Dan's FAQ Improveable?

[Neckbone]

Lawman, your "numerous places in the IRC" apply only for their own chapters or scopes, not for purposes of Chapter 24.

If you were to follow the logic that "When the statute says [term] 'employee' it means a [common-word] Employee" in Chapter 22, it would apply to the clause in 3231(b) that says "The term 'employee' includes an officer of an employer"; and the term "employee" would include all workers, and all workers would be subject to Railroad Retirement. Same for natty's logic that "any person who reasonably fits the meaning of [common-word] 'employee' is not excluded."

There is no law that places ordinary workers within the meaning of 3401(c) "employee". ["No law" would mean no statutes nor court decisions, and neither is correct.] Only fuzzy, easily-deceived, subject-to-correction thinking does that. [And, of course, you include in "fuzzy thinkers" all federal court judges who have ever addressed the issue, all legal and tax scholars, and every one of the million or so other people who disagree with you. Count me in as a "fuzzy thinker", please.] The statutes, canons of construction, and rules of logic do not. You describe this sloppy, inaccurate thinking as "normal" thinking: well, the IRS counts on such "normal" thinking.

Natty, the same applies. It is not possible to assign variables logically so as to yield the result you want. First, your assignment of A is ambiguous: the thing being defined is "employee for Chapter 24 purposes" (X), not "employee for Webster's purposes" (what you want A to be). But either way your result does not follow.

If A is employee for Chapter 24 purposes, then your conclusion is valid that X = A + B: Employee for Chapter 24 purposes means employee for Chapter 24 purposes and government/corporate workers.

If A is employee for Webster's purposes as you want, then there is no law stating X = A, or A includes B. The law states only that X includes B. As to 7701, what is "not excluded" from X is "others otherwise within the meaning of the term defined (that term being 'employee for Chapter 24 purposes')"; what is not excluded is simply "all other 'employees for Chapter 24 purposes'". So X, once again, includes government/corporate workers and any other "employees for Chapter 24 purposes".

But at no point does the law state that common workers are "others otherwise withing the meaning of" Chapter 24 employees. Those "not excluded" (i.e. those additionally included) are limited to "others otherwise within the meaning". That means that "others NOT otherwise within the meaning" are NOT in the additionally included class.

I have two real simple questions for you, John:

1. Why does no reputable legal or income tax scholar, Congressional Representative, federal judge agree with your "unassailable logic".

2. Why don't high income folks with high tax liabilities use the CtC logic you espouse to avoid income taxes?

Just curious,

Neckbone

P.S. Aren't you intentionally obfuscating the issue by mixing Chapter 22 and 24 together? I thought the Chapter 24 definition only applies to Chapter 24. Am I wrong?

[John J. Bulten]

Hi Neckbone, who's the new strummer?

1. There are some occasional agreements, but more importantly there are no disagreements from those required to explain the law rightly. Among tax scholars, Tax Notes ran a review of Pete which was very even-handed, not taking a position itself, but admitting that the logic on both sides was believed by reasonable people. Among Congressional reps, Barbara Kennelly admitted that the CRS told her that 3121(e) only includes possessions and territories, and we get similar admissions from time to time. Among federal judges, I don't believe they've ever touched the question. I read the USSC dictum in Groetzinger as saying they want to avoid the "includes" question (in the "trade or business" context) like the plague.

So it is more significant that the IRS, the draftsmen, the Congressional Record, and the courts never disagree with CtC logic. (Please feel free to cite your proposed counterexamples.)

2. The way you asked, I could answer that if you have "income", CtC requires you to pay the income tax. But since you really mean why don't high-"earnings" folks use CtC, I see that George Baer had $90,000 refunded that had been withheld from him, over 3 successive tax years running. Yet he was not among the Hendrickson Nine. Other examples abound if you look at all the pages of refunds. So why have no millionaires given us venture capital yet? Ask them.

P.S. Yes, each of the four Chapters 21-24 has a different definition of "employee". My point is that those who say Chapter 24 includes all workers cannot escape the logical conclusion that the same language in Chapter 22 would also include all workers. Since every tax "pro" knows that Chapter 22 is only for railroad workers, it's surprising that no tax "pro" admits (what the law says) that Chapter 24 is only for government/corporate/similar workers.

[jg]

If you were to follow the logic that "When the statute says [term] 'employee' it means a [common-word] Employee" in Chapter 22, it would apply to the clause in 3231(b) that says "The term 'employee' includes an officer of an employer"; and the term "employee" would include all workers, and all workers would be subject to Railroad Retirement. "

Indeed all workers, based on the definition of employee in 3231(b), are subject to Railroad Retirement if they work for an employer as defined in 3231(a).
Good job, you got it right !

Oh, of course, there are several other workers included and not included as subject to Railroad Retirement in 3231(b)( e.g. The term “employee” shall not include any individual while such individual is engaged in the physical operations consisting of the mining of coal, the preparation of coal...).

[natty]

Natty, the same applies. It is not possible to assign variables logically so as to yield the result you want. First, your assignment of A is ambiguous: the thing being defined is "employee for Chapter 24 purposes" (X), not "employee for Webster's purposes" (what you want A to be). But either way your result does not follow.

If A is employee for Chapter 24 purposes, then your conclusion is valid that X = A + B: Employee for Chapter 24 purposes means employee for Chapter 24 purposes and government/corporate workers.

If A is employee for Webster's purposes as you want, then there is no law stating X = A, or A includes B. The law states only that X includes B. As to 7701, what is "not excluded" from X is "others otherwise within the meaning of the term defined (that term being 'employee for Chapter 24 purposes')"; what is not excluded is simply "all other 'employees for Chapter 24 purposes'". So X, once again, includes government/corporate workers and any other "employees for Chapter 24 purposes".

But at no point does the law state that common workers are "others otherwise withing the meaning of" Chapter 24 employees. Those "not excluded" (i.e. those additionally included) are limited to "others otherwise within the meaning". That means that "others NOT otherwise within the meaning" are NOT in the additionally included class.

No, A is not ambiguous. A is known. In 3401(c), A = employee.

X is the variable in 7701(c) because 7701(c) applies to any definition that uses 'includes' and 'including'.

3401(c) uses 'includes', therefore, 7701(c) applies.
Therefore,

X = A + B
X = (employee) + (items included)
(employee) is not given a meaning, but 7701(c) says do not exclude things otherwise in its meaning. Therefore, a private worker employee can not be excluded.

Your interpretation ASSUMES a "Chapter 24 purpose" which is totally self-serving and flies in the face of 7701(c).

[Demosthenes]

Hi Neckbone, who's the new strummer?

1. There are some occasional agreements, but more importantly there are no disagreements from those required to explain the law rightly. Among tax scholars, Tax Notes ran a review of Pete which was very even-handed, not taking a position itself, but admitting that the logic on both sides was believed by reasonable people.

The article:

http://www.cheatingfrenzy.com/ctc_taxnotes.pdf

[Cpt Banjo]

If you were to follow the logic that "When the statute says [term] 'employee' it means a [common-word] Employee" in Chapter 22, it would apply to the clause in 3231(b) that says "The term 'employee' includes an officer of an employer"; and the term "employee" would include all workers, and all workers would be subject to Railroad Retirement.

Guess again. The definition of "employee" in Section 3231(b) is "any individual in the service of one or more employers for compensation", and the term "employer" means a rail carrier. So not all common-word employees are subject to Railroad Retirement. All common-word employees who work for rail carriers are, including officers of rail carriers.

Of course, neither Section 3121 nor Section 3401 contains a similarly restrictive definition of "employer", so that any common-word employees (who aren't specifically excluded by the statutes) would be included in the definition. Bulten's analogy is, as usual, way off the mark.

[Demosthenes]

The way you asked, I could answer that if you have "income", CtC requires you to pay the income tax. But since you really mean why don't high-"earnings" folks use CtC, I see that George Baer had $90,000 refunded that had been withheld from him, over 3 successive tax years running. Yet he was not among the Hendrickson Nine.

That he was not included in the civil suit should be giving Mr. Baer considerable heartburn.

[natty]

P.S. Yes, each of the four Chapters 21-24 has a different definition of "employee". My point is that those who say Chapter 24 includes all workers cannot escape the logical conclusion that the same language in Chapter 22 would also include all workers. Since every tax "pro" knows that Chapter 22 is only for railroad workers, it's surprising that no tax "pro" admits (what the law says) that Chapter 24 is only for government/corporate/similar workers.

No, Chapter 21 tells you what "employee" MEANS. A private worker is definitely within that meaning. 7701(c) says do not exlude that meaning when using 'includes'.

Chapter 22 tells you what "employee" MEANS. It means only railroad workers. A private worker would not be within its meaning.

Chapter 24 gives no MEANING to "employee". Nevertheless, 7701(c) says not to exlude things within its meaning. Therefore, a private worker is not excluded.

Just curious, why aren't you liable for the tax under Chapter 21 since the obfuscation you apply to Chapter 24 withholding can not be used on Chapter 21?

[Imalawman]

Among federal judges, I don't believe they've ever touched the question. I read the USSC dictum in Groetzinger as saying they want to avoid the "includes" question (in the "trade or business" context) like the plague.

Well, then explain this....

In US v. Hunn, the court stated:

Hunn's citation of I.R.C. §§ 3121 and 3401, his use of Forms 4852 and so-called "corrected" Forms 1099, the alterations he makes to those forms, and his characterization of Social Security and Medicare taxes as income taxes, all follow a scheme promoted by Peter Hendrickson of Michigan. … Hendrickson claims that under I.R.C. §§ 3121 and 3401, only income received from the federal government is subject to federal tax. Id. Federal courts have uniformly and repeatedly rejected this argument. See, e.g., United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1985) (characterizing the argument "that under 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) the category of 'employee' does not include privately employed wage earners [as] a preposterous reading of the statute."); Abdo v. United States, 234 F.Supp.2d 553, 563 (M.D.N.C.2002) (noting at the claim that wages are not income "has been rejected as many times as it has been asserted."), aff'd 63 Fed. Appx. 163 (4th Cir.2003). (emphasis added) 2006 WL 2663783, *3 (D.Ariz. 2006).

or

"In short, Ms. Charboneau contends that the Code's definitions of “wage income” and “self employment income” only include income derived from individuals who work for the federal government, or whose work involves that of “the performance of the functions of a public office.” Because Ms. Charboneau never worked for any federal or state government during the tax years in question, she claims that the IRS cannot make any tax assessments against her.

This nonsensical argument is belied by the plain language of the Internal Revenue Code itself. For example, 26 U.S.C. § 3401 defines wages as “all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer ....“ 26 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (emphasis added). The statute then goes on to define various exceptions to this broad definition of wages in certain categories of private employment, such as in the agricultural and domestic service fields,FN17 newspaper delivery, FN18 the clergy,FN19 and for wages incurred by individuals working for employers “other than the United States or an agency therof” within Puerto Rico or a possession of the United States.FN20 There is nothing in the statute limiting “wages” to solely publicly-derived income."

U.S. v. Charboneau 2006 WL 2346280, *4 (M.D.Fla.) (M.D.Fla.,2006)

or

"Although Ms. Smethers is not a federal, nor presumably a state employee, it is clear that § 6332 (which defines ‘person’ under the Tax Code) is stated in all-inclusive terms of general application. The statute further claries that “[t]he terms ‘includes' and ‘including’ when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.” 26 U.S.C. § 7701(b)."

Smethers v. Joliet 2005 WL 1983371, *3 (N.D.Ohio) (N.D.Ohio,2005)

or

"McCoy argues she should not have to pay taxes for 1996-98 because under Code Section 3401 FN1 she was not an “employee,” which she contends is defined as an elected or appointed employee or official of the federal government. McCoy clearly misconstrues Section 3401(c). The definition of “employee” includes private-sector employees, employees of the federal government, as well as elected and appointed officials.FN2 The very language of the Code is inclusive, not limited to the examples of included persons. Additionally, Treasury Regulation Section 31.3401(c)-1(a) states: “employee includes every individual performing services if the relationship between him and the person for whom he performs such services is the legal relationship of the employer and employee.” Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(a). "

McCoy v. U.S., Dept. of Treasury 2001 WL 1478793, *2 (N.D.Tex.) (N.D.Tex.,2001)


Just to name a few....

[John J. Bulten]

(employee) is not given a meaning, but 7701(c) says do not exclude things otherwise in its meaning.

See how easy it is? What is otherwise in the meaning of something which is not given a meaning? Nothing!

Therefore, a private worker employee can not be excluded.

Why are private workers otherwise in the meaning of something which is not given a meaning? There is no law that places them there.

Your interpretation ASSUMES a "Chapter 24 purpose" which is totally self-serving and flies in the face of 7701(c).

You neglected to note that the definition of 3401(c) "employee" includes a "Chapter 24 purpose" in its opening words "For purposes of this chapter".

Natty and Banjo both seem to ignore the implication of the fact that the word "include(s)" appears 3 times in 3231(b), once even using the phrase "officer of an employer" that is parallel to 3401(c) "officer of a corporation". If your argument is that you cannot exclude the ordinary meaning of the word when "includes" appears, you cannot exclude it from the "includes" clauses of 3231(b) (even if you successfully exclude it from the "means" clause). The "includes" clause adds to the "means" clause, remember?

It may seem strange to import common workers into 3231 just because the word "includes" appears and because the presence of "includes" is sufficient to prevent exclusion of the common meaning of the word; I agree that it's strange, but it's exactly how you claim you can import them into 3401, and so your import into 3401 ought to appear equally strange to you.

The following statement is about one correct way to read definitions like 3231(b) which use both "means" and "includes":

Given a definition "E means A; E includes B" we substitute the definition of "includes" and get "E means A; (or) E means B; (or) E means other things besides B otherwise within the meaning of E". Well, since E includes B, the "other things" might well be just A; and this yields "E means A or B".

This correct reading would be prohibited if your position is "you cannot exclude the ordinary meaning of the word when 'includes' appears." This means you must fall back (like Dan) to an even more convoluted rule, or admit that you are making a special pleading for the 3401 case.

As for Chapter 21, that has to do with the 50 states not being included in 3121(e)(1) "States". There is another thread on that. The fact that these incomplete inclusions keep appearing, but only where a complete inclusion would overreach the Constitution, should give one pause.

[John J. Bulten]

Lawman, since these rulings rely on and interpret the law, none of them says or can say that all private workers are 3401(c) employees. As I said, they're avoiding the question, because there's no way to answer it directly within the law.

United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1985) (characterizing the argument "that under 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) the category of 'employee' does not include privately employed wage earners [as] a preposterous reading of the statute ....

Yes, "employee" includes all privately employed "wage" earners, whether they are officers of a corporation, or work for a federally-owned entity like the TVA.

26 U.S.C. § 3401 defines wages as “all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer ....“ 26 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (emphasis added). The statute then goes on to define various exceptions to this broad definition of wages in certain categories of private employment, such as in the agricultural and domestic service fields,FN17 newspaper delivery, FN18 the clergy,FN19 and for wages incurred by individuals working for employers “other than the United States or an agency therof” within Puerto Rico or a possession of the United States.FN20 There is nothing in the statute limiting “wages” to solely publicly-derived income.

Yes, among 3401(c) employees, it is true that those government/corporate/similar workers who happen to be ag workers, newsies, clergy, or possessions workers are excluded from earning "wages", whether they work in public or private "employment". Yes, there is nothing limiting "wages" to publicly-derived income; some individual "wage" income is derived from corporations and is thereby no more publicly-derived than corporate income is.

It is clear that § 6332 (which defines ‘person’ under the Tax Code) is stated in all-inclusive terms of general application. The statute further claries that “[t]he terms ‘includes' and ‘including’ when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.”

It is also clear that 1 USC 8 defines "person" to include any born-alive Homo sapiens.

McCoy argues she should not have to pay taxes for 1996-98 because under Code Section 3401 FN1 she was not an “employee,” which she contends is defined as an elected or appointed employee or official of the federal government. McCoy clearly misconstrues Section 3401(c). The definition of “employee” includes private-sector employees, employees of the federal government, as well as elected and appointed officials.FN2 The very language of the Code is inclusive, not limited to the examples of included persons. Additionally, Treasury Regulation Section 31.3401(c)-1(a) states: “employee includes every individual performing services if the relationship between him and the person for whom he performs such services is the legal relationship of the employer and employee.” Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(a). "

Exactly! The language is expansive to others of the same general class, so it includes some private-sector employees like corporate officers and workers for corporations fully or partially owned by the government. And of course the regs state that "employee" means anyone who works for someone in a legal "employer"-"employee" relationship. That relationship is defined in 3401. The fact that the regs circularly refer the legal definition of "employee" to the legal definition of "employee" is merely to shrug off responsibility for defining more completely. (And I've already commented on 1(b).)

[Cpt Banjo]

Therefore, a private worker employee can not be excluded.

Why are private workers otherwise in the meaning of something which is not given a meaning? There is no law that places them there.

What places them there are (a) the ordinary meaning of the word, and (b) the absence of any language that qualifies or restricts the ordinary meaning of the word. For example, private employees fall under 3121 and 3401 because they are within the normal meaning of the term "employee" and because there's nothing in either of these sections that indicates that all private employees are not to be included. By contrast, Section 3132(b) contains language that indicates that not all normal-word employees are to be included within the term "employee", but only those who work for rail carriers.

Bulten might ask himself why, if Congress really intended to exclude private employees from 3132 and 3401, it didn't use a restrictive definition of "employer" as it did in 3132(b).

Natty and Banjo both seem to ignore the implication of the fact that the word "include(s)" appears 3 times in 3231(b), once even using the phrase "officer of an employer" that is parallel to 3401(c) "officer of a corporation". If your argument is that you cannot exclude the ordinary meaning of the word when "includes" appears, you cannot exclude it from the "includes" clauses of 3231(b) (even if you successfully exclude it from the "means" clause). The "includes" clause adds to the "means" clause, remember?

It's not necessarily "the ordinary meaning of the word" that isn't to be excluded, although it may be. 7701(c) talks about not excluding "other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined". Now, what is "otherwise within the meaning of the term defined"? Well, as stated above, if the normal term isn't qualified in some way, its normal meaning is what's not to be excluded, but if it's normal meaning is qualified in some way (as is the case with 3132(b), which restricts the term "employee" to railroad employees), then it's the qualified meaning that's not to be excluded.

It may seem strange to import common workers into 3231 just because the word "includes" appears and because the presence of "includes" is sufficient to prevent exclusion of the common meaning of the word; I agree that it's strange, but it's exactly how you claim you can import them into 3401, and so your import into 3401 ought to appear equally strange to you.

No, I don't import them into 3401, because they're already there.

[jg]

I hereby nominate Mr. Bulten for the title of "Rabid rationalizing deracinator of ratiocination" (or a shorter verison that fits as a title e.g. "Rabid deracinator of reason").

See http://www.geocities.com/gene_moutoux/pageR.htm

[Quixote]

Hi Neckbone, who's the new strummer?

1. There are some occasional agreements, but more importantly there are no disagreements from those required to explain the law rightly. Among tax scholars, Tax Notes ran a review of Pete which was very even-handed, not taking a position itself, but admitting that the logic on both sides was believed by reasonable people.

The article:

http://www.cheatingfrenzy.com/ctc_taxnotes.pdf

That can't be the article Bulten is talking about. That article does not "[admit] that the logic on both sides was believed by reasonable people." The only person discussed at any length is Pete Hendrickson.

Hendrickson has been in the tax protest movement
for almost 20 years. He spent time in prison
following an attempt to send a mail bomb to the IRS
in 1990. Cracking was published in July 2003.

Maybe that's Bulten's idea of a reasonable person.

[natty]

(employee) is not given a meaning, but 7701(c) says do not exclude things otherwise in its meaning.

See how easy it is? What is otherwise in the meaning of something which is not given a meaning? Nothing!

If Congress does not import a meaning to a word then the common ordinary usage is assumed, i.e., dictionary. Otherwise, every word in every statute would require a definition. See how easy that was?

Therefore, a private worker employee can not be excluded.

Why are private workers otherwise in the meaning of something which is not given a meaning? There is no law that places them there.

Why would you assume private workers are excluded? The common ordinary meaning of employee certainly has private workers in its meaning.

Your interpretation ASSUMES a "Chapter 24 purpose" which is totally self-serving and flies in the face of 7701(c).

You neglected to note that the definition of 3401(c) "employee" includes a "Chapter 24 purpose" in its opening words "For purposes of this chapter".

But YOUR "Chapter 24 purpose" contains the hidden premise that private workers are not subject to withholding simply because you say so.

Natty and Banjo both seem to ignore the implication of the fact that the word "include(s)" appears 3 times in 3231(b), once even using the phrase "officer of an employer" that is parallel to 3401(c) "officer of a corporation". If your argument is that you cannot exclude the ordinary meaning of the word when "includes" appears, you cannot exclude it from the "includes" clauses of 3231(b) (even if you successfully exclude it from the "means" clause). The "includes" clause adds to the "means" clause, remember?

No, the law is that you can not exclude things otherwise within the MEANING of the term defined. The ORDINARY meaning is only used if Congress has not specified a particular meaning or somehow qualified that meaning. Ch. 22 gives a specific meaning to 'employee'. That meaning is different than the ordinary meaning and private workers are not in that meaning. However, Ch. 24 does not give a specific meaning to 'employee'. Therefore, the ordinary meaning is used. Private workers are not excluded from that ordinary meaning.

It may seem strange to import common workers into 3231 just because the word "includes" appears and because the presence of "includes" is sufficient to prevent exclusion of the common meaning of the word; I agree that it's strange, but it's exactly how you claim you can import them into 3401, and so your import into 3401 ought to appear equally strange to you.

The following statement is about one correct way to read definitions like 3231(b) which use both "means" and "includes":

Given a definition "E means A; E includes B" we substitute the definition of "includes" and get "E means A; (or) E means B; (or) E means other things besides B otherwise within the meaning of E". Well, since E includes B, the "other things" might well be just A; and this yields "E means A or B".

This correct reading would be prohibited if your position is "you cannot exclude the ordinary meaning of the word when 'includes' appears." This means you must fall back (like Dan) to an even more convoluted rule, or admit that you are making a special pleading for the 3401 case.

You are close, but the inclusion of a word does not change the meaning of the term defined. Its meaning remains the same and the inclusion merely adds to the items within that definition. The ordinary meaning of a term IS the meaning of the term IF Congress has not given it another meaning. And this isn't "one correct way to read definitions". This is the ONLY way.

As for Chapter 21, that has to do with the 50 states not being included in 3121(e)(1) "States". There is another thread on that. The fact that these incomplete inclusions keep appearing, but only where a complete inclusion would overreach the Constitution, should give one pause.

That is something that you have failed to prove and remains your fantasy.

[LPC]

Among Congressional reps, Barbara Kennelly admitted that the CRS told her that 3121(e) only includes possessions and territories,

Another lie.

According to Hendrickson, Kennelly wrote (in relevant part) as follows:

In your letter you asked if section 3(a) of H.R. 97 defining the word state, and 26 U.S.Code 3121(e) are the same. I have checked with Legislative Counsel and the Congressional Research Service about the definition. According to these legal experts the definitions are not the same. The term state in 26 U.S. Code 3121(e) specifically includes only the named U.S. territories and possessions of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa. [...] H.R. 97, section 3(a) does not specifically define the U.S. territories and possessions that would be eligible under the legislation, and therefore is somewhat more expansive.

This is not much different than two people comparing brownie recipes. Person #1 says "My brownie recipe includes both walnuts and almonds." Person #2 says "My brownie recipe includes only walnuts." Does either recipe include flour, eggs, or chocoloate? Obviously yes. The only difference is what is *added* to the recipe.

Section 3(a) of H.R. 97 of the 104th Congress provided (in relevant part) that "the term 'State' shall be deemed to include the District of Columbia and any United States territory or possession."

By contrast, 26 USC section 3121(e)(1) says: "The term 'State' includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa."

So H.R. 97 included/added *all* territories and possessions but 3121(e) included/added "only" certain named territories and possessions.

But neither excluded any states of the United States.

Incidentally, H.R. 97 had nothing to do with taxes, but was
titled the "Rapid Deployment Strike Force Act." Why did someone ask about a difference in definitions in (a) FICA tax withholding and (b) rapid depoloyment strike forces? Does anyone else smell a set-up?

[Neckbone]

Hi Neckbone, who's the new strummer?

The new strummer is a DC area legend. Perhaps the greatest guitarist that ever lived. But I'm waiting for Demo, our resident authority on all things related to our beloved capital city, to guess the picker.

1. There are some occasional agreements, but more importantly there are no disagreements from those required to explain the law rightly. And who, pray tell, besides you and Pete, are "those required to explain the law rightly"? Among tax scholars, Tax Notes ran a review of Pete which was very even-handed, not taking a position itself, but admitting that the logic on both sides was believed by reasonable people. I read the article. It was just a commentary about what Pete was up to. I didn't think that article was meant to be a legal analysis of Pete's methods. If you construed the article as legal analysis, good luck at trial. Among Congressional reps, Barbara Kennelly admitted that the CRS told her that 3121(e) only includes possessions and territories, and we get similar admissions from time to time. Kennely admitted nothing helpful to Pete, and I'm sure the "similar admissions" you get "from time to time" are more in the nature of testimonials from those who have received refund checks. Do you have any testimonials from someone who's been sued by the US to recover an erroneous refund? I'd like to read one of those. Among federal judges, I don't believe they've ever touched the question. I read the USSC dictum in Groetzinger as saying they want to avoid the "includes" question (in the "trade or business" context) like the plague. Imalawman just needs to add the Judge in Pete's case to his list. I guess you just missed the others he listed.

So it is more significant that the IRS, the draftsmen, the Congressional Record, and the courts never disagree with CtC logic. (Please feel free to cite your proposed counterexamples.) Counterexamples already cited. Thanks, Imalawman.

2. The way you asked, I could answer that if you have "income", CtC requires you to pay the income tax. But since you really mean why don't high-"earnings" folks use CtC, I see that George Baer had $90,000 refunded that had been withheld from him, over 3 successive tax years running. Yet he was not among the Hendrickson Nine. Other examples abound if you look at all the pages of refunds. So why have no millionaires given us venture capital yet? Ask them. I bet Mr. Baer wishes he was in the group of nine. It's always better to deal with the agents that don't carry guns.

P.S. Yes, each of the four Chapters 21-24 has a different definition of "employee". My point is that those who say Chapter 24 includes all workers cannot escape the logical conclusion that the same language in Chapter 22 would also include all workers. Since every tax "pro" knows that Chapter 22 is only for railroad workers, it's surprising that no tax "pro" admits (what the law says) that Chapter 24 is only for government/corporate/similar workers. Your logic is faulty as others point out in this thread. Chapter 22 is limited by its own terms to RR workers. I'm surprised you haven't figured that out yet. And if Chapter 24 is only for government/corporate/similar workers, why all the exclusions for paper throwers and the like? Or is that just a red herring designed by the govt. to confuse the ignorant masses.

You'll get it right one of these days, John. Keep trying.

Neckbone

[Demosthenes]

The new strummer is a DC area legend. Perhaps the greatest guitarist that ever lived. But I'm waiting for Demo, our resident authority on all things related to our beloved capital city, to guess the picker.

Danny Gatton. I never heard of him (I'm a relatively new transplant to DC) but I love a "where's waldo" type of challenge.

[Neckbone]

The new strummer is a DC area legend. Perhaps the greatest guitarist that ever lived. But I'm waiting for Demo, our resident authority on all things related to our beloved capital city, to guess the picker.

Danny Gatton. I never heard of him (I'm a relatively new transplant to DC) but I love a "where's waldo" type of challenge.

Correct. Check out the world's greatest unknown guitar player here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MS5XH84m ... ed&search=

He killed himself. What a waste.

Neckbone

[Demosthenes]

Yikes. He was wonderful!