Weston White wrote:The use of income came along later on, I think somewhere in the mid1800’s. This term was specifically defined later on within the 1909 Corporation Excise Tax Act. SCOTUS has directly ruled on this in numerous cases. The Annotated Constitution, specifically makes reference to “income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.” within. Also what you claim to be, is never discussed one time within either, you would think something as monumental as what you allege would be mentioned at least once. But no it is not, never, not once.
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html ... amdt16_hd8
Please return to the thread
income from whatever source derived (again) to read the SCOTUS ruling in
Glenshaw Glass as to what does constitute gross income subject to the income tax. That ruling determined that the Court's characterization of income in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 , as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined."... {But it]was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.
Eisner v. Macomber wrote:The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was adopted. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 , 15 Sup. Ct. 912, under the Act of August 27, 1894 (28 Stat. 509, 553, c. 349, 27), it was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real estate and upon returns from investments of personal property were in effect direct taxes upon the property from which such income arose, imposed by reason of ownership; and that Congress could not impose such taxes without apportioning them among the states according to population, as required by article 1, 2, cl. 3, and section 9, cl. 4, of the original Constitution.
Afterwards, and evidently in recognition of the limitation upon the taxing power of Congress thus determined, the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, in words lucidly expressing the object to be accomplished:
'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.'
As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 , 17-19, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713, L. R. A. 1917D, 414; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 , 112 et seq., 36 Sup. Ct. 278; Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172 , 173 S., 38 Sup. Ct. 432.
A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, requires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts.
In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article 1 of the Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,' as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.
The fundamental relation of 'capital' to 'income' has been much discussed by economists, the former being likened to the tree or the land, the latter to the fruit or the crop; the former depicted as a reservoir supplied from springs, the latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow during a period of time. For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term 'income,' as used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the amendment, and, having formed also a correct judgment as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide the matter at issue.
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard Dict.; Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 , 34 S. Sup. Ct. 136, 140 [58 L. Ed. 285]; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 467, 469 [62 L. Ed. 1054]), 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case, 247 U.S. 183, 185 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 467, 469 (62 L. Ed. 1054).
Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of income essential for a correct solution of the present controversy. The government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis upon the word 'gain,' which was extended to include a variety of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was either overlooked or misconceived. 'Derived-from- capital'; 'the gain-derived-from-capital,' etc. Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived'-that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal- that is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description.
Please note the statement above in regard to the 16th amendment (emphasis added): "A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, requires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify,
except as applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and personal." The tax on income does not require apportionment according to population for direct taxes.
That holds true regardless of the source from which the income is derived.
So, we now understand the SCOTUS position from
Glenshaw Glass to be that income is an accession to wealth, clearly realized.
Payments to you for work, labor, sweat, time served or whatever source that gives you an increase in wealth is gross income subject to the income tax according to the SCOTUS. That holds whether the payer is or is not in any way connected with the federal government. That holds true for income from whatever source derived.
These rulings leave no doubt, regardless of "the possibilities" that may be imagined, that the SCOTUS has ruled payments to you from a private party that represent an accession to wealth are included in gross income subject to the income tax and are free from any apportionment requirement.
Hendrickson's, and other deniers of these rulings, ignorance or willful disregard of what the SCOTUS has stated does not give license to misrepresent what has been ruled or to pretend that the payments that increase your wealth are not subject to the income tax within any constitutional limits on taxation.
“Where there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income.” — Plato
