) employee. So, Brian, what is otherwise within that meaning? Is it really ordinary workers, or is it just those in the same class as lodge/division employees and employer officers? [This paragraph corrected.]

[Brian Rookard]

If the IRC were to say "brownie recipe includes eggs" and nothing else on the subject, there is no legal authority to assume that the ordinary meaning of brownie recipe was intended, because then the definition would be superfluous. In ordinary legal construction "brownie recipe includes eggs" cannot be expanded beyond eggs. In IRC it can be expanded to things of like kind as eggs. (Obviously if it specified elsewhere (as you just did) that flour and sugar were included, that point would be established; and if it specified an "etc." as you did, it would also include chocolate and the other common ingredients.)

Except that 7701(c) says you do NOT exclude what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined ("brownies").

We are concerned with the term defined (brownies) ... you are looking at the defining terms (eggs).

You must look to the term defined (brownies) ... and ask what is otherwise within the meaning of brownies.

Tax protestors like you look at the defining terms (eggs) and not the term defined (brownies).

If you say that an IRC definition of the type "brownie recipe includes eggs" can be expanded to the ordinary meaning of "brownie recipe", you would, by the same logic, be forced to expand 3231(b) employees to include all workers, because of the inclusion clauses of 3231(b).

Wrong. I can fully accept that the normal meaning of employee is intended ... but then one must also look to the fact that the employee must also work for an "employer" ... which has a very limited meaning under 3231.

Now, again, what is the definition of "employer" under the act.

I noticed that you have yet to look at the definition of "employer".

[Neckbone]

To be more precise, and so JB doesn't get so much room to wiggle, the term being defined in Bryan's "brownie" example is "ingredients used in a brownie recipe". If the defined term is merely "brownies", then it could be reasonably argued that eggs would not be included in the defined term but cupcakes, cookies and ice cream would. Brian is absolutely correct, however, when he identifies JB's entire argument as hinging on his feigned inability to identify the term being defined. I say feigned because JB is clearly smart enough to know he's wrong and that his silly, hypertechnical semantic crappola has NEVER prevailed and will NEVER prevail in federal court. It hasn't and won't precisely because it is silly hypertechnical semantic crappola that no one should waste more than 5 minutes of their precious time on.

TPs never change. They believe that a federal judge will listen patiently while they pick at nits and lice. I hate to break this to you, John, but anyone who believes that hasn't been in federal court very often. Keep in mind that the maxim de minimis non curat lex applies to legal arguments as well as criminal offenses. There's a real good reason why PH lost, why CtC is phony and why the whole TP movement is nothing more than an annoyance to anyone with an ounce of common sense. It's because the whole raison d'etre for the TP movement is a semantic sleight-of-hand that any ten-year-old could see through in less than a minute. When are the TPs going to figure out that puns that are laugh-out-loud funny to a four-year-old aren't neccesarily so amusing to adults.

John, when you finally get to court and the judge says your argument is "frivolous", he/she's just being polite. What they're really saying is:

Get the f--- outta here. We've heard this crap before from folks who are way more erudite than you. We didn't buy it from them, and we ain't buyin' it from you, either. I don't care if you used different words and caselaw citations than the last BOZO we had to listen to. We still don't believe that your box of horses--t means that someone gave you a pony.

BTW, remember to pay your fine to the Court Clerk and don't let the door hit you in the ass on the way out.

Sharpen your lance, John, I'm sure there are more windmills out there to combat.

Neckbone

[natty]

I say feigned because JB is clearly smart enough to know he's wrong...

I am not sure that is true. The common trait among tax denying nutjobs is their arrogance. Some people simply lack reasoning and critical analysis skills no matter how smart they are.

[grixit]

I wonder how "confused" these folks would continue to be if the judges started recommending guardianships. After all, anyone who has this much trouble understanding sinple definitions of common words in their own language might not be capable of functioning as autonomous adults.

[LPC]

Let me just change the example Brian without changing your logic.

And there you have it. To John, when it says that you DO NOT EXCLUDE what is otherwise within the meaning of the term defined (in my example, "employees") then you would only include the railroad workers. Even though what is "otherwise within the meaning of the term defined" would include the other normal ingredients (private workers)

Term defined - employees.

Include - railroad workers.

Wrong. That's not what section 3231(b) says.

Try again.

If you say that an IRC definition of the type "brownie recipe includes eggs" can be expanded to the ordinary meaning of "brownie recipe", you would, by the same logic, be forced to expand 3231(b) employees to include all workers, because of the inclusion clauses of 3231(b).

Wrong.

Section 3231(a) limits the definition of "employer" to railroad-related employers, and so the definition of the word "employee" in section 3231(b) is necessarily limited to the employees of railroad-related employers.

Section 7701(c) says that "includes" does not exclude what is *otherwise* within the term being defined. Section 3231(b) says that "employee" MEANS (not includes) individuals in the service of "employers" (which is defined in section 3231(a) to mean railroad-related employers). If section 3231(b) later uses the word "includes" to add other individuals to the meaning of "employee," those "otherwise within the meaning" of "employee" are not all *employees* of all *employers,* but only the employees previously defined by section 3231(b).

In other words, the word "includes" does not wipe out everything that went before, but adds to what went before. When nothing went before, then "includes" adds to the normal meaning of the word. When a specific definition has gone before, then "includes" adds to that specific definition, and not the normal meaning of the word.

I'm sorry that this is so taxing to your little brain, but the fact that you have such difficulty with these relatively simple definitions shows why you should not be trying to play in court with the adults.

[John J. Bulten]

Dan, I knew you could pull another rationalization out of your ... hat. I was kind of hoping you'd fall into this particular trap. Your position amounts to saying that you can import the common meaning only when no other meaning goes before the inclusion, and not otherwise. Winsome, but contains a contradiction. Problem is:

If section 3231(b) later uses the word "includes" to add other individuals to the meaning of "employee," those "otherwise within the meaning" of "employee" are not all *employees* of all *employers,* but only the employees previously defined by section 3231(b).

See, here you include based on the TERM 3231(b) employee.

When nothing went before, then "includes" adds to the normal meaning of the word.

And here you include based on the WORD employee in common usage.

You can't use 7701(c) to mean two different things. Either 3401(c) only includes what is already in the meaning of the TERM 3401(c) employee, or 3231(b) includes everything in the meaning of the WORD employee in common usage.

You can only salvage consistency by invoking your "nothing went before" rule to say that ordinary employees are already in the meaning of the TERM 3401(c) employee. But no law supports your rule by stating that the meaning of the WORD is automatically already in the meaning of the TERM. In fact numerous case law cites say the opposite, as you know. You have imported it by fiat, without basis in law; and you have pretended 7701(c) simultaneously permits both of two different inclusions which cannot coexist.

In short, if 7701(c) expands to what is in the meaning of the WORD, you are required to include ordinary workers in 3231(b) (because your attempt to exclude them was due to the meaning of the TERM 3231(b) employee).

But if 7701(c) expands to what is in the meaning of the TERM, you are not permitted to include ordinary workers in 3401(c) (because your attempt to include them was due to the meaning of the WORD employee in common usage).

[Nikki]

John:

Why are you wasting so much time here?

Don't you think your time would be better spent dealing with the nice people in the Florida IRS office?

Remember, you can usually keep the CI people off your case if you work with the people on the civil side. Or are you intentionally working up a case to become a martyr on behalf of your guru?

To date every thing you have attempted to state as logical fact has been previously dismissed as frivolous by one or more courts. Do you think that, by posting your inane theories here, you are establishing a basis of evidence for a Cheek defense?

[Brian Rookard]

Oh here we go ... now John's pulling out the old "term" versus "word" schtick.

For like the millionth time John ...

The definition of "employer" in 3231 is?

___________________________________

___________________________________

___________________________________

Please fill in your answer.

There is only confusion in your mind because you keep ignoring the definition of "employer".

[jg]

7701(c) says to not exclude what is otherwise in the meaning of the TERM; but CtC and other tax deniers imagine that if the term has not been defined that there is no meaning to the TERM or there is nothing that is not to be excluded. This is how they can change "includes" into "means" - for that is what occurs when the TERM is claimed not to have any relation to the meaning of the word.

7701(c) says items otherwise within the meaning of the TERM because the statute is not defining the WORD. It can not be correct to say "items otherwise within the meaning of the WORD defined" as the WORD is not being defined.

"Includes" is not used to add to a null set. If a term was to be defined that did not have any other meaning, then a term could be invented that is not a WORD. If a term is to broadened from the ordinary meaning of a WORD "includes" can be used to add items not otherwise within the meaning. If a WORD is to defined as a TERM to have other than the usual meaning then "means" can be used to specify the meaning.

It seems that CtC and other tax deniers imagine that 7701(c) somehow should be read to say that items within the inclusion of the term (or those of like class) are the only items that are not to be excluded. Again, this often changes the use of "includes" to "means".

That CtC and other tax deniers are unable or unwilling to see or understand that "includes" and "means" are used and intended to yield a different result (and therefore must end in different results or the interpretation is incorrect) is not a fault of the manner in which the law is written.

[John J. Bulten]

Brian, you were trying so hard not to answer my questions that you missed my answer to your question. Granted I typed it a bit too fast.

Your point that the "means" clause has reference only to 3231(a) employers (railroad companies) does not change the fact that the inclusion clauses do not exclude what is otherwise within the meaning of the term 3231(b) employee. So, Brian, what is otherwise within that meaning? Is it really ordinary workers, or is it just those in the same class as lodge/division employees and employer officers?

And just what is wrong with the "term" versus "word" schtick?

(BTW, JG, your post does not answer that question. I'll return with the specifics.)

[John J. Bulten]

"Includes" is not used to add to a null set.

Sorry, the ordinary legal usage of "includes" is in fact synonymous with "means" and it often adds to a null set. Starting with the very first definition in the entire US Code (unless like Dan you think conventions are also definitions):

The words "insane" and "insane person" and "lunatic" shall include every idiot, lunatic, insane person, and person non compos mentis.

Montello v Utah, 221 US 452, indicates "including" is limiting while "and" is expansive; see also TD 3980, Black's and Bouvier's, etc. So it is simply incorrect that "includes" always has different import than "means".

However, in laws with the convention "includes is not limiting", "means" and "includes" have different uses, and "includes" is simply equivalent to "includes but is not limited to".

Further, in the IRC with its 7701(c) convention, which is neither the Black's convention nor the nonlimiting convention, "includes" is neither "means" nor "includes but is not limited to". It is, by definition, equivalent to "means, besides other items otherwise within the meaning of the term defined".

(If, instead, you were to hold that it is equivalent to "means, besides other items otherwise within the common meaning of the word being redefined", then in 3231(b) you are stuck again with all ordinary workers in the two inclusion clauses.)

It seems that CtC and other tax deniers imagine that 7701(c) somehow should be read to say that items within the inclusion of the term (or those of like class) are the only items that are not to be excluded. Again, this often changes the use of "includes" to "means".

No, it doesn't. Saying employee means government/corporate is different from saying employee means government/corporate/similar. The difference is, in this case, that the latter adds such classes as TVA workers which are not present in the former. So "includes" and "means" do have different import.

[Joey Smith]

indicates "including" is limiting

Not in any sense that would assist your theory.

But again, when are all the tens-of-thousands of legal, tax and constitutional scholars going to come out and protest the (alleged) outrage over Pete getting thumped so badly in court?

Or could it be that this poorly-eduated dolt who once blew up an innocent postal employee with a mail bomb is simply, utterly, and unmistakenly wrong?

[jg]

Employees in 3231(b) are individuals in the service of an "employer" and several other included types. For the correct definition of employer in this context, see section 3231(a). No problem there, except in your imagination.

"Includes" is not used to add to a null set.

Sorry, the ordinary legal usage of "includes" is in fact synonymous with "means" and it often adds to a null set.

And, don't forget, the plain meaning of "includes" does not apply because "includes" is defined in 7701(c), which nullifies your point. ...

Sorry, that is enough for me to kiss off any further discussion.

It is, by definition, equivalent to "means, besides other items otherwise within the meaning of the term defined".

Indeed, and those items otherwise within the meaning of the term need not be similar or related.
From SIMS v. UNITED STATES, 359 U.S. 108 (1959)

Though the definition of "person" in 6332 does not mention States or any sovereign or political entity or their officers among those it "includes", it is equally clear that it does not exclude them. This is made certain by the provisions of 7701 (b) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code that "The terms `includes' and `including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 26 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 7701 (b). Whether the term "person" when used in a federal statute includes a State cannot be abstractly declared, but depends upon its legislative environment, Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370; Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161. It is clear that 6332 is stated in all-inclusive terms of general application. "In interpreting federal revenue measures expressed in terms of general application, this Court has ordinarily found them operative in the case of state activities even though States were not expressly indicated as subjects of tax." Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411, 416, and cases cited. We think that the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation, i. e., the legislative environment, of 6332 make it plain that Congress intended to and did include States within the term "person" as used in 6332.

No one that reads portions of the Internal Revenue Code could ever imagine that the intent of Congress was to give the term employee the limited meaning that Hendrickson and other tax deniers claim. Just the exclusions for those that are not considered as employees is more than enough to clearly see the intention to include private workers.
The many rules regarding employers and employees that could never apply in the CtC universe (such as to deductions by employers and benefits of employees) is another example that makes clear that the contention that under 3401(c) the category of "employees" does not include privately employed wage earners is a preposterous reading of the statute.

Your inability or unwillingness to properly read the income tax law does not relieve you of your affirmative duty to file and pay, as required.