The Couple That Lives Together Frivs Together

[The Observer]

CHRISTOPHER CHAPMAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent-Appellee.

PAMELA J. CHAPMAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent-Appellee.

DO NOT PUBLISH

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Appeals for Review of a Decision of the U.S. Tax Court

(October 27, 2017)

Before HULL, JULIE CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher and Pamela J. Chapman (collectively, "the Chapmans"), proceeding pro se, appeal the Tax Court's grants of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on their petitions for review of determinations from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") Office of Appeals. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The IRS issued the Chapmans, husband and wife taxpayers, notices of intent to levy and notices of federal tax lien for the years 1999 to 2004. The notices informed the Chapmans of their right to collection-due-process ("CDP") hearings regarding the proposed collection actions. The Chapmans submitted CDP-hearing requests, arguing that the notices of intent to levy were based on computer calculations that the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") repeatedly had determined to be unreliable. The IRS Office of Appeals rejected the Chapmans' requests because they had raised arguments deemed to be frivolous.

The Chapmans filed petitions with the Tax Court to dispute the Office of Appeals' determinations. They argued that the letters denying their requests for hearings were insufficient because they had failed to explain why the IRS believed their arguments were frivolous. The Commissioner moved for summary judgment against the Chapmans, contending that the Chapmans' arguments sought only to delay or impede the administration of their taxes and were therefore barred. The Commissioner argued there were no genuine issues of material fact because the Chapmans' general attacks on the reliability of the IRS's system of calculating tax liability, rather than specific allegations of error in their tax assessments, were not reviewable.

In response, the Chapmans argued that the IRS's letter denying their CDP-hearing requests failed to explain why their arguments were frivolous. They argued that the Office of Appeals officers assigned to their cases had not asserted that the IRS's computer calculations were accurate and that the IRS had failed to provide any documentation supporting the accuracy of its computer programs generally or of the calculations made in their cases. They also reiterated their assertion that the GAO repeatedly had questioned the reliability of the IRS's records.

The Tax Court granted the Commissioner's motions for summary judgment, noting that the Chapmans had not challenged any specific aspect of their tax assessments. The court also noted that the Chapmans had only challenged the amount or existence of their tax liabilities but that such challenges were not proper in their administrative or tax-court proceedings. The Tax Court denied the Chapmans' motions for reconsideration.

On appeal, the Chapmans raise four arguments, all of which they concede were not raised before the Tax Court or the Office of Appeals. First, the Chapmans argue that their notices of deficiency were invalid because federal-income taxes are only applied to U.S. citizens by regulation, rather than an act of Congress, in violation of the Sixteenth Amendment. Second, they argue that the IRS violated 26 U.S.C. § 83(a) by taxing them on their wages without allowing them to adjust their gross income by deducting the fair-market value of their labor. Third, they argue that 26 U.S.C. § 1, which imposes the federal-income tax, is void for vagueness because the tax code is unclear and misleading as to individuals' tax liabilities. Finally, they argue that their notices of deficiency were invalid because the IRS could sanction them for failing to pay the deficiencies by revoking their passports without allowing them to challenge provisions of the tax code without being financially sanctioned.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment. Roberts v. Comm'r, 329 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2003). Issues not raised before the Tax Court are not properly before us on appeal. Stubbs v. Comm'r, 797 F.2d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we may consider an issue not raised in a lower court if: (1) the issue involves a pure question of law and refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice; (2) the party had no opportunity to raise the issue previously; (3) the interest of substantial justice is at stake; (4) the proper resolution is beyond any doubt; or (5) the issue presents significant questions of general impact or of great public concern. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004).

The Chapmans concede that "this appeal does not concern the issues presented in Tax Court, but rather raises only new issues." Appellants' Br. 2. Before the Tax Court, the Chapmans had argued that their notices of deficiency were unenforceable because the IRS's calculations were unreliable.1Link to the text of the note Here, however, the Chapmans raise four arguments that were not raised before the Tax Court or the Office of Appeals. Additionally, the Chapmans have not shown why it would be a miscarriage of justice to decline to address their claims or why they could not have raised these arguments before the Tax Court and appealed any resulting sanctions order along with the merits of their claims.2Link to the text of the note See Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1332. We therefore decline to address their arguments for the first time on appeal. See Stubbs, 797 F.2d at 938. Accordingly, the Chapmans have not properly raised any argument that the Tax Court's grants of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner were erroneous.

AFFIRMED.

Footnotes:

/1/ By failing to raise this argument on appeal, the Chapmans have abandoned it. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.").

/2/ The IRS may impose penalties on any person who submits an argument that previously has been deemed frivolous or reflects a desire to delay or impede tax collection. 26 U.S.C. § 6702(b). We review the Tax Court's imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion. See Roberts, 329 F.3d at 1229.

[LaVidaRoja]

No sanctions! VICTORY!!

[jcolvin2]

They're back!
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InternetOrde ... 8&Todays=Y

UNITED STATES TAX COURT
WASHINGTON, DC 20217

CHRISTOPHER R. CHAPMAN & )
PAMELA J. CHAPMAN, )
)
Petitioners, ) CT
v. ) Docket No. 3007-18.
CIR, )
)
Respondent )
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On February 12, 2018, petitioners filed a petition with the Court indicating
that they were bringing both a deficiency case under section 6213(a) and a
collection review case under sections 6320 and/or 6330.1 The petition states in
relevant part: "Never received Notice of Deficiency(s) and never received Notices
of Determinations subsequent to any returns filed voluntarily by Petitioners during
years 1999-2004."

On March 9, 2018, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction and a separate Motion to Impose a Penalty under I.R.C. section 6673.
On March 21, 2018, respondent filed a Motion to Permit Levy.

On March 23, 2018, petitioners filed separate Responses in opposition to
respondent's motion to dismiss and motion to impose a penalty. On March 30,
2018, petitioners filed a Response in opposition to respondent's motion to permit
levy.

Background

Petitioners have a long history of failing to file Federal income tax returns, and in many instances the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has processed substitutes for return under the authority prescribed in section 6020(b). Petitioners are no strangers to the Court--they have both now filed three petitions with the Court concerning (in relevant part) their Federal income tax liabilities for the taxable years 1999 to 2004.

I. Docket Nos. 30014-15L and 30031-15L

Mr. Chapman filed a petition with the Court at docket No. 30014-15L challenging a notice of determination concerning a proposed collection action for the taxable years 1999 through 2004, and Mrs. Chapman filed a petition with the Court at docket No. 30031-15L challenging a notice of determination regarding a proposed collection action for the taxable years 1999 through 2001. The Court granted the Commissioner's motions for summary judgment in those cases, noting in the process that petitioners were barred from challenging the existence or amount of their tax liabilities for the years in question consistent with the provisions of section 6330(c)(2)(B).2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Court's decisions by way of an unpublished opinion, see Chapman v. Commissioner, 715 F. App'x 885 (11th Cir. 2017), and those decisions are now final. See sec. 7481(a)(2)(A).

II. Docket Nos. 22516-17 and 22520-17

Mrs. Chapman and Mr. Chapman filed petitions with the Court at docket Nos. 22516-17 and 22520-17, respectively, indicating that they were seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction to redetermine a tax deficiency and to review a collection action and alleging that they had never received notices of deficiency or notices of determination for the taxable years 1993 through 2017.

The Commissioner ultimately filed motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in both cases informing the Court that petitioners had no objection to the Court granting the motions to dismiss. In Mrs. Chapman's case, the parties agreed that no notices of deficiency or notices of determination had been issued to her for the taxable years 1993 to 1998 and 2002 to 2017, that the petition was not timely filed as to notices of deficiency issued to her for the taxable years 1999 through 2001, and that notices of determination issued to her for the taxable years 1999 through 2001 had been adjudicated by the Court at docket No. 30031-15L and affirmed on appeal. In Mr. Chapman's case, the parties agreed that the petition was not timely filed as to notices of deficiency issued to him for the taxable years 1993 through 2004, that no notices of deficiency were issued to him for the taxable years 2005 through 2017, that no notices of determination were issued to him for the taxable years 1993 through 1998 and 2005 through 2017, and that notices of determination for the taxable years 1999 through 2004 had been adjudicated by the Court at docket No. 30014-15L and affirmed on appeal. The Court issued Orders of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction granting the Commissioner's motions to dismiss, and those orders are now final. See sec. 7481(a)(1).

III. Docket No. 3007-18

As noted above, the petition in the present case again refers to the taxable years 1999 to 2004 (years in issue). In their response to respondent's motion to dismiss, petitioners acknowledge that they have disputed the taxable years 1999 to 2004 in previous actions before the Court, but allege that they have never challenged the assessed income tax deficiencies on the ground that they derive from substitutes for return prepared by the IRS pursuant to section 6020(b). Specifically, petitioners assert they did not file income tax returns for the years in
issue and, consequently, there can be no tax deficiencies.

Petitioners also object to respondent's motion to impose a penalty and motion to permit levy. They acknowledge that they have been warned about the possibility of sanctions if they continue to institute proceedings containing frivolous or groundless positions or undertake actions to cause delay, but they deny that their current petition is frivolous or that it was filed for an improper purpose. In their responses to each of respondent's motions, petitioners reiterate that they are not liable for income tax deficiencies arising from substitutes for return prepared and processed by respondent under section 6020(b).

Discussion

I. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

Although respondent correctly points out that the Court's jurisdiction typically depends on a determination by the Commissioner and a timely filed petition, see secs. 6213(a) and 6330(d), we need not focus on those requirements in this case. Rather, we look to the doctrine of res judicata which bars repetitious suits on the same cause of action. See Koprowski v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 54, 59-60 (2012). This doctrine serves a dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating the same cause of action and promoting judicial economy by preventing unnecessary or redundant litigation. Meier v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.
273, 282 (1988). In short, once a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on the
merits of a cause of action, the parties may thereafter be barred from relitigating
every matter which was offered in the prior suit, as well as any matter which might have been offered in the prior suit. Koprowski v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. at 60; see Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948).

The doctrine of res judicata applies in respect of Federal tax litigation. As the Supreme Court explained: "Income taxes are levied on an annual basis. Each year is the origin of a new liability and of a separate cause of action. Thus, if a claim of liability or nonliability relating to a particular tax year is litigated, a judgment on the merits is res judicata as to any subsequent proceeding involving the same claim and the same tax year." Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 598.

As discussed above, Mr. Chapman previously challenged a proposed collection action for the taxable years 1999 through 2004 at docket No. 30014- 15L, and Mrs. Chapman previously challenged a proposed collection action for the taxable years 1999 through 2001 at docket No. 30031-15L. The Court granted the Commissioner's motions for summary judgment in those cases and sustained the proposed collection actions. In the process the Court noted that petitioners were barred from challenging the existence or amount of their tax liabilities for the years in issue consistent with the provisions of section 6330(c)(2)(B). The Court's decisions in those cases are final. Consequently, we will dismiss this case on the ground that petitioners are barred by res judicata from challenging either the existence or amount of their tax liabilities for the years 1999 through 2004 or the
collection actions sustained by the Court at docket Nos. 30014-15L and 30031-
15L.

II. Respondent's Motion to Impose a Penalty Under I.R.C. Section 6673

Section 6673(a) authorizes the Court to require a taxpayer to pay a penalty up to $25,000 whenever it appears that proceedings have been instituted or maintained primarily for delay or that the taxpayer's position in such proceedings is frivolous or groundless. Petitioners argue that the Court should not impose a penalty because they have raised a novel question as to whether they are properly characterized as "taxpayers" subject to Federal income tax where they have not filed Federal income tax returns and their tax liabilities arise from substitutes for
return made by the Secretary under section 6020(b).3

The Court informed petitioners in their collection cases at docket Nos. 30014-15L and 30031-15L that section 6330(c)(2)(B) barred them from challenging the existence or amount of their tax liabilities for the years in issue. Petitioners were reminded of that fact again in connection with the agreed dismissals of the petitions that they had filed at docket Nos. 22516-17 and 22520- 17. Against this backdrop, it is clear to the Court that petitioners' latest attempt to challenge their tax liabilities represents a delay tactic and that their argument amounts to nothing more than time-worn tax protestor rhetoric that is both frivolous and groundless. Addressing this matter has resulted in a needless waste of the Court's resources. Accordingly, the Court will grant respondent's motion and impose a penalty of $3,000 on petitioners pursuant to section 6673(a).

III. Respondent's Motion to Permit Levy

As discussed above, the Court sustained respondent's proposed levy actions against petitioners for the years in issue at docket Nos. 30014-15L and 30031-15L, and the decisions in those cases are now final. See sec. 7481(a)(2)(A). Because the Court concludes that the present action is barred by res judicata, the Court sees no impediment to respondent proceeding with the levy actions previously sustained at docket Nos. 30014-15L and 30031-15L. Accordingly, respondent's motion to permit levy is denied as moot.

Upon due consideration and for cause, it is

ORDERED that respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
filed March 9, 2018, is granted in that this case is dismissed. It is further

ORDERED that respondent's Motion to Impose a Penalty Under I.R.C.
Section 6673(a), filed March 9, 2018, is granted and a penalty of $3,000 is
imposed on petitioners pursuant to section 6673(a). It is further

ORDERED that respondent's Motion to Permit Levy, filed March 21, 2018,
is denied as moot.

(Signed) Daniel A. Guy, Jr.
Special Trial Judge
ENTERED: JUL 19 2018


¹ Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to sections of the Internal
Revenue Code, as amended and in effect for the taxable years in issue, and Rules
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 The Court noted that petitioners did not deny receipt of relevant notices of
deficiency referenced in the Commissioner's motions or otherwise challenge a
specific entry on any of the attachments to those motions.

3 Sec. 6020(b)(1) expressly authorizes the Secretary to make a return "f any person fails to make any return required by any internal revenue law or regulation
made thereunder at the time prescribed therefor, or makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return". Sec. 6020(b)(2) further provides that "[any return so made and subscribed by the Secretary shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes."

[Famspear]

[ . . . ] Upon due consideration and for cause, it is

ORDERED that respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
filed March 9, 2018, is granted in that this case is dismissed. It is further

ORDERED that respondent's Motion to Impose a Penalty Under I.R.C.
Section 6673(a), filed March 9, 2018, is granted and a penalty of $3,000 is
imposed on petitioners pursuant to section 6673(a). It is further

ORDERED that respondent's Motion to Permit Levy, filed March 21, 2018,
is denied as moot.

Kah-ching!

And thanks for playing!

[Judge Roy Bean]

Specifically, petitioners assert they did not file income tax returns for the years in
issue and, consequently, there can be no tax deficiencies.

I don't know that I've seen that one before.

[Gregg]

Specifically, petitioners assert they did not file income tax returns for the years in
issue and, consequently, there can be no tax deficiencies.

I don't know that I've seen that one before.

Its a brilliant legal strategy where you contest a civil action by admitting to a criminal act.

[notorial dissent]

Specifically, petitioners assert they did not file income tax returns for the years in
issue and, consequently, there can be no tax deficiencies.

I don't know that I've seen that one before.

Its a brilliant legal strategy where you contest a civil action by admitting to a criminal act.

Now be nice. This pair ain't exactly rocket surgeons. Yon have to work with what you've got, which in this case ain't much!!

[Burnaby49]

Specifically, petitioners assert they did not file income tax returns for the years in
issue and, consequently, there can be no tax deficiencies.

I don't know that I've seen that one before.

Its a brilliant legal strategy where you contest a civil action by admitting to a criminal act.

Reminds me of our local legal mastermind Dean Kory who once pleaded guilty to a criminal charge so he could get out of jail on time served and get to work on his defense on the charge he'd just pleaded guilty to.

[notorial dissent]

Scary thought, but true geniuses of a feather or something.

[Cpt Banjo]

I don't know that I've seen that one before.

Its a brilliant legal strategy where you contest a civil action by admitting to a criminal act.

Reminds me of our local legal mastermind Dean Kory who once pleaded guilty to a criminal charge so he could get out of jail on time served and get to work on his defense on the charge he'd just pleaded guilty to.

Or the guy who was convicted of murdering his parents and who pleaded for mercy on the grounds he was an orphan.

[Dr. Caligari]

Specifically, petitioners assert they did not file income tax returns for the years in
issue and, consequently, there can be no tax deficiencies.

I don't know that I've seen that one before.

Isn't it just a variation on the decades-old "taxes are voluntary" theory?

[notorial dissent]

Specifically, petitioners assert they did not file income tax returns for the years in
issue and, consequently, there can be no tax deficiencies.

I don't know that I've seen that one before.

Isn't it just a variation on the decades-old "taxes are voluntary" theory?

It certainly could be, although I suspect a more proximal cause of stupidity. I can't tell from the documents if they offered any kind of defense other than they just didn't file. I can't decide where they fit on the TP scale, but I would say from this, not very.

[noblepa]

It sure would be nice if I could avoid paying income tax by simply not filing a return.

How does that work, exactly? If I file a return, but don't disclose all my income or miscalculate my tax liability, the IRS can come after me for a deficiency, but if there is no return at all, then there can be no deficiency?

Amazing!