"That's 'MR. SUI JURIS' To You, Buddy!"

[The Observer]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
C. GREGORY MELICK

Release Date: AUGUST 06, 2010


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Opinion No. 2010 DNH 140C

ORDER

The government petitioned, under 26 U.S.C. section 7402(b) and 7604(a), to enforce an Internal Revenue Service summons against C. Gregory Melick. The court ordered Melick to appear before the magistrate judge to show cause why he should not be compelled to obey the IRS summons. Melick filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process, insufficient service of process, duress, estoppel, laches, and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Doc. no. 4. Melick received a copy of the order to show cause but refused to accept it. He also failed to appear at the show cause hearing, and he filed a second motion to dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction. Doc. no. 6.

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that Melick be ordered to obey the IRS summons and that his first motion to dismiss be denied. The magistrate judge also recommended that the government be awarded its costs.

BACKGROUND

The facts are taken from the government's petition and its attachments. The IRS has been investigating the collection of Melick's tax liability for the year ending December 31, 2003. The IRS seeks Melick's testimony and documents within his control regarding the investigation. On February 26, 2010, an IRS summons was issued, directing Melick to appear before an IRS officer on March 16, 2010, to testify and to produce for examination certain records and data. Melick was served with the summons on March 2, but he did not comply with it.

IRS Revenue Officer Sonia Cryan, who was investigating Melick's case before her retirement from the IRS, submitted a declaration stating that she issued and served the administrative summons. 1 She also stated that the books, papers, records, and data described in the summons are not in the possession of the IRS, that all administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code for issuing a summons have been taken, and that it is necessary to obtain the testimony and data sought to complete a Collection Information Statement concerning Melick's federal tax liability for the period(s) ending December 31, 2003.

Melick filed a motion to dismiss, to which the government objected. The petition and the motion were referred to the magistrate judge, who issued a report and recommendation on July 8, 2010. Just before the report and recommendation was issued, Melick filed a second motion to dismiss, challenging the court's jurisdiction. The government again objected.

On July 12, Melick filed a notice of a change of address, informing the court that his mailing address is P.O. Box 422, Chocorua, New Hampshire. Melick also stated that he might return mail addressed to the wrong party or sent to a different address. On July 23, Melick filed a second notice of change of address, stating that his correct mailing address is "Charles Gregory Melick, Sui Juris, c/o P.O. Box 422, Chocorua [03817-0422], New Hampshire, U.S.A." Doc. no. 12. Melick said again that mail addressed to another name or to an address other than the one given would not be "received or accepted" by him. Id. On August 5, Melick filed a third notice of change of address, in which he provided a new mailing address, a post office box in North Conway, New Hampshire. Doc. no. 15.

The magistrate judge recommended that Melick's first motion to dismiss be denied, that the government's petition be granted, and that the government be awarded its costs. Neither party filed an objection to the report and recommendation.

I. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Where "a magistrate judge passes upon a dispositive motion, he or she may only issue a recommended decision. . . . Absent a timely objection, the recommended decision ripens into an order." PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2010). Neither party filed an objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation addressing Melick's first motion to dismiss and the government's petition. It is herewith approved. 2

II. SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS

Melick's second motion to dismiss raises many of the same theories as his first motion. He argues that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over him and subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding. He also appears to raise a number of substantive arguments regarding the legality of federal taxation.Relying in part on its objection to Melick's first motion to dismiss, the government again objects.

A. Personal Jurisdiction

"To hear a case, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties, that is, the power to require the parties to obey its decrees." Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the motion to dismiss is decided without an evidentiary hearing, "the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Levesque v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, No. 09-cv-55-SM, 2009 WL 4547744, at *1 (D.N.H. Nov. 30, 2009) (citing United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 987 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1993)). The court must "accept the plaintiff's (properly documented) evidentiary proffers as true, and construe those facts in the light most congenial to the plaintiff's jurisdictional claim." Hannon, 524 F.3d at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also considers any uncontradicted facts adduced by the defendant. Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998).

"An exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized by state statute and must comply with the Constitution." Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005). Because New Hampshire's long-arm statute permits a court to exercise jurisdiction to the same extent as the Constitution, the only inquiry that remains is what the Constitution permits. Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 287 (1st Cir. 1999).

General personal jurisdiction, as opposed to specific personal jurisdiction, "broadly subjects the defendant to suit in the forum state's courts in respect to all matters, even those that are unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Cossaboon v. Me. Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[A] court is precluded from asserting jurisdiction unless 'the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that [he] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'" Id. at 32 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). "To justify the exercise of general jurisdiction, (1) the defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum state, (2) those contacts must be purposeful, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances." Cossaboon, 600 F.3d at 32.

In its petition, the government stated that, "pon information and belief, . . . Melick resides or is found at 11 Runnells Hall Road, Chocorua, New Hampshire 03817." Doc. no. 1 at paragraph 3. The petition was served on Melick at the same address, which was his "last and usual place of abode." Doc. no. 1, Exh. A & B. The government certified that Melick was served, by giving the documents in hand, with a copy of the petition, the order to show cause, and other documents at 11 Runnells Hill Road in Tamworth, New Hampshire. 3 Doc. no. 3. Moreover, Melick's first motion to dismiss listed his address as 11 Runnells Hall Road, Chocorua, New Hampshire, and his declaration of service stated that he was "from Chocorua, New Hampshire." Doc. no. 4 at 1, 54, 55. Melick does not deny that he resides at that address; rather, he makes legal arguments regarding the limits of federal jurisdiction.

It is undisputed that Melick resides in New Hampshire, and he suggests no other facts that would indicate that he is domiciled elsewhere. "Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring a [] . . . defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment." Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940). This court has personal jurisdiction over Melick.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

"Federal courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, must be scrupulous in applying the tenets that define the limits of their subject matter jurisdiction." U.S. ex rel. Ondis v. City of Woonsocket, 587 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.

Melick does not state any facts or otherwise introduce evidence to suggest that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, he argues that the "United States" only encompasses the District of Columbia, he is not domiciled there, he does not engage in any activity within the jurisdiction of the federal government -- which, he argues, exists only within Washington, D.C., and he does not hold any federal public office. 4 The government counters that the court has jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. section 7604.

Section 7604(a) provides that, "f any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data." The same language is repeated in 26 U.S.C. section 7402(b).

Sonia Cryan served Melick with a summons "ssued under authority of the Internal Revenue Code," which required that Melick appear before Cryan "to give testimony and to bring for examination . . . [a]ll documents and records [he] possess[es] or control[s] regarding" his assets and liabilities. Doc. no. 1, Exh. A & B. As discussed above, Melick resides and was found in New Hampshire. Therefore, under sections 7604(a) and 7402(b), this court has jurisdiction to enforce the IRS summons in this proceeding.

C. Legality of Federal Taxation

Although Melick denominates his motion as one to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, he also attacks the jurisdiction of the IRS and the legality of imposing federal taxes against him. To the extent Melick intended to raise these as grounds for dismissal, the court will not address them on the merits. The government's petition seeks only to enforce an IRS summons, and in such a proceeding, the court's function is "to assess within the limits of [U.S. v.] Powell[, 379 U.S. 48 (1964)] whether the IRS issued its summons for a legitimate tax determination purpose." Sugarloaf Funding, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 584 F.3d 340, 347 (1st Cir. 2009). Arguments regarding the propriety or legality of the tax itself are not relevant at this stage. 5

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the government's petition (doc. no. 1) is granted and Melick's motions to dismiss (doc. nos. 4 and 8 ) are denied.

C. Gregory Melick is hereby ordered to obey the IRS summons and is ordered to appear August 20, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. at 80 Daniel Street, Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03802, before Revenue Officer David Kalinowski (or any other authorized Revenue Officer of the IRS), to give testimony and produce all books and records in Melick's possession or control required and called for by the terms of the summons of February 26, 2010.

Costs are awarded to the government.

This order shall be served in hand on C. Gregory Melick by the United States Marshall or his deputy and a return of service shall be filed with this court.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 6, 2010.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge

cc:
Gretchen Witt, Esquire
C. Gregory Melick, pro se

FOOTNOTES:

/1/ Internal Revenue Officer David Kalinowski is now responsible for the investigation of Melick's tax liability.

/2/ In his first motion to dismiss, Melick took issue with the show cause order's caption, in which he was named "C. GREGORY MELICK," rather than "C. Gregory Melick." Similarly, Melick objects to the use of his Social Security number and to mail being sent to his home address, as opposed to a post office box, or addressed to him without the suffix "Sui Juris." The court notes his preference for mail to be sent to a post office box, and accordingly his address has been changed on the docket. The remainder of Melick's objections are without merit. Melick is advised that he is deemed to have received copies of documents from the court or the government upon mailing to his last known address. Because this court has jurisdiction over him, as discussed below, he must comply with all orders of the court. If he chooses not to open his mail, or to return it to this court, he does so at his own peril.

/3/ The variation between Runnells Hall and Runnells Hill appears to be a typographical error. Chocorua and Tamworth are neighboring towns in central New Hampshire. See Google Map of 11 Runnells Hall Road, Chocorua, NH, http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl (last visited Aug. 3, 2010).

/4/ Melick also argues that the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. section 7421, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2201, strip the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Without further citations, he contends that the two statutes, read together, stand for the idea that, "f there isn't a specific waiver of immunity within 26 USC then the federal district courts can't grant the relief requested." Doc. 8 at 15. Melick is incorrect. Section 7421 prohibits any "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax." This case is nearly the opposite: the IRS is seeking to determine Melick's tax liability, and Melick is attempting to restrain the investigation. Section 7421 is plainly inapplicable.

Similarly, the Declaratory Judgment Act allows a federal court to "declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration," except in most cases involving federal taxes. 28 U.S.C. section 2201. The Declaratory Judgment Act is inapplicable because no declaratory judgment is sought in this case. Unlike Fogel v. United States, No. 00-CV-2293-J (LSP), 2001 WL 306496, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2001), on which Melick relies, no party in this case is seeking a declaratory judgment that he is not required to file U.S. taxes.

/5/ As explained in the report and recommendation, the government has satisfied the Powell test and Melick has not effectively rebutted the government's showing.

[Pottapaug1938]

For another tasty tidbit regarding this buffoon, check out this link:

www.laconiadailysun.com/pdf/2010/7/1.pdf

You'll want to go to page 25, in the lower right hand corner.

[bmielke]

www.laconiadailysun.com/pdf/2010/7/1.pdf

Public Notice
Notice of Default
Be it Known and Remembered by All to Whom These
Presents Come and May Concern:
This public notice is posted for purposes of Edification and
imputing Knowledge to Christ’s church, and to all the
World, Declareth and Witnesseth that, Carroll county, New
Hampshire, superior court case number RE 597 071 920 US,
process was properly and duly served on the Twenty-Fifth
day of the month of June in the Year of Our Lord and
Saviour Jesus, the Christ, Two-Thousand and Ten, upon
Defendant David Kalinowski and same will Default on the
Seventh day of July in the Year of Our Lord and Saviour
Jesus, the Christ, Two-Thousand and Ten, and Default
Judgment in favor of Demandant, Charles Gregory Melick,
suae potestate esse , will enter accordingly on that rule day.

Thats what your looking for it is a 13MB download so I'll save you the trouble.

[bmielke]

I don't know how it works in NH, but in TN the only way you get permission to post a public notice like that is if you try and fail to serve the defendant and then show due dilligance in attempting to locate the defendant. How much dilligance is due depends on the judge. When I was a volunteer in another legal aid office, I had to drive 250 miles trying to serve a guy in order for us to prove due dilligance. Then I found him in a simple google search, we served him the old fashioned way.

[Gregg]

I just want to point out to all the crackheads tuning in on shortwave a phrase

Melick has not effectively rebutted the government's showing

Now what that means, kids, is he didn't come up with some credible information to oppose the information the government asserted.

That's not the same as sending a 4852 saying you didn't make any "wages" or goofy stuff like that....that would be "ineffective attempt to rebut with patent nonsense"

[Pottapaug1938]

Another possibly interesting tidbit for this guy might be:

January 8, 1996

The owners of a movie theater are offering to give their cinema to the winner of an essay contest designed to help pay the medical expenses of a 12-year-old girl. Owner C. Gregory Melick and his three principal investors have agreed to award the Eveningstar Cinema to the contest winner if they receive enough entries at $95 apiece to raise at least $70,000. Melick's closest friend, Brad Smith of Charlton, Mass., is one of the partners who established the cinema. Melick said Smith's daughter, Lila, suffers from cystic fibrosis.

Brunswick is north of Portland. The soon-to-be-closed Brunswick NAS is there. Our pal lives roughly to the west of there, just east of the intersections of Routes 16 and 113; so if you're headed up to the Conway/North Conway area, anytime soon, wave as you drive by.

[bmielke]

Then I found him in a simple google search, we served him the old fashioned way.

With some chianti and some nice fava beans?

White rice and pinto beans, with a Sundrop, (or a construction worker who moonlights as a process server.)

[LPC]

/2/ In his first motion to dismiss, Melick took issue with the show cause order's caption, in which he was named "C. GREGORY MELICK," rather than "C. Gregory Melick." Similarly, Melick objects to the use of his Social Security number and to mail being sent to his home address, as opposed to a post office box, or addressed to him without the suffix "Sui Juris." The court notes his preference for mail to be sent to a post office box, and accordingly his address has been changed on the docket. The remainder of Melick's objections are without merit. Melick is advised that he is deemed to have received copies of documents from the court or the government upon mailing to his last known address. Because this court has jurisdiction over him, as discussed below, he must comply with all orders of the court. If he chooses not to open his mail, or to return it to this court, he does so at his own peril.

A couple of comments on this.

First, I've seen this kind of nonsense before, and I simply can't understand how anyone with an IQ greater than that of algae could believe that you can tell a court that you're not going to accept something unless it's addressed exactly the way you want it. Courts obviously adopt the rather obvious and common-sense position that, if you got it, and you knew it was addressed to you, that's good enough. Believing that you can safely reject papers based on punctuation, capitalization, or other trivial differences seems to be a variation of the "magic words" delusion.

Second, it is pathetic that this guy (and others like him) feel such powerlessness in their lives that they are left with only these kinds of arguments. Melick seems to understand that he can't stop the IRS from assessing taxes against him, and can't stop them from levying against him, but seems to take some comfort in the idea that he can force them to address notices to him the way HE wants rather than the way they want. By settling for what is at best only a symbolic victory in a symbolic issue, he's giving up on the possibility of any real victory. I don't mean that he's ever going to beat the IRS on one of his fantasy-constitutional issues, but he could eke out a real victory for himself by coming to grips with his situation and dealing with it honestly and realistically, and so improve his life.

So I find his arguments to be both very strange and funny, and very sad.

[LPC]

When we last saw Mr. Melick, the district court had entered an order enforcing the IRS summons and dismissed his second petition to dismiss the IRS enforcement action. Judging by the 1st Circuit order below, the following has since transpired:

1. Melick failed to comply with the order enforcing the summons;
2. Melick was found to be in contempt;
3. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest;
4. Melick filed another motion to dismiss (his third?);
5. The district court dismissed the motion to dismiss on the grounds of "fugitive disentitlement."

It also appears that Melick appealed from district court orders #2 and #5. The 1st Circuit dismissed the appeal to the contempt finding because there was no enforcement, but wasn't the arrest warrant in enforcement of the order?

It looks as though Melick's mistake was in appealing the contempt order instead of the order issuing the arrest warrant. (But would that have been dismissed as well, as long as he is a fugitive?)

Sometimes TDs raise interesting issues, but only in the ways they find to lose.

United States v. C. Gregory Melick, Nos. 11-2245 and 11-2448 (1st Cir. 12/13/2012)

UNITED STATES,
Petitioner, Appellee,
v.
C. GREGORY MELICK,
Respondent, Appellant.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Before

Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Thompson, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

Entered: December 13, 2012

C. Gregory Melick, pro se, appeals the district court's October 6, 2011, civil contempt order (Appeal No. 11-2245) and its August 31, 2011, order striking his motion to dismiss the underlying petition to enforce an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine (Appeal No. 11-2448).

I. Appeal 11-2245

The civil contempt order in issue here, although entered after the order granting the petition to enforce the IRS summons, remains interlocutory because it imposes no sanction on Melick. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review it. See United States v. Gonzales, 531 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding post-judgment contempt orders to be interlocutory and non-appealable because district court imposed no sanction on appellant); see SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir.) ("an adjudication of civil contempt is not appealable until sanctions have been imposed" (quotation omitted)), amended on other grounds, 335 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2003); In re U.S. Abatement Corp., 39 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1994) ("It is well-settled that a civil contempt order is not 'final for purposes of appeal unless two actions occur: (1) a finding of contempt is issued, and (2) an appropriate sanction is imposed").

II. Appeal No. 11-2448

As to Melick's challenge to the order striking his motion to dismiss the enforcement proceeding based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the district court. At the time Melick filed the motion to dismiss, he was subject to a bench warrant for his arrest because he had refused to appear in court or to comply with the order enforcing the IRS summons. The record demonstrates Melick was aware of the warrant and was intentionally avoiding both arrest and enforcement of the district court's order. Under these circumstances, the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to entertain Melick's motion. See Goya Foods, Inc. v. Unanue-Casal, 275 F.3d 124, 128-29 (1st Cir. 2001); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 125 125 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1997); Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1997). Moreover, it seems clear that the motion would have been denied in any event, as it was based on arguments challenging the validity of the enforcement order that either had been previously considered and rejected by the district court or could have been raised in a timely appeal. See United States v. Allee, 888 F.2d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 1989). To the extent that Melick continues to press those issues on appeal, his arguments are foreclosed by his failure to file a timely appeal of the enforcement order.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal from the district court's civil contempt order (No. 11-2245) is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the district court's August 31, 2011, order, which is the subject of Appeal No. 11-2448, is summarily affirmed.

By the Court:

Margaret Carter, Clerk.

cc:
Aframe, Seth R.
Iacopino, Michael J.
Nolet, John A.
Rowan, Bridget Maria
Witt, Gretchen Leah
Melick, C. Gregory

[The Observer]

Sometimes TDs raise interesting issues, but only in the ways they find to lose.

Seems that could be another Quatloosian Award we could hand out to TPs: "Most Interesting Way To Lose A Court Case."

[The Observer]

By the way, any information out there to suggest that Melick is a disciple of or interacted with Ed Brown? I note that he is from New Hampshire and can't help but suspect that he is or was a sympathizer with the Browns during their escapade. The sad thing here is that he is heading down the same road as Ed and Elaine did; at some point the court is going to have him arrested and jailed.

[The Observer]

Here is what transpired after the August 6th, 2010 hearing (from a subsequent hearing - 108 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6031):

Melick failed to appear at the IRS office on August 20, 2010, in response to the court's order. Three hours after his ordered appointment, Melick left a telephone message with the Taxpayer Walk-in Service that he would need to reschedule his appointment. On September 6, Melick wrote a letter to the IRS indicating that he expected to provide the 2003 information within thirty days. On September 13, Revenue Officer David Kalinowski contacted Melick, who told Kalinowski that he had hired an accountant to prepare a substitute [*6] tax return for 2003. The IRS did not receive any responsive paperwork with regard to Melick's 2003 tax liability within thirty days.

On November 17 and 23, 2010, Revenue Officer Kalinowski attempted to contact Melick by telephone to determine whether he still intended to comply with the court's order. On both occasions, he received no answer and left messages on Melick's answering machine asking him to return the call. Melick did not return Kalinowski's calls.

On December 16, 2010, the government moved to hold Melick in civil contempt. In response, the court ordered Melick to show cause in court on February 14, 2011, at 10 a.m., as to why he should not be held in contempt of the court's August 6, 2010, enforcement order. The court specifically warned Melick that if he did not appear for the hearing, a warrant would issue for his arrest. Deputy U.S. Marshal Paul Schmieder personally served Melick with the show cause order and related documents on February 3, 2011.

On February 11, 2011, Melick mailed a 14-page "warning notice" to the district court in which he claimed that the court and judge were "imposing provisions of a contract counter to public morals." He attached a copy of the court's [*7] January 14 show cause order, demonstrating that he was well aware of the order. Melick failed to appear for the February 14 show cause hearing. The government asked for a bench warrant for Melick's arrest. The court issued a bench warrant on February 15, 2011. Melick, however, has not turned himself in and continues to evade arrest.

In June of 2011, ten individuals who were not parties or counsel in this case attempted to file a "Petition for Redress of Grievances in Support of Motion to Dismiss" and an "Order for Dismissal with Prejudice" on Melick's behalf. On June 21, 2011, the court rejected the papers. The order that rejected the filings stated that Melick was subject to an outstanding bench warrant for his arrest and that he remained at large.

Melick then sent the same "Petition" with the same third-party signatures back to the court, along with a cover page and a purported verification signed by him and notarized. The court again rejected the attempted filing in a June 28, 2011, order. The order, which directed the clerk of court to "return those documents to Charles Gregory Melick, along with a copy of this order, to the return address provided on the mailing envelope," also [*8] specifically noted that "a bench warrant was issued for his arrest on February 15, 2011."

Melick filed his currently pending motion to dismiss on July 15, 2011.

Seems to be that Melick is getting more strident, never a good sign, and that he has enablers or supporters out there as well.

[webhick]

If you search the Conway Daily Sun you can find more information about Gregory.

I attempted to do a search for Charles Gregory Melick, but the stupid search box cuts me off at 20 characters, so I searched for Gregory Melick because he's been using the initial for Charles.

He wrote an editorial called Melick Column: If the Rule of Law Fails and then someone wrote a letter to the editor requesting to see more information like that because it made people think.

Then, I happened upon some controversy with Sheriff Christopher Conley. I want to read more about this before elaborating, but Melick seems to really like this guy and he allegedly refused to detain Melick who was at the time a fugitive and Conley possibly made threats against another public official. Like I said, I need to read more about this.

[webhick]

In the Meyers Mystery Solved there is an interesting account of Conley refusing to detain Melick. I've quoted the applicable part of the story, which is far from being the whole article:

The relationship between Meyers and Conley soured in March of 2011. Meyers was at odds with Conley for refusing to detain Melick who was wanted by the U.S. Marshal on federal civil warrant.
Meyers also wrote up a detailed account of the incident with Melick which occurred on March 2, 2011. Meyers said he was driving through Freedom when he received a call from the sheriff's administrative assistant Teresa Shackford. Shackford told him that Conley was in a meeting with Melick. She believed the U.S. Marshal may have a warrant for Melick's arrest.
The U.S. Marshal's Service confirmed there was a warrant for Melick. A deputy marshal asked Shackford to have the sheriff's office detain Melick until the U.S. Marshal service could arrive. The deputy marshal's estimated time of arrival was 30 minutes.
The sheriff's secretarial staff were nervous about giving the information to the sheriff. Meyers agreed to tell Conley the news about the warrant.
"I told her not to go into the room," wrote Meyers referring to the administrative assistant.
According to Meyers' documentation, members of the secretarial staff were crying when he arrived back at the office. One secretary told Meyers that Conley let Melick walk out the door and that Conley had been banging on the locked door of the civil service room. Conley demanded to know if Shackford was "inserting herself" into the situation. Meyers said he confronted Conley for not detaining Melick.
"He said all future items that deal with the U.S. Marshal's Office or Mr. Melick were to be directed to him," stated Meyers. "During the time I was in Conley's office, he was on a phone call with a subject I believed to be the chief deputy U.S. Marshal. Conley became very agitated at the person and said he did not know there was an active warrant for Melick and he decided not to detain Melick."
According to Meyers, Conley told the person on the other end of the phone line that the sheriff's office would only take action after having "detailed coordination" with U.S. Marshal David Cargill.
Conley then told Meyers that the case against Melick would never stand up in court and that the U.S. Marshal's previous attempt to serve Melick in February 2011 was done incorrectly.
In a recent phone interview, Cargill confirmed that he wanted the sheriff's office to detain Melick.
"When my deputy showed up, Melick was gone," said Cargill adding in all his years of law enforcement no agency has ever denied such a request.
Eventually, the U.S. Marshal's Service was able to arrest Melick and bring him to federal court. The IRS was investigating Melick's alleged tax liability in 2003.
Conley denied having official notice of the warrant until days after his meeting with Melick. According to Conley, Meyers did call to tell him there was a warrant for Melick's arrest. However, Conley said Meyers didn't know what the warrant was for or who issued it. Conley said at the time there was no way he could verify the warrant which had not been entered in the National Crime Information Center.
Further, Conley said he had a pre-existing agreement with Cargill about how they should handle Melick and other county residents.
"State law enforcement is prohibited by law from serving or detaining for federal civil warrants," said Conley.
On Feb. 3, 2011, the U.S. Marshal's Service attempted to serve Melick at the Carroll County Sheriff's Office. The notice said Melick must appear in federal court on Feb. 14, 2011 to show cause for why he shouldn't be held in civil contempt for not following the court order of Aug. 6, 2010 regarding an IRS summons.
Conley described what happened on Feb. 3 in a memo to the U.S. District Court Clerk James Starr.
"The summons appears to be irregular and defective," wrote Conley. "Charles Gregory Melick did not take it in hand; the documents were dropped on the floor. I recovered the summons later. I have enclosed the summons and forwarded the documents from the public record."
Conley said he was confident Melick would appear in court if properly served.
Because Melick didn't show up in court in Feb. 14, 2011 the court issued a warrant for his arrest the next day.
United States District Judge Joseph DiClerico Jr. ruled that Melick had been properly served in Feb. 3, 2011.
In October, Melick told the judge that the service in Feb. 3, 2011 was flawed because the documentation lacked the clerk of court's seal and signature. Melick said Conley found the documentation to be deficient and it was the marshal who threw it on the floor.
"I was simply asking for due process repeatedly and it was nothing more than that," said Melick to DiClerico. "I wasn't being contumacious or difficult."
DiClerico replied that Melick was wrong about the need for the seal and signature of the clerk.

From what it sounds like, Conley is drinking roughly the same brand of koolaid as Melick.

[Gregg]

It looks like he's giving the kind of financial advice only idiots, lunatics and Harvey could believe in....

CONWAY – REDPILL Seminars and KLEOSSUM advisers, a Tech Village firm that offers investment advice and consulting for individuals and retirement plans, are teaming up to present weekly seminars on pressing money matters.
KLEOSSUM president and CEO David Brochu along with REDPILL Seminars' founder Gregory Melick will lead an interactive financial forum supplemented by films and videos in the new "Dare to Prepare" weekly series.

If the titles of the films don't give away the whackadoosie viewpoint, maybe the price of admission will...

The cost for each event, including breakfast, is $1 in any denomination of pre-1965 U.S. coinage (one dollar coin, four quarter coins, etc). Pre-1965 coins can be purchased at Valley Jewellers at 1

http://www.conwaydailysun.com/index.php ... re-seminar

[webhick]

Melick published another editorial, this time about the sheriff and his side of the story. It's called "A sheriff accountable to his oath, the people and the law"

He also appears to operate something called REDPILL seminars. He and a certified financial planner by the name of David Brochu are holding "Dare to Prepare" seminars in Conway! If only I had known sooner, I could have been treated to such gems as "Plunder: The Crime of Our Time," "Money as Debt" and "The End of the Road: How Money Became Worthless!" Oh boo.

ETA: Nutty Drizzle stole my thunder.

[Gregg]

I'm actually quite disturbed, for those who don't know, my personalized license plate for the Boss is "RED PILL" and I'm afraid that if I ever take it to New Hampshire I'll be mistaken for this nutjob.