Rubbing SteveSy's nose (& Weston White's nose) in Pollock

[SteveSy]

1. Now you're adding elements.

2. If the tax is an excise, why is the exercise of a government privilege a necessary compontent?

Because excises tax privileges an excise has never been defined to tax there mere receipt of money.

The 16th A contains no such limitation. Neither does the Constitution. This sounds like a "jurisdictional" argument per Lost Horizons.

The 16th was made for a purpose and that was to keep the court from resorting to the source of the income in order to make the determination of what type of tax it is. Corporations like the one in Pollock have always been taxable because they are using a privilege. They could not exist if it weren't for the charter with is a product of government

Beyond the limitation of resorting to the source the 16th has no other purpose. It certainly wasn't created to tax the earnings of the average laborer working in the ditch.

3. I simply do not understand this statement: "It could be that it is indeed it takes a direct tax to tax a person's gross earnings, not their profit. "

what I meant to say is a tax on profit would be an excise, but a tax on the gross earnings of an individual would take a direct tax. In other words a tax on gross earnings of an individual includes a tax on the capital itself and thus is a tax on a person's property.

[ASITStands]

Case closed.

If the case is closed, why do you continue to harp on the matter?

It shows you're not entirely convinced when you continue to attempt to convince others.

And, by the way, your copy of Black's Law Dictionary very clearly delineates a CAPITATION TAX, as, "A poll tax." Duh?! That's exactly what we discussed in Springer.

[Prof]

1. Now you're adding elements.

2. If the tax is an excise, why is the exercise of a government privilege a necessary compontent?

Because excises tax privileges an excise has never been defined to tax there mere receipt of money.

The 16th A contains no such limitation. Neither does the Constitution. This sounds like a "jurisdictional" argument per Lost Horizons.

The 16th was made for a purpose and that was to keep the court from resorting to the source of the income in order to make the determination of what type of tax it is. Corporations like the one in Pollock have always been taxable because they are using a privilege. They could not exist if it weren't for the charter with is a product of government

Beyond the limitation of resorting to the source the 16th has no other purpose. It certainly wasn't created to tax the earnings of the average laborer working in the ditch.

3. I simply do not understand this statement: "It could be that it is indeed it takes a direct tax to tax a person's gross earnings, not their profit. "

what I meant to say is a tax on profit would be an excise, but a tax on the gross earnings of an individual would take a direct tax. In other words a tax on gross earnings of an individual includes a tax on the capital itself and thus is a tax on a person's property.

1. Why does an excise have to be related to a government priv. Further, the government involved in chartering most corporations is state government, not federal government. Now you sound like PH/Lost Horizons again.

2. You keep saying that the 16th was not intended to allow taxation of ordinary laborers; the 16th does not say that; the legislative history is not clearly in your favor; history is not in your favor. So, what difference does your basically unsuported opinion make? If the legislative hitory were crystal clear, you might have a point, but the history of the 16th is certainly not clear enough to support your position and I, for one, think that the l6th was written solely for the purpose of taxing incomes of individuals -- since that is what it says and what it was written to "fix" --Pollock -- did not find that taxation of individuals was unconstitutional.

3. As a number of people have pointed out, you are arguing about deductions from gross income, which the law/courts/common sense says are matters entrusted solely to the legislature, limited only by the due process/equal protection clauses.

[Quixote]

My bad, I cut the wrong court.
Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 02/17/1943)

My source was Vesuslaw

The quote does appear in that case, but when seen in context does not mean what Steve would like it to mean.

"It necessarily follows that [**5] HN3a tax paid a foreign country is not an income tax within the meaning of Section 131(a)(1) of the Act unless it conforms in its substantive elements to the criteria established under our revenue laws. These commonly accepted criteria, although not defined in the statute, may be easily ascertained. It is clear from a reading of the Act, as well as the revenue acts which preceded it, and the cases interpretive of its provisions, that an income tax is a direct tax upon income as therein defined. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493, L.R.A. 1917D, 414, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570; and, other cases hereinafter cited. The defined concept of income has been uniformly restricted to a gain realized or a profit derived from capital, labor, or both. Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Act of 1936, 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev. Acts, page 825; Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 60 S.Ct. 631, 84 L.Ed. 864; United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U.S. 88, 56 S.Ct. 353, 80 L.Ed. 500; Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 59, 80 L.Ed. 3, 101 A.L.R. 391; [**6] United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 52 S.Ct. 4, 76 L.Ed. 131; Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 53 S.Ct. 761, 77 L.Ed. 1439; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 S.Ct. 336, 74 L.Ed. 916; Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247, 42 S.Ct. 483, 66 L.Ed. 923; Eisner v. Macomber, supra; Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 38 S.Ct. 543, 62 L.Ed. 1149; Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 38 S.Ct. 540, 62 L.Ed. 1142; MacLaughlin v. Harr, 3 Cir., 99 F.2d 638. It seems logical to conclude that any tax, if it is to qualify as a tax on income within the meaning of Section 131(a)(1), is subject to the same basic restrictions. The Supreme Court, without advancing any precise definition of the term "income tax", has unmistakably determined that taxes imposed on subjects other than income, e.g., franchises, privileges, etc., are not income taxes, although measured on the basis of income. Stratton's Independence, Ltd., v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 34 S.Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed. 285; McCoach v. Minehill & S.H.R. Co., 228 U.S. 295, 33 S.Ct. 419, 57 L.Ed. 842; [**7] Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 31 S.Ct. 342, 55 L.Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312; Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 24 S.Ct. 376, 48 L.Ed. 496; see: Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 183, 38 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed. 1054; United States v. Whitridge, 231 U.S. 144, 147, 34 S.Ct. 24, 58 L.Ed. 159. These criteria are determinative of the nature of the tax in question." Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894 (Emphasis added.)

The court in Keasbey was just saying that an income tax is a tax on income, not a tax on something else, but which uses income as the measure of the tax.

[ASITStands]

I'm not going to join the argument but here's the complete text in Keasbey:

HN3 A tax paid a foreign country is not an income tax within the meaning of I.R.A. of 1936 § 131(a)(1) unless it conforms in its substantive elements to the criteria established under the revenue laws. These commonly accepted criteria, although not defined in the statute, may be easily ascertained. It is clear from a reading of the Act, as well as the revenue acts which preceded it, and the cases interpretive of its provisions, that an income tax is a direct tax upon income as therein defined. The defined concept of income has been uniformly restricted to a gain realized or a profit derived from capital, labor, or both. I.R.A. of 1936 § 22(a).

It necessarily follows that [**5] HN3 Go to the description of this Headnote.a tax paid a foreign country is not an income tax within the meaning of Section 131(a)(1) of the Act unless it conforms in its substantive elements to the criteria established under our revenue laws. These commonly accepted criteria, although not defined in the statute, may be easily ascertained. It is clear from a reading of the Act, as well as the revenue acts which preceded it, and the cases interpretive of its provisions, that an income tax is a direct tax upon income as therein defined. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493, L.R.A. 1917D, 414, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570; and, other cases hereinafter cited. The defined concept of income has been uniformly restricted to a gain realized or a profit derived from capital, labor, or both. Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Act of 1936, 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev. Acts, page 825; Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 60 S.Ct. 631, 84 L.Ed. 864; United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U.S. 88, 56 S.Ct. 353, 80 L.Ed. 500; Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 59, 80 L.Ed. 3, 101 A.L.R. 391; [**6] United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 52 S.Ct. 4, 76 L.Ed. 131; Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 53 S.Ct. 761, 77 L.Ed. 1439; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 S.Ct. 336, 74 L.Ed. 916; Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247, 42 S.Ct. 483, 66 L.Ed. 923; Eisner v. Macomber, supra; Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 38 S.Ct. 543, 62 L.Ed. 1149; Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 38 S.Ct. 540, 62 L.Ed. 1142; MacLaughlin v. Harr, 3 Cir., 99 F.2d 638. It seems logical to conclude that any tax, if it is to qualify as a tax on income within the meaning of Section 131(a)(1), is subject to the same basic restrictions. The Supreme Court, without advancing any precise definition of the term "income tax", has unmistakably determined that taxes imposed on subjects other than income, e.g., franchises, privileges, etc., are not income taxes, although measured on the basis of income. Stratton's Independence, Ltd., v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 34 S.Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed. 285; McCoach v. Minehill & S.H.R. Co., 228 U.S. 295, 33 S.Ct. 419, 57 L.Ed. 842; [**7] Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 31 S.Ct. 342, 55 L.Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312; Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 24 S.Ct. 376, 48 L.Ed. 496; see: Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 183, 38 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed. 1054; United States v. Whitridge, 231 U.S. 144, 147, 34 S.Ct. 24, 58 L.Ed. 159. These criteria are determinative of the nature of the tax in question.

The phrase, "... that an income tax is a direct tax upon income as therein defined" is defined by the following sentence, "The defined concept of income has been uniformly restricted to a gain realized or a profit derived from capital, labor, or both."

Don't confuse the issue by saying what the court did not say.

EDIT: I see 'Quixote' beat me to it!

[Famspear]

I added an edit to one of my earlier posts -- to make clear that SteveSy made an honest mistake, not an intentional attempt to fake a quote.

[Imalawman]

Steve the problem is that you cite from cases which touched on other subjects and were not on point. Then, you cite to cases that when looking at it unfocused for hours a spaceship appears (to you) when in fact the court never says such a thing. We can cite directly to supreme court cases which state the law precisely on point and with precise language - all you can do is muddle a few lines from decisions that are taken out of context and stretch them to mean more than they were intended.

For instance, you cannot cite to a court has ever said, "to be constitutionally valid, an income tax can only be levied as an excise where it is connected to a privilege" while we can cite to cases which state the opposite. You're running against the wind trying to say that the law means something different from it really does. I just think you're efforts are misplaced. I think you ought to be laying down arguments about the law should be. At least there we can have a debate that's not pull-your-hair-out frustrating for those of us that actually know the law as it currently is.

But I ask you again, doesn't the 16th amendment take the steam out of any argument you're making? I forget the importance of what you're trying to argue.

[SteveSy]

1. Why does an excise have to be related to a government priv. Further, the government involved in chartering most corporations is state government, not federal government. Now you sound like PH/Lost Horizons again.

Well, that's what the SC has said especially in cases like Flint v. Stone and several of the succession tax cases.

2. You keep saying that the 16th was not intended to allow taxation of ordinary laborers; the 16th does not say that; the legislative history is not clearly in your favor; history is not in your favor. So, what difference does your basically unsuported opinion make? If the legislative hitory were crystal clear, you might have a point, but the history of the 16th is certainly not clear enough to support your position and I, for one, think that the l6th was written solely for the purpose of taxing incomes of individuals -- since that is what it says and what it was written to "fix" --Pollock -- did not find that taxation of individuals was unconstitutional.

IMO the legislative history is clear. Leading up to the actual amendment and while the amendment was being ratified. The populists wanted the amendment because the rich were escaping taxation in big business and the little people were getting hit with high tarrifs. Its rather silly to claim the populists wanted the amendment just so they could be taxed directly from their paycheck. If they even remotely thought this was going to tax laborers the amendment would have died a very quick death.

3. As a number of people have pointed out, you are arguing about deductions from gross income, which the law/courts/common sense says are matters entrusted solely to the legislature, limited only by the due process/equal protection clauses.

Of course it is....let's let the government decide what the constitution means, the very document that was intended to limit their powers.

[Weston White]

Case closed.

If the case is closed, why do you continue to harp on the matter?

It shows you're not entirely convinced when you continue to attempt to convince others.

And, by the way, your copy of Black's Law Dictionary very clearly delineates a CAPITATION TAX, as, "A poll tax." Duh?! That's exactly what we discussed in Springer.

Actually it shows that I am actively and thoroughly researching this issue. Though think what you wish, it has no bearing on the reason why I am actually here debating.

You realize of course that many legal definitions hold more than one meaning, right? For example INCOME or SERVICE. That is to say that the capitation tax and the poll tax are often used interchangeably, in fact the Convention and the Federalist Papers, never use the term capitation tax, except in the clause itself, in debate and discussion it was always referred to a poll-tax.

In actuality capitation taxes and poll taxes are also known as 'personal taxes'. The point being that capitations and polls affect the individual directly and personally, regardless of the substance taxed, the form never changes. It is a tax upon that person for their class, rank, or for something specific that they do, something that is unavoidable to them as person, as a human being… such as basic human responsibilities, like working to support themselves and their families for example.

Though the definition within the dictionary has two entries defined within, citing Wharton… and being an attorney you should be familiar with the prestigious Francis Wharton.

Also about the Springer case, it is interesting to note that the CRS Annotated Constitution includes only a partial sentence mention of that case in its opening paragraph, stating that the issues in that case were similar to that in the Pollock case. You would tend to think that if Springer meant what you allege it does, they would have included a special section about that within that topic, perhaps titled taxation on wages from labor. Though again such an issue is not brought up, not mentioned, not a single word on the matter. And to say that is because there was no need to, well, that is just the sillies! Because that is not what this is about, whether or not it is needed, it is about clarifying the law in all aspects as it pertains to that individual topic.

[Cpt Banjo]

1. Why does an excise have to be related to a government priv. Further, the government involved in chartering most corporations is state government, not federal government. Now you sound like PH/Lost Horizons again.

Well, that's what the SC has said especially in cases like Flint v. Stone and several of the succession tax cases.

Except that the Court didn't require any sort of privilege in upholding the gift tax or in holding that illegally-obtained income is taxable. Mr. Hylton wasn't exercising any privilege, either.

Because excises tax privileges an excise has never been defined to tax there mere receipt of money.

The mere transfer of property (whether money or anything else) has been held reachable by an excise (i.e., the gift tax). Does it really matter whether the tax is imposed on the transferor or the transferee?

[SteveSy]

Steve the problem is that you cite from cases which touched on other subjects and were not on point.

Whatever....man you guys just say anything. Those cases are exactly on point because the defendant argued them and the court rejected the arguments based in part with what I quoted.

Then, you cite to cases that when looking at it unfocused for hours a spaceship appears (to you) when in fact the court never says such a thing. We can cite directly to supreme court cases which state the law precisely on point and with precise language - all you can do is muddle a few lines from decisions that are taken out of context and stretch them to mean more than they were intended.

I have never quoted out of context....if anything you guys do that nonsense with cases like Steward Machine that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with a tax on the income of individuals. Yet almost all of you will be quick to surgically cut a quote out of that case as if you have found the holly grail of proof....

But I ask you again, doesn't the 16th amendment take the steam out of any argument you're making? I forget the importance of what you're trying to argue.

No, because the 16th serves a purpose and that is to prevent someone from looking to the source to take what was otherwise in the class of excises and placing it in the category of direct taxes where it doesn't belong. As shown by history a tax on income generally is a direct tax. Nothing you can produce, except by others who can not back up anything they say with historical fact, shows otherwise. Again, the only documentation that can be found during or shortly after the adoption of the constitution unequivocally say such a tax is a direct tax.


Bottom line is this is an old tired argument. The only thing you guys can or ever will produce to back up your claim is court cases that have no foundation in historical fact whatsoever. The courts prove their claims by quoting themselves. The unassailable assumption of the validity of the premise is proof you're right. Its a logic fallacy, and in any other realm accept a court of law it would be laughable. That's the problem with you legal guru's, all of your arguments are based in an alternate reality where provable facts are inconsequential. Facts are what your icons say they are, no matter how ludicrous, and nothing else matters.

Its truly absurd, no quotes exist in history, nor is there any support in the laws of other countries which we may have adopted our term "direct tax" from that support you. In fact the one's that do exist ALL prove you wrong. Yet without hesitation you'll latch on to the preposterous theory that something nonexistent has always existed. Truly delusional....

[SteveSy]

1. Why does an excise have to be related to a government priv. Further, the government involved in chartering most corporations is state government, not federal government. Now you sound like PH/Lost Horizons again.

Well, that's what the SC has said especially in cases like Flint v. Stone and several of the succession tax cases.

Except that the Court didn't require any sort of privilege in upholding the gift tax or in holding that illegally-obtained income is taxable. Mr. Hylton wasn't exercising any privilege, either.

I would have to see what the gift was and who was giving. I would also like to see if the constitutional question was ever raised. Mr. Hylton was taxed on the use, just like we're taxed on the use of cars via registration.

[Weston White]

Gallatin had nothing to do with the creation or ratification of the Constitution, and his ideas were never adopted by the Supreme Court. His views are therefore outside the scope of my FAQ, the purpose of which is not to explain what the law might have been, but what the law actually is.

His ideas were in complete accord with everybody's ideas also quoted within that case. The Justices did not include that information for no reason or just to cause confusion or to toy with peoples heads. It was done for a reason, they were seeking absolute clarification on the issues at bar. What do you think the Justices said to themselves, oh we know much more about taxation than Gallatin, he was must have been a moron, we therefore discard all of his writings, and Smith... and Cooley... and all of those in Congress, they must have all been stupid, stupid, stupid! The fact is your FAQ is entirely incorrect regarding this issue.

Weston, this part is actually correct:

The Justices did not include that information for no reason or just to cause confusion or to toy with peoples heads. It was done for a reason, they were seeking absolute clarification on the issues at bar.

We've been through this before: When a court issues a written opinion explaining its decision, the court lists the arguments -- often the arguments on both sides. The court then makes a decision -- which generally means that the court rejects one side's arguments.

I believe you have made this argument before: that if the court mentions an argument in its opinion, the court must somehow be accepting that argument. That's just stupid.

On this, you are wrong.

Weston, how many actual court cases have you read? Or are you still copying and pasting excerpts from tax protester web sites?

As I noted above, Gallatin wrote that a direct tax was a tax on the revenue of the people. Tax protesters in general use Gallatin's argument to argue that an income tax is a direct tax for purposes of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court in Pollock clearly rejected the Gallatin proposition as a general proposition. I've already provide you with the quotes, and yet (as usual) you simply ignore what the Court stated.

Perhaps you should actually read the Pollock cases. If you've already read them, then re-read them.

And, another comment about a prior posting of yours: Stop the trollish behavior. When I give you a quote from case, that's a quote from the case --and it's a quote in context. In that situation, don't contradict me; don't falsely accuse me of planting false quotes. You were caught doing that with Lucas v. Earl. Don't you falsely accuse others of doing what you clearly did yourself. And don't launch into another "defense" of your behavior, Weston.

No you are a liar, the courts never used the word revenue as you had stated. Geez, you do not even know what trolling is, just as you do not know what chaining is. I must ask are you really even a lawyer? My goodness.

And lets get your story straight, so you claim that the court sized about 1/2 a dozen people including Hamilton himself, all what they were quoted on agrees with what every other had stated, for the most part anyways. So the Justices than include all of those quotes to reject them all the while never including the quotes or the commentary of those they do agree with... and then they also leave out the part were they mentioned or affirmed that they reject all of those quotes? I think I have said enough, obviously you look very foolish in your stated notions.

[SteveSy]

This is old....We've done this so many times its like regurgitation.

No, these arguments will not win in court. No surprise there, they are hand picked by the very people wanting the tax.

You've established that history does not matter and anything that was said during the adoption of the constitution by the founders is meaningless. The only thing that matters is what a hand picked judge says 200 years later. That's you choice....its not mine. This is why I've mainly stuck to ranting and raving at least people have a little closer connection to reality there.

Have fun.

[Quixote]

I have never quoted out of context....

That's a strange claim coming from a man just exposed for quoting out of context.

[Dr. Caligari]

Well, that's what the SC has said especially in cases like Flint v. Stone and several of the succession tax cases.

...but they said the opposite in the gift tax cases and in Steward machine, no?

[SteveSy]

I have never quoted out of context....

That's a strange claim coming from a man just exposed for quoting out of context.

Its not out of context....you can say it a thousand times it won't change the fact that I did not.

Tell me how the quote I posted is out of context. My guess is you'll avoid showing where and try another one of your silly tactics of shifting the argument. This is why I hate discussing this nonsense with you guys. You can't have a serious discussion with you guys, you'll resort to personal attacks or doing what you just did by trying to win by character assassination.

[Cpt Banjo]

I would have to see what the gift was and who was giving. I would also like to see if the constitutional question was ever raised. Mr. Hylton was taxed on the use, just like we're taxed on the use of cars via registration.

Have at it. Here's the case:
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/g ... &invol=124

If you read the opinion, you'll discover that the particular identity of the donor or the subject matter of the gift didn't matter in the least. And please don't suggest that it's still an open question whether a privilege is required for an excise simply because Mr. Bromley's attorneys didn't make the argument. [Edit: it appears Bromley's counsel did indeed argue that making a gift was a right, not a privilege, and that taxing the exercise of this right with respect to property was the same as taxing the property, which made it a direct tax. His counsel also argued, "If the tax is a tax upon a person or upon property, it is a direct tax; if on a privilege, it is an excise and is indirect." The Court obviously rejected this and all of his other constitutional arguments.]

Re Hylton: are you suggesting that the mere use of my own property involves a privilege? Who knew?

Your analogy is inapposite, btw. Registering cars is for the privilege of driving on public highways. As long as I don't drive on the public highway, I needn't register my car. The carriage tax, on the other hand, didn't require any such connection. It reached, among others, any carriage kept by someone for his own use, and it didn't matter whether he drove it on a public road or just around his farm.

[Weston White]

Again:

These subjects, in 1798, 1813, 1815, 1816, were lands, improvements, dwelling houses, and slaves, and, in 1861, lands, improvements, and dwelling houses only. Under the act of 1798, slaves were assessed at fifty cents on each; under the other acts, according to valuation by assessors."

"This review shows that personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like have never been regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct tax. It has been supposed that slaves must be considered as an exception to this observation. But the exception is rather apparent than real. As persons, slaves were proper subjects of a capitation tax, which is described in the Constitution as a direct tax; as property, they were, by the laws of some, if not most, of the States classed as real property, descendible to heirs. Under the first view, they would be subject to the tax of 1798, as a capitation tax; under the latter, they would be subject to the taxation of the other years as realty.

As I noted above, Gallatin wrote that a direct tax was a tax on the revenue of the people. Tax protesters in general use Gallatin's argument to argue that an income tax is a direct tax for purposes of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court in Pollock clearly rejected the Gallatin proposition as a general proposition. I've already provide you with the quotes, and yet (as usual) you simply ignore what the Court stated.

That is not what he said, what he actually said was:

""... by direct taxes, meant those paid directly from, and falling immediately on, the revenue, and, by indirect, those which are paid indirectly out of the revenue by falling immediately upon the expense.""

Nobody here is making the argument that income taxes are direct taxes. The argument is that income taxes are not taxes upon the individual’s basic revenue. And everything historical, everything foundational supports that understanding. The income tax only applies to that individual after they have taken they have used that revenue to profit themselves, otherwise you might as well tax their feet to walk, their hands to touch, and their mouths to eat!

Quoting from Pollock [this is what the income tax would be if it means to tax the laborer on their labor or the money from their labor]:

4. Whether Particular Taxes Are Direct or Indirect – a. On Income. – A tax upon one’s whole income is a tax upon the annual receipts from his whole property, and as such falls within the same class as a tax upon that property, and is a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution.

The federal statutes annotated [1905]

AND

Mr. Sedgwick said that "[1] a capitation tax, and taxes on [2] land and [3] on property and [4] income generally were direct charges, as well in the immediate as ultimate sources of contribution. He had considered those, and those only, as direct taxes in their operation and effects. On the other hand, a tax imposed on a specific article of personal property, and particularly if objects of luxury, as in the case under consideration, he had never supposed had been considered a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution."

[/quote]

[SteveSy]

Well, that's what the SC has said especially in cases like Flint v. Stone and several of the succession tax cases.

...but they said the opposite in the gift tax cases and in Steward machine, no?

To be honest I haven't looked at the gift tax cases, was there a constitutional argument even made there? As far as steward machine I think its blatantly obvious many of you are taking what they said out of context.

An excise is not limited to vocations or activities [p581] that may be prohibited altogether. It is not limited to those that are the outcome of a franchise. It extends to vocations or activities pursued as of common right. What the individual does in the operation of a business is amenable to taxation just as much as what he owns, at all events if the classification is not tyrannical or arbitrary. "Business is as legitimate an object of the taxing powers as property." Newton v. Atchison, 31 Kan. 151, 154 (per Brewer, J.), 1 Pac. 288. Indeed, ownership itself, as we had occasion to point out the other day, is only a bundle of rights and privileges invested with a single name. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577. "A state is at liberty, if it pleases, to tax them all collectively, or to separate the faggots and lay the charge distributively." Ibid. Employment is a business relation, if not itself a business. It is a relation without which business could seldom be carried on effectively. The power to tax the activities and relations that constitute a calling considered as a unit is the power to tax any of them. The whole includes the parts. Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 267, 268.

First off what is the case about?

Every employer (with stated exceptions) is to pay for each calendar year "an excise tax, with respect to having individuals in his employ," the tax to be measured by prescribed percentages of the total wages payable by the employer during the calendar year with respect to such employment.

This has nothing to do with taxing individuals. Its is however about taxing an employer, in this case a corporation, based on the wages paid to the individuals. Again its a company being taxed not the people who work for it. That first quote basically says in a nutshell that taxing business is a legitimate operation of an excise tax. "A state is at liberty, if it pleases, to tax them all collectively, or to separate the faggots and lay the charge distributively." Meaning that business is the object of taxation and they can separate the operation of that business and tax any piece of it.

We need to focus on what the object was in this case, it was a tax on the employer for the employment of people. Hence:

We learn that employment for lawful gain is a "natural" or "inherent" or "inalienable" right, and not a "privilege" at all. But natural rights, so called, are as much subject to taxation as rights of less importance.

So the court is talking about taxing employment not the earnings of the employees and the employees being liable for the tax. The company that hired them is the one being taxed, that's a huge difference.

An excise is not limited to vocations or activities [p581] that may be prohibited altogether. It is not limited to those that are the outcome of a franchise. It extends to vocations or activities pursued as of common right.

Again the context is the employer being the one liable for the tax not the person working. Vocations and activities have been taxed with an excise many times throughout history, generally in the form of licenses, something clearly within the definition of an excise. In fact I would be willing to bet not one definition offered by the supreme court has ever missed mentioning licenses.

And to no surprise they graciously give us examples:

The statute books of the states are strewn with illustrations of taxes laid on [p583] occupations pursued of common right. [n7]
...
7. Alabama General Acts, 1935, c.194, Art. XIII (flat license tax on occupations); Arizona Revised Code, Supplement (1936) § 3138a et seq. (general gross receipts tax); Connecticut General Statutes, Supplement (1935) §§ 457c, 458c (gross receipts tax on unincorporated businesses); Revised Code of Delaware (1935) §§ 192-197 (flat license tax on occupations); Compiled Laws of Florida, Permanent Supplement (1936) Vol. I, § 1279 (flat license tax on occupations); Georgia Laws, 1935, p. 11 (flat license tax on occupations); Indiana Statutes Ann. (1933) § 64 2601 et seq. (general gross receipts tax); Louisiana Laws, 3rd Extra Session, 1934, Act No. 15, 1st Extra Session, 1935, Acts Nos. 5, 6 (general gross receipts tax); Mississippi Laws, 1934, c. 119 (general gross receipts tax); New Mexico Laws, 1935, c. 73 (general gross receipts tax); South Dakota Laws, 1933, c. 184 (general gross receipts tax, expired June 30, 1935); Washington Laws, 1935, c. 180, Title II (general gross receipts tax); West Virginia Code, Supplement (1935) § 960 (general gross receipts tax).

Every one of those are either a license tax or a tax on a privilege, the law specifically says so. I've looked them all up, all of them I have posted here prior when we went through this argument before.